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“The ability to take in information and 
make it one’s own by processing it, 
restructuring it, and then presenting it in 
a form so that it can be understood by 
others (or by oneself at a later point) is 
one of those ‘basic skills’ that is useful 
throughout life” (Cohen, Kim, Tan, & 
Winkelmes, 2013).  
THE FACTS 
Studies show 11% of a lecture is typically 
captured in a first-year college student’s 
notes. 
 
Even the best students only capture 75%
of a lecture. 
 
 
     (Kiewra, 1985) 
 
The quality of notes taken 
during a lecture has a 
direct relationship to 







“Researchers have found that if 
important information is contained 
in notes, it has a 34% chance of 
being remembered. Information 
not found in notes only has a 5% 
chance of being remembered” 
(Howe, 1970 as cited in Longman 
& Atkinson,  1999). 
Myth: “I just have to copy what my 
teacher writes on the board.” 
 
Reality: Not everything written on 
the board is important. 
BEFORE CLASS… 
- Review notes from other classes 
and readings. 
 
- Clarify unclear points. 
Successful 
Note-Taking 
A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 
DURING CLASS… 
- Make notes easy to read. 
- Underline key words.  
- Connect important thoughts. 
- Listen for key words/cues. 
 “The most important point…” 
 “The three ideas…” 
- Request handouts of complicated 
diagrams. 
- Leave a space if you miss something. 
 
THE FINDINGS 
The Good News 
 
“Studies show that during a 
20-minute lecture, you 
retain approximately 70% 
of what is presented in the 
first 10 minutes.” 
 
The Bad News 
 
“You only retain 20% of 
what is presented in the 





CAN YOU RECALL? 
After hearing a lecture, studies show the 
average student is able to recall: 
 
50% after 1 day 
35% after 1 week 
20% after 2 weeks 
 
Taking notes is critical! 
AFTER CLASS… 
- Within 24 hours, review, clarify, 
and elaborate. 
 
- Do it again a week later, and then




Having trouble taking 
notes during class? 
 
Talk to your instructor. 
Socrates – Historical Background and Key Themes 
Life as a Divine Mission 
  
Image 1: Socrates ("Socrates" by Ian W Scott is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 ) 
 
Socrates (469 – 399 BCE) was the first philosopher in Ancient Greece to think critically about 
how people should live.  In other words, he was the first serious philosophical ethicist in the west 
and the first to reflect seriously about the good life.  His thought and his life are inspirational; as 
the great Roman stateman and orator Cicero put it: “All philosophers think of themselves and 
want others to think of them as followers of Socrates.” 
 
Socrates wrote nothing.  What we know of him is based on the writings of his great student and 
lifelong admirer Plato and to a lesser extent a comedic play by Aristophanes and the work of a 
historian named Xenophon.  Evidence from all three sources suggests that Socrates was very 
unusual.  He was poor and spent most of his time in public places engaging people in 
philosophical conversations.  He was ugly, walked around barefoot with a swagger or waddle, 
and he was not bothered by extremes of heat and cold.  Apparently, he could drink a lot of 
alcohol without getting drunk.  He had three sons by his wife Xanthippe.  Socrates also had 
unusual religious beliefs.  He claimed a childhood friend named Chaerephon had once asked the 
priestess at Delphi if anyone was wiser than Socrates.  (Delphi is the site of a shrine to Apollo, 
Greek god of light, intelligence, and the arts.) The ambiguous reply Chaerephon received was 
that “no one is wiser.”  Socrates also thought he was guided by a daimonion, a sort of divine 
“voice” or a “sign.”   
 
Socrates was put to death for his philosophical views.  The speech he gave in defense of himself 
at his trial is reconstructed in The Apology, written by Plato.  Evidence from a different Platonic 
dialogue, Crito, suggests Socrates could have escaped from jail had he wanted, by allowing 
wealthy friends to bribe the prison guard.  Socrates refused the offer, arguing it would be wrong 
for him to escape, and so he was executed.  A different Platonic dialogue, Euthyphro, portrays 
Socrates’ typical manner of philosophical conversation.  By embarrassing Euthyphro,  the 
dialogue shows why Socrates may have become so despised by wealthy and powerful people in 
Athens. 
 
Some brief historical and political context is relevant.  In Socrates’ youth, the city-state of 
Athens was prosperous, democratic, and its culture was vibrant.  This changed following the 
long and difficult Peloponnesian War with rival Sparta.  Socrates apparently served admirably in 
the war and saved the life of Alcibiades, an Athenian general.  Sparta finally conquered Athens 
in 404 B.C., five years before Socrates was executed. After the war, Sparta demanded that 
Athens’ democratic assembly be replaced by the so-called “Thirty Tyrants,” a council composed 
of three members from each of Athens’ ten tribes.  The council confiscated property from 
wealthy Athenians and killed some 1,500 political opponents.  They were replaced by of “Board 
of Ten” which instituted a wave of democratic reforms, including amnesty for past crimes. 
Despite the reforms, many jurors at Socrates’ trial may have been in a mood to find scapegoats 




1. Virtue is Knowledge 
 
Socrates is well-known for various paradoxical sayings: one of Socrates’ more puzzling ideas is 
his belief that virtue is knowledge.  Most people nowadays think of ethical or moral virtues 
(excellences) as character states, not a mere mental or cognitive state like knowledge.  The 
striking implication of Socrates’ identification of virtue with knowledge is that he thinks when 
someone does ethical wrong, he or she must have been acting in ignorance.  In other words, he 
believes one cannot both really know that something is wrong and do it anyway.   
 
Why would anyone think this?  Socrates’ view makes more sense when we notice two additional 
background assumptions he makes but does not mention specifically.  The first assumption is 
that everyone always does and desires what he or she thinks is overall best for him- or herself.  
The second assumption is that what is virtuous, righteous and just is what is overall best for each 
individual to do.  (Notice how striking this idea is: most people typically think that the right thing 
to do is often quite different from the thing that best serves their interests.)  From these two 
assumptions, it follows logically that any action that is not for the best must be the result of 
ignorance. People do the wrong thing not because even though they may not think it’s the right 
thing to do, it’s still not what they want to.  (Put differently: They do what they want to do rather 
than what they know to be the right thing.)  Rather, Socrates’ view is that they fail to do the right 
thing because they are ignorant about what is really best for them to do, or what it is genuinely in 
their interest to do.      
 
2. The Unexamined Life is Not Worth Living 
 
Another famous Socratic claim is the idea that the unexamined life is not worth living.  On the 
face of it, this seems false – cannot a relatively simple life, full of enjoyment but little intellectual 
activity or reflection, be worth living?  After all, many higher animals seem incapable of 
thinking about the meaning of life or anything like this, but as long as their lives are mostly free 
from pain and suffering and include food and decent living conditions, are not these lives “worth 
living”? 
 
To make sense of Socrates’ thought, realize that as he’s thinking about it, a life of pleasure is not 
a worthy life for a human being to live.  To live a worthy life, one must do worthy and 
worthwhile things, things befitting a rational being.  One must live virtuously, and virtue, 
remember, is possible only with knowledge.  If we assume further, along with Socrates, that only 
someone who subjects his or her beliefs to critical scrutiny – makes arguments for and against 
them, tries to find their weak points, and allows them to be questioned by others – has genuine 
knowledge, it follows that one can live a life worthy of a human only when one tests his or 
beliefs by serious questioning and examination.    
 
3.  It is better to suffer injustice (or harm) than to do it.  
 
Socrates seems to have cared very little about the things that most people care about and 
structure their lives around.  He cares little about pleasure, fame, or money.  He does not care 
about his reputation, status, or political power.  For him, the only thing that really matters is the 
“state of his soul,” that is, his moral character.  Suffering injustice means a loss of pleasure, or 
property, or even loss of one’s life.  But none of these things are as important as virtue.  Virtue 
cannot be taken away by the wrongs others may inflict on us.  Consequently, it is better to be the 
victim of wrongdoing than to do wrong oneself.  Rather than “stick and stones can break my 
bones but words will never hurt me,” for Socrates it’s “wrongdoing and ignorance can harm my 
soul, but being the victim of injustice can never hurt me!”   
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1 The agora was the market in Athens.  Socrates was said to spend a lot of his time there. 













When	 I	 heard	 the	 answer,	 I	 said	 to	myself,	What	 can	 the	 god	mean?	 and	what	 is	 the	
interpretation	of	his	riddle?	for	I	know	that	I	have	no	wisdom,	small	or	great.	What	then	can	
he	mean	when	he	says	that	I	am	the	wisest	of	men?	And	yet	he	is	a	god,	and	cannot	lie;	that	
would	be	against	his	nature.	After	 long	consideration,	 I	 thought	of	a	method	of	trying	the	
question.	I	reflected	that	if	I	could	only	find	someone	wiser	than	myself,	then	I	might	go	to	
the	god	with	a	refutation	in	my	hand.	I	should	say	to	him,	'Here	is	someone	who	is	wiser	than	
























































































doing	anything	he	 is	doing	 right	or	wrong—acting	 the	part	of	 a	 good	person	or	of	 a	bad	







mission	of	 searching	 into	myself	 and	other	men,	 I	were	 to	 leave	my	post	 through	 fear	of	
death,	or	any	other	fear.	That	would	be	strange.	and	I	might	justly	be	arraigned	in	court	for	

























































































There	 is	 Crito,	 who	 is	 of	 the	 same	 age	 and	 of	 the	 same	 deme	with	myself,	 and	 there	 is	
Critobulus	his	son,	whom	I	also	see.	…Adeimantus	the	son	of	Ariston,	whose	brother	Plato	is	












asking	 a	 favor	 of	 a	 judge,	 and	 thus	 procuring	 an	 acquittal,	 instead	 of	 informing	 and	
convincing	him.	For	his	duty	is,	not	to	make	a	present	of	justice,	but	to	give	judgment;	and	he	
has	 sworn	 that	 he	will	 judge	 according	 to	 the	 laws,	 and	 not	 according	 to	 his	 own	 good	
pleasure.	Do	not	then	require	me	to	do	what	I	consider	dishonorable	and	impious	and	wrong,	
especially	now,	when	I	am	being	tried	for	impiety	on	the	indictment	of	Meletus….	For	I	do	











that	 he	 may	 instruct	 you?	 There	 can	 be	 no	 reward	 so	 fitting	 as	 maintenance	 in	 the	
Prytaneum,	a	reward	which	he	deserves	far	more	than	the	citizen	who	has	won	the	prize	at	
Olympia	in	the	horse	or	chariot	race,	whether	the	chariots	were	drawn	by	two	horses	or	by	













3 Socrates is proposing that he is punished by receiving free meals for life in the Prytaneum, which was a sort of 












































But	 if	 death	 is	 the	 journey	 to	 another	 place	where	 all	 the	 dead	 abide,	what	 good	 can	 be	
greater	than	this?	Above	all,	I	shall	then	be	able	to	continue	my	search	into	true	and	false	
knowledge	 in	 this	world	and	also	 in	 the	next.	Then	 I	may	 find	out	who	 is	wise,	 and	who	
merely	pretends	to	be	wise,	and	who	is	not.	What	would	not	a	man	give	to	be	able	to	examine	
the	leader	of	the	great	Trojan	expedition,	or	Odysseus	or	Sisyphus,	or	countless	others!	What	
infinite	 delight	 would	 there	 be	 in	 conversing	 with	 them	 and	 asking	 them	 questions!	 In	
another	world	they	do	not	put	a	man	to	death	for	asking	questions.	
Be	of	good	cheer	about	death,	and	know	of	a	certainty,	that	no	evil	can	happen	to	a	good	
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Study Guide: 1. Apology 
 
What are the accusations (legal charges) brought against Socrates? 
 
Socrates grudgingly admits that he has “a certain sort of wisdom.”  What sort of wisdom is this, 
exactly, and what kind of wisdom does Socrates contrast it with?   
 
What does the oracle at Delphi say about Socrates?  Why does this surprise him, and what does 
he do to see whether or not the oracle is true?  What does he end up concluding about his 
wisdom?  
 
What does Socrates take to be his divine mission, undertaken in “devotion to the god”?  On a 
day-to-day level, what kind of activities does Socrates engage in to fulfill it?   
 
What are we supposed to make of Meletus’ testimony? 
 
Socrates cites what to him is a core moral conviction: “wherever a man’s place is, whether the 
place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought 
to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace.”  
What examples from his own life does he describe to show how he has followed the principle?  
What is the relevance of this principle for his divine mission? 
 
What does Socrates say he “scolds” people for caring about?  What does he think they should 
care about?  How do you suppose people react to being scolded like this?   
 
At one point, Socrates alludes to one of the famous yet paradoxical views he held: he says a bad 
person cannot (by his bad deeds) hurt another.  That is, one can be injured not by being the 
victim of others’ wrongdoing, but only by doing bad deeds oneself.   What does this view 
presuppose about the nature of injury and well-being?  Is this view at all plausible?  It seems 
quite contrary to most peoples’ ideas about injury and well-being.  
 
Socrates says he is a gadfly God has attached to the state.  What does he mean by this? 
 
At one point Socrates says: “from virtue comes money and every good of man, public as well as 
private.  That is my teaching and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a 
mischievous person.”  But then on the next page he says: “Whether he runs out to be a bad man 
or a good one, neither result can be attributed to me, because I never taught or pressed to teach 
him anything….”  These two claims seem to contradict each other.  Is there any way to reconcile 
them?   
 
Socrates, upon being found guilty, is required to propose a fitting punishment.  He proposes free 
meals for life at the Prytaneum, which is the same as the reward given to Olympic heroes.  What 
should we make of this?  Is he serious? 
 
Socrates, upon contemplating his impending death, hypothesizes that death is one of two things.  
What are these two things?   
 
Nearing the end of the speech, he claims that no evil can happen to a good person, either in life 
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Socrates (So): Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Or isn't it still 
early? 
Crito (Cr): It certainly is. 
So: About what time is it? 
Cr: Just before dawn.  
So: I'm surprised that the prison guard was willing to let you in.  
Cr: He is used to me by now, Socrates, since I visit here so often. 
And besides, I have done him a good turn.  
So: Did you get here just now or a while ago?  
Cr: Quite a while ago.  
So: So how come you didn't you wake me up immediately, but sat 
by in silence?  
Cr: By Zeus, no, Socrates. I wish I myself were not so sleepless and 
sorrowful, and so I have been marveling at you, when I see how peacefully 
you've been sleeping. I deliberately didn't wake you so that you would 
pass the time as peacefully as possible. Even before now I have often 
thought you fortunate in your demeanor towards your entire life, and 
even more so in your present misfortune, so easily and calmly do you bear 
it. 
So: It's because it would be out of tune, Crito, to be angry, at my 
age, if I must finally die. 
Cr: And yet others of your age, Socrates, have been caught up in 
such misfortunes, but their age does not prevent them from being angry at 
their fate. 
So: That's true. But why did you come so early?  
Cr: Carrying troubling news, Socrates—though not for you, as it 
appears—but deeply troubling for me and all of your friends, and I, it 
seems, am among the most heavily burdened. 
So: What is it? Has the ship arrived from Delos,* upon whose arrival 
I must die? 
Cr: No, it hasn't arrived, but it looks like it will arrive today, based 
on the report of some people who have come from Sounion* and who left 
when it was there. It's clear from this that it will arrive today, and you will 
have to end your life tomorrow, Socrates. 
So: May it be for the best, Crito. If this pleases the gods, so be it. 
However, I don't think it will come today. 
Cr: Where do you get your evidence for this?  
So: I will tell you. I must be put to death sometime the day after the  
 ship arrives?  
Cr: That's what the authorities in these matters say, at least.  
So: In that case, I don't think it will arrive this coming day, but the 
next. My evidence is something I saw in a dream a little while ago during 
the night. It's likely that you chose a very good time not to wake me. 
Cr: Well, what was the dream?  
So: A woman appeared, coming towards me, fine and good-
looking, wearing white clothing. She called to me and said, "Socrates, you 
shall arrive in fertile Phthia on the third day."* 
Cr: What a strange dream, Socrates.  





































































































Cr: Too obvious, perhaps. But, my supernatural Socrates, even now 
listen to me and be saved. If you die, for me it won't be just one 
misfortune: apart from being separated from the kind of friend the like of 
which I will never find again, many people, moreover, who do not know 
me and you well will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to 
spend the money, but that I didn't care to. And wouldn't this indeed be the 
most shameful reputation, that I would seem to value money above 
friends? For the many will not believe that it was you yourself who 
refused to leave here, even though we were urging you to.  
So: But why, blessed Crito, should we care so much about the 
opinion of the many? The best people, who are more deserving of our 
attention, will believe that the matter was handled in just the way it was. 
Cr: But surely you see, Socrates, that we must pay attention to the 
opinion of the many, too. The present circumstances make it clear that the 
many can inflict not just the least of evils but practically the greatest, when 
one has been slandered amongst them. 
So: If they were of any use, Crito, the many would be able to do the 
greatest evils, and so they would also be able to do the greatest goods, and 
that would be fine. But as it is they can do neither, since they cannot make 
a man either wise or foolish, but they do just whatever occurs to them. 
Cr: Well, let's leave that there. But tell me this, Socrates. You're not 
worried, are you, about me and your other friends, how, if you were to 
leave here, the informers would make trouble for us because we stole you 
away from here, and we would be compelled either to give up all our 
property or a good deal of money, or suffer some other punishment at 
their hands? If you have any such fear, let it go, because it is our obligation 
to run this risk in saving you and even greater ones if necessary. So trust 
me and do not refuse.  
So: I certainly am worried about these things, Crito, and lots of 
others too. 
Cr: Well don't fear them. Indeed, some people only need to be given 
a little silver and they're willing to rescue you and get you out of here. And 
on top of that, don't you see how cheap those informers are and that we 
wouldn't need to spend a lot of money on them? My money is at your 
disposal, and is, I think, sufficient. Furthermore, even if, because of some 
concern for me, you think you shouldn't spend my money, there are these 
visitors here who are prepared to spend theirs. One of them has brought 
enough silver for this very purpose, Simmias of Thebes, and Kebes too is 
willing, and very many others. So, as I say, don't give up on saving 
yourself because you are uneasy about these things.  
And don't let what you said in the court get to you, that you 
wouldn't know what to do with yourself as an exile. Wherever you go, 
there are places they would welcome you. And if you want to go to 
Thessaly, I have some friends there who will think highly of you and 
provide you with safety, so that no one in Thessaly will harass you.  
What's more, Socrates, what you are doing doesn't seem right to me, 
giving yourself up when you could be saved, ready to have happen to you 






















































seem correct to you? Because you, as far as any human can tell, are in no 
danger of being executed tomorrow and the present misfortune should not 
lead you astray. Have a look, then. Is it fair enough to say that one should 
not value every human opinion but only some and not others? And not the 
opinions of everyone but of some and not others? What do you say? Isn't 
this right? 
Cr: Yes, that's right.  
So: Shouldn't we value the good opinions, and not the worthless 
ones? 
Cr: Yes.  
So: Aren't the good ones the opinions of the wise, while the 
worthless ones come from the ignorant? 
Cr: Of course. 
So: So then, what did we say, again, about cases such as this: should 
a man in training, who takes it seriously, pay any heed to the praise and 
blame and opinion of everyone, or only to one person, the one who is a 
doctor or a trainer? 
Cr: Only to the one.  
So: So he should fear the criticisms and welcome the praises of that 
one person, and not those of the many? 
Cr: Clearly.  
So: He must practice and exercise, and eat and drink, in the way 
that seems best to that one person, the trainer and expert, more than to all 
the others together. 
Cr: That's right.  
So: Well then. If he disobeys this one man and dishonors his 
opinion and his praises and instead honors those of the many who know 
nothing, won't he suffer harm? 
Cr: How could he not?  
So: What is this harm, and what does it tend to do, and in what part 
of the disobedient person? 
Cr: It's clear that it's in the body, since this is what it destroys.  
So: Well said. Isn't it the same with the others—not to go over them 
all, but in particular justice and injustice and shameful and fine things and 
good and bad, which are what our current discussion is about—whether 
we must follow the opinion of the many and fear it or instead the opinion 
of the one person, if there is someone who has knowledge, whom we must 
defer to and fear more than all the others together? If we do not heed his 
opinion we will corrupt and harm that part of us which becomes better 
with justice and is destroyed by injustice. Or don't you think so? 
Cr: I do indeed, Socrates.  
So: Tell me, if we do not follow the opinion of the person who 
knows and so destroy that part of us which is improved by what is 
wholesome and corrupted by what sickens, is life worth living when that 
part is ruined? This is the body, I suppose, isn’t it? 
Cr: Yes.  
So: Then is life worth living with a wretched and corrupt body? 
Cr: Not at all.  





















































injures and justice benefits has been corrupted? Or do you think this is 
unimportant in comparison with the body, this part of us, whatever it is, 
that injustice and justice affect?  
Cr: Not at all.  
So: But more valuable?  
Cr: Much more.  
So: So, best of men, we must not pay much heed to what the many 
will say to us, but to what the one who knows about just and unjust things 
will say—to that one person, and to the truth itself. So you were wrong, at 
the beginning, to bring this up, that we must heed the opinion of the many 
concerning just things and noble things and good things and their 
opposites. "But in spite of that," someone might declare, "the many can put 
us to death." 
Cr: That too is obvious. For someone might say so, Socrates. You're 
right. 
So: But, you wonderful fellow, it seems to me that the following 
statement, which we have been over before, remains just the same as 
before. So examine again whether or not it still holds true for you, that it's 
not living that should be our priority, but living well.  
Cr: Why, of course it's still true. 
So: And that this is living well and finely and justly, does that 
remain true or not? 
Cr: It remains true.  
So: Therefore, based on what you've agreed, we must consider the 
following: whether it is just or unjust for me to try to leave here, when I 
was not acquitted by the Athenians. And if it seems just let's try it, and if 
not, let's abandon it. As for the points you make about spending money 
and reputation and the upbringing of children, Crito, I suspect that these 
are really questions belonging to people who would casually put someone 
to death and resurrect him, if they could, without any thought—to the 
members of the multitude.  
As for us, since the argument requires it, I suppose we should 
examine precisely what we just mentioned: whether we will act justly by 
giving money and thanks to those who will get me out of here—both you 
in the lead and me being led—or whether we will in fact act unjustly by 
doing all of this. If we think that we're acting unjustly by doing these 
things, I don't think we should take into consideration whether we will die 
if we hold our ground and keep our peace, or anything else we will 
suffer—only whether we're acting unjustly. 
Cr: I think you put that well, Socrates. See what we should do, then. 
So: Let's look together, my good man, and if at any point you have 
an objection to what I am saying, make it and I will persuade you; if not, 
you blessed man, finally quit saying the same thing over and over, that I 
have to get out of here against the will of the Athenians. I think it is most 
important to act with your consent and not against your will. See, then, 
that the starting point of the inquiry is laid down to your satisfaction and 
try to answer the questions in the way you think best. 
Cr: I shall certainly try.  





















































we should in some instances and not in others? Or is acting unjustly never 
good or noble, as we often agreed on previous occasions? Or have all our 
previous agreements been overturned in these last few days, and did we 
fail to notice long ago, Crito, that when we have serious discussions with 
one another, we ourselves, at our age, are no different from children? Or 
more than anything isn't what we used to say still true? Whether the many 
agree or not, and whether we must also suffer harsher things than these or 
gentler, nevertheless acting unjustly is evil and shameful in every way for 
the person who does it. Do we say this or not? 
Cr: We do.  
So: And so one must never act unjustly. 
Cr: By no means.  
So: And so one should not repay an injustice with an injustice, as 
the many think, since one should never act unjustly. 
Cr: It appears not.  
So: What next? Should one cause harm, Crito, or not?  
Cr: Presumably not, Socrates.  
So: And then? Is returning a harm for a harm just, as the many say, 
or not just? 
Cr: Not at all.  
So: Because harming a man in any way is no different from doing 
an injustice. 
Cr: That's true. 
So: One must neither repay an injustice nor cause harm to any man, 
no matter what one suffers because of him. And see to it, Crito, that in 
agreeing with this you are not agreeing contrary to what you believe, 
because I know that few people believe it or will believe it. And so there is 
no common ground between those who hold this belief and those who 
don't; when they see each other's positions they are bound to despise one 
other. So think carefully about whether you yourself agree and believe it 
and let us begin thinking from here: that it is never right to act unjustly, or 
to return an injustice, or to retaliate when one has suffered some harm by 
repaying the harm. Do you reject or accept this starting principle? For it 
still seems good to me now, as it did long ago, but if it seemed some other 
way to you, speak up and educate me. If you're sticking to what we said 
before, listen to what comes next. 
Cr: I do stick to it, and I accept it. Go ahead. 
So: Here in turn is the next point. Or rather, I'll ask you: when 
someone has made an agreement with someone else, and it is just, must he 
keep to it or betray it? 
Cr: He must keep to it. 
So: Observe what follows from this. If we leave here without having 
persuaded the city, are we doing someone a harm—and those whom we 
should least of all harm—or not? And are we keeping to the just 
agreements we made, or not? 
Cr: I'm unable to respond to what you're asking, Socrates; for I do 
not know.  
So: Well, look at it this way. If the laws and the community of the 





















































whatever it should be called—and, standing over us, were to ask, "Tell me, 
Socrates, what are you intending to do? By attempting this deed, aren't 
you planning to do nothing other than destroy us, the laws, and the civic 
community, as much as you can? Or does it seem possible to you that any 
city where the verdicts reached have no force but are made powerless and 
corrupted by private citizens could continue to exist and not be in ruins?"  
What will we say, Crito, to these questions and others like them? 
Because there's a lot more a person could say, especially an orator, on 
behalf of this law we're destroying, which makes sovereign the verdicts 
that have been decided. Or will we say to them "The city treated us 
unjustly and did not decide the case properly"? Will we say this or 
something like it? 
Cr: By Zeus, that's what we'll say, Socrates. 
So: What if the laws then said, "Socrates, did we agree on this, we 
and you, to honor the decisions that the city makes?" And if we were 
surprised to hear them say this, perhaps they would say, "Socrates, don't 
be surprised at what we're saying, but answer, since you are accustomed 
to using questions and answers. Come then, what reason can you give us 
and the city for trying to destroy us? Did we not, to begin with, give birth 
to you? And wasn't it through us that your father married your mother 
and conceived you? So show those of us, the laws concerning marriages, 
what fault you find that keeps them from being good?" "I find no fault 
with them," I would say.  
"What about the laws concerning the upbringing and education of 
children, by which you too were raised? Or didn't those of us, the laws 
established on this matter, give good instructions when they directed your 
father to educate you in the arts and gymnastics?" "They did," I would say.  
"Well, then. Since you have been born and brought up and 
educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and slave from 
the beginning, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you 
suppose that justice between you and us is based on equality, and do you 
think that whatever we might try to do to you, it is just for you to do these 
things to us in return? Justice between you and your father, or your master 
if you happened to have one, was not based on equality, so that you could 
not do whatever you had suffered in return, neither speak back when 
crossed nor strike back when struck nor many other such things. Will you 
be allowed to do this to your homeland and the laws, so that, if we try to 
destroy you, thinking this to be just, you will in return try to destroy us the 
laws and your homeland with as much power as you have and claim that 
you're acting justly in doing so—the man who truly cares about virtue?  
“Are you so wise that it has slipped your mind that the homeland 
deserves more honor and reverence and worship than your mother and 
father and all of your other ancestors? And that she is held in higher 
esteem both by the gods and by men of good sense? And that when she is 
angry you should show her more respect and compliance and obedience 
than your father, and either convince her or do what she commands, and 
suffer without complaining if she orders you to suffer something? And 
that whether it is to be beaten or imprisoned, or to be wounded or killed if 





















































must not be daunted or withdraw or abandon your position, but at war 
and in the courts and everywhere you must do what the city and the 
homeland orders, or convince her by appealing to what is naturally just? 
And that it is not holy to use force against one's mother or father, and it is 
so much worse to do so against one's homeland?" What will we say to this, 
Crito? That the laws speak the truth? Or not? 
Cr: It looks so to me. 
So: "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws might say, "if what we say is 
true: that it is not just for you to try what you're now attempting to do to 
us. For we gave birth to you, brought you up, educated you, and gave you 
and all the other citizens every good thing we could, and yet even so we 
pronounce that any Athenian who wishes, when he has been admitted as 
an adult and sees the affairs of the city and us the laws, has the power, if 
he is not pleased with us, to take his possessions and leave for wherever he 
wants. And if any among you wants to live in a colony because we and the 
city do not satisfy him, or if he wants to go somewhere else and live as a 
foreigner, none of us laws stands in the way or forbids him from taking his 
possessions with him and leaving for wherever he wants.  
“But whoever remains with us, having observed how we decide 
lawsuits and take care of other civic matters, we claim that this man by his 
action has now made an agreement with us to do what we command him 
to do, and we claim that anyone who does not obey is guilty three times 
over: he disobeys us who gave birth to him, and who raised him; and 
because, despite agreeing to be subject to us, he does not obey us or 
persuade us that we are doing something improper. And we give him an 
alternative and don't angrily press him to do what we order; and although 
we allow either of two possibilities—either to persuade us or to comply—
he does neither of these.  
“We say that you especially will be liable to these charges, Socrates, 
if indeed you carry out your plans, and you not least of the Athenians but 
most of all." If, then, I would say, "How do you mean?", perhaps they 
would scold me justly, saying that I most of all among the Athenians have 
made this agreement. They might say, "Socrates, we have great evidence 
for this, that we and the city satisfy you. For you would never have spent 
more of your life here than all of the other Athenians unless it seemed 
particularly good to you. You never left the city for a festival, except once 
to Isthmos, but never went anywhere else except on military duty, nor did 
you ever make another trip like other Athenians do, nor did any urge seize 
you to get to know a different city or other laws, but we and our city were 
sufficient for you. So decidely did you choose us and agree to be governed 
by us that, among other things, you had children in it, because the city was 
satisfactory to you.  
“Moreover, at your trial you could have proposed exile, if you had 
wished, and what you're now trying to do to the city without her consent, 
you could have done then with her consent. At the time, you prided 
yourself on not being angry if you had to die, and you chose death, you 
said, in preference to exile. But now you neither feel shame in the face of 
those words nor have you any respect for us the laws. By trying to destroy 





















































I also think you are betraying your sons, whom you could raise and 
educate, by going away and abandoning them, and, as far as you are 
concerned, they can experience whatever happens to come their way, 
when it's likely that as orphans they'll get the usual orphans’ treatment. 
One should either not have children or endure the hardship of raising and 
educating them. But it looks to me as though you are taking the laziest 
path, whereas you must choose the path a good and brave man would 
choose, especially when you keep saying that you care about virtue your 
whole life long.  
So I am ashamed both on your behalf and on behalf of us your 
friends, that this whole affair surrounding you will be thought to have 
happened due to some cowardice on our part: the hearing of the charge in 
court, that it came to trial when it need not have, and the legal contest 
itself, how it was carried on, and, as the absurd part of the affair, that by 
some badness and cowardice on our part we will be thought to have let 
this final act get away from us, since we did not save you, nor you save 
yourself, when it was possible and we could have done so if we were of 
the slightest use. So see, Socrates, whether this is both evil and shameful, 
for you and for us as well. Think over—or rather, there's no longer time for 
thinking but only for deciding—this one consideration, because everything 
must be done this coming night; if we hang around any longer it will be 
impossible and we'll no longer be able to. So in every way, Socrates, 
believe me and do not refuse.  
So: My dear Crito, your eagerness would be worth a lot if it were in 
pursuit of something righteous, but the more it is not, the more difficult it 
is to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should do this or 
not, because as always, and not just now for the first time, I am the sort of 
person who is persuaded in my soul by nothing other than the argument 
which seems best to me upon reflection. At present I am not able to 
abandon the arguments I previously made, now that this misfortune has 
befallen me, but they appear about the same to me, and I defer to and 
honor the ones I did before. If we have nothing better than them to offer 
under the present circumstances, rest assured that I will not agree with 
you, not if, even more so than at present, the power of the multitude were 
to spook us as though we were children, imposing chains and deaths and 
monetary fines upon us.  
What's the most reasonable way we can examine this matter? By 
first resuming this argument that you give about reputations. Was it 
correct on each occasion when we said that one must pay attention to the 
opinions of some people and not to others'? Was this the correct thing to 
say before I had to die, whereas now it has become obvious that it was said 
only for the sake of argument and was actually just playing around and 
hot air?  
I am determined to examine this together with you, Crito, whether 
it appears different when I consider it in this condition, or the same, and 
whether we should ignore it or be persuaded by it. It is always put like 
this, I think, by people who think there is something in it, the way I put it 
just now: that it is necessary to pay serious attention to some of the 





















































away contrary to the contract and the agreement by which you agreed to 
be governed by us. So answer us first on this particular point: do we speak 
the truth when we say that you agreed to be governed by us in deed and 
not merely in words?" What can we say to this, Crito? Mustn't we agree? 
Cr: We must, Socrates.  
So: "Aren't you", they might say, "going against your contracts and 
agreements with us, which you were not forced to agree to, nor deceived 
about, nor compelled to decide upon in a short time, but over seventy 
years, in which time you could have gone away if we did not satisfy you 
and these agreements did not appear just to you. You did not prefer 
Lakedaimonia* or Crete, each of which you claim is well-governed, or any 
of the other Hellenic cities or the foreign ones, but you left her less often 
than the lame and the blind and the other disabled people. Evidently the 
city and also we the laws were so much more pleasing to you than to other 
Athenians, for is a city pleasing to anyone without its laws? Now then, 
won't you keep to what you agreed? You will, if you are convinced by us, 
at any rate, Socrates; and at least you won't make yourself ridiculous by 
leaving the city. 
"Just think about what good will it do you and your friends if you 
break them and do wrong in one of these ways. It's pretty clear that your 
friends will risk exile along with you and disenfranchisement from the city 
and confiscation of their property. And if you first go to one of the closest 
cities, to Thebes or to Megara—since both are well-governed—you will 
come as an enemy, Socrates, of those governments, and everyone who 
cares about their cities will regard you suspiciously, thinking that you are 
a destroyer of the laws. And you will confirm the opinion of the judges, so 
that they will think they judged the case correctly, since whoever is a 
destroyer of the laws would certainly be considered in some way a 
destroyer of young and foolish men.  
"Will you flee, then, from well-governed cities and from the most 
civilized people? Is it worth it to you to live like this? Will you associate 
with them, Socrates, and feel no shame when talking with them? What will 
you say, Socrates? What you said here, that virtue and justice are of the 
greatest value to humans, along with lawfulness and the laws? And you 
don't think the conduct of such a Socrates will appear shameful? One 
should think so.  
"But will you leave these places and go to Crito's friends in 
Thessaly? There is plenty of disorder and disobedience there and they 
might listen with pleasure to you, about how you amusingly ran away 
from prison wearing some costume or a peasant's vest or something else of 
the sort that runaways typically dress themselves in, altering your 
appearance. But still, will no one say that an old man, who probably only 
has a short time left in his life, was so greedy in his desire to live that he 
dared to violated the greatest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not annoy 
anyone. But if you do, Socrates, you will hear many dishonorable things 
about yourself. You will surely spend your life sucking up to everyone and 
living like a slave. What else will you do in Thessaly but feast, as though 
you had traveled to Thessaly for dinner? And those speeches, the ones 



















































"Is it for the sake of your children that you want to live, so that you 
can raise and educate them? What are you going do, in that case? You'll 
raise and educate them by bringing them to Thessaly and making them 
outsiders, so that they will enjoy that benefit too? Or if not that, will they 
grow up better if they are raised and educated with you away from them 
but alive, because your friends will take care of them? But is it that if you 
go to Thessaly, they'll look after them, whereas if you go to Hades, they 
won't? If those who claim to be your friends are any good, you must 
believe they will. 
"So be convinced by us who brought you up, Socrates, and do not 
put children or life or anything else ahead of justice, so that when you go 
to Hades you will be able to provide all this as your defense to those who 
rule there. Since neither in this world, nor in the next when you arrive, will 
this action be thought better or more just or more pious for you and your 
friends to do. But as it is you leave us, if indeed you depart, having been 
done an injustice not by us, the laws, but by men. If you return the 
injustice, however, and repay the harm and flee in shame, having violated 
your agreement and contract with us and harmed those who least of all 
should be harmed—yourself, your friends, your homeland, and us—we 
will make life hard for you while you're alive, and then our brothers, the 
laws in Hades, will not receive you favorably, knowing that you tried to 
destroy us too, as far as you were able. So do not be persuaded by Crito to 
do what he says instead of what we say." 
Rest assured, my dear friend Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, 
just as the Korubantes* seem to hear the pipes, and the echo from these 
words resonates within me and makes me unable to hear anything else. So 
know that, based on my current beliefs, at least, if you speak against them 
you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you honestly think you can achieve 
anything more, speak. 
Cr: No, Socrates. I am unable to speak.  
So: Then let it be, Crito, and let us act in this way, since this is where 




ship arrived from Delos. Socrates has spent a month in prison since the trial 
because he could not be executed until a religious mission returned from 
the island of Delos, the mythical birth-place of Artemis and Apollo and 
where Theseus slayed the minotaur, before returning to Athens.  
Sounion. The tip of Attica; a headland 200 feet above sea-level, bearing a 
temple to Poseidon. 
you shall arrive in fertile Phthia on the third day. Iliad 9.363. Achilles is 
threatening to leave Troy and return home. 
Lakedaimonia. Sparta. 
Korubantes. In the cult of Kubele, worshippers danced as though possessed. 
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Study Guide: 2. Crito 
 
What is the setting for conversation?   
 
When is Socrates to be executed?  Why then, and why the delay?   
 
Crito gives several reasons why he thinks Socrates should escape and avoid his punishment. 
What are they?   
 
What’s Socrates’ response to Crito’s concern about his reputation? 
 
Socrates claims that “one should not repay an injustice with an injustice,” similar to our saying 
that “two wrongs don’t make a right”.  What are the two injustices Socrates has in mind?  
 
Socrates refers to the notion that “when someone has made an agreement with someone else, and 
it is just, he must keep to it.”  What agreement is he thinking of, here?   
 
Socrates says a citizen who does not obey the city’s laws is guilty “three times over”.  What does 
he mean?   
 
What do you think Crito’s thoughts are at the end?  Do you think he’s convinced by Socrates’ 
argument?  Are you convinced by Socrates’ argument? – Why or why not?   
 
Stoicism – Historical Background and Key Themes 
Focus Exclusively on What You Can Control 
Image 1: “Epictetus.” Frontispiece drawn by “Sonnem.” or “Sonnern.” (?, left bottom corner) and engraved by 
“MB” (bottom right corner). The engraver is Michael Burghers ([1]). Image scanned by the John Adams Library at 
the Boston Public Library. Image cropped and greyscaled by Pasicles. Public domain, downloaded from: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Epicteti_Enchiridion_Latinis_versibus_adumbratum_(Oxford_1715)_fron
tispiece_-_greyscale.jpg 
Epictetus (approx. 55 CE – 135 CE) was a Greek philosopher, one of a number of philosophers 
from antiquity whose thought is considered “Stoic.” He was born a slave in what is now a part of 
Turkey.  Early in his life, Epictetus’ passion for philosophy was obvious, and his master 
permitted him to study Stoicism with Musonius Rufus.  At some point he became crippled; one 
account has it that his leg was broken deliberately by his wealthy owner, although another 
ancient source reports that he was lame from childhood.  Soon after the death of the Roman 
Emperor Nero in 68 CE, Epictetus was freed and began to teach philosophy in Rome.  When 
Domitian banished philosophers from Rome in around 93 CE, Epictetus fled to Greece and 
founded a philosophical school of his own.  Reportedly, he lived a life of simplicity with few 
possessions.  None of Epictetus’ writings have survived.  What we know of his thought comes 
from two writings compiled by his student Arrian: his main work, The Discourses, and a popular, 
shorter work called the Enchiridion (the “Handbook”).  
The Stoic school of thought was originally started in Athens by Zeno of Citium in Athens.  The 
term derives from the term for “Painted Porch,” which was a decorated colonnade on the north 
side of the Agora in Athens where Zeno and his followers used to gather.  Besides Epictetus, 
other Stoics still studied today include Seneca, Nero’s tutor, and two politically prominent 
Romans: the great orator and statesman Cicero and the emperor and military leader Marcus 
Aurelius.  Thus, Stoicism appealed to people from various strata of society, from lowly slaves to 
even emperors.  Stoicism  was very practical in its teaching, stressing ways to remain calm and 
brave in the face of dangerous and painful circumstances.   
Key Themes 
1. What is and is not in one’s control.
A central theme in Stoicism involves the distinction between what is and is not within our power 
or control.  The things that are within our power are “prohairetic” things (prohairesis = 
“choice”).  They include our opinions, desires, likings and dislikings.  Aprohairectic things not 
within our power include the “externals” like glory, power, possessions, and our bodies.   
The “externals” are in themselves neither good nor bad.  All we control and all we should care 
about are the opinions we form of them.   
Thus, a key part of Stoic advice is strict indifference and absence of opinion regarding external 
things over which we have no control.  If someone loses a possession, Epictetus advises the 
person to say to himself, “I have lost nothing that belongs to me; something that was not in my 
power has left me.”  Desires degrade us and make us slaves of what we desire, because external 
things we may want are not solely within our control.  Whether we get the externals we desire 
always depends on forces outside of ourselves.  Glory and popularity, for example, depend on 
other people even more than they depend on oneself.  True freedom and true happiness involves 
wishing for nothing except what fate or God has in store, and striving to perfect and focus on the 
few things that can be achieved solely by our own choices.  Marcus Aurelius writes that rather 
than asking God to give us what we want or save us from what we fear, we should ask God to rid 
us of the desires and the fears. That’s a characteristically Stoic attitude to fear and desire: not to 
focus on attaining or avoiding the external thing one desires or fears, but to change one’s desires 
and fears and other internal states that may perturb us.  
2. Virtue is the only Good
Like Socrates, the Stoics stress the importance of virtue.  Because of their emphasis on the few 
things within our control, many Stoics maintained that the only good was that which is most 
firmly within our choice or control: virtue itself.  Also like Socrates, Epictetus’ view is that all 
philosophy is founded on self-knowledge and that ridding oneself of ignorance, false 
preconception, and gullibility is of central importance in life. 
Another Socratic theme prominent in Stoic thought is the idea that the harms other people may 
do to us are really nothing.  The only genuine harms are those we do to ourselves through our 
own bad choices.  Rather than despise or hate other people, we ought to focus on our own faults 
and shortcomings.  As Marcus Aurelius wrote in his journal, “it is silly to try to escape other 
people’s faults.  They are inescapable.  Just try to escape your own.’ 
There is also an optimistic side to this point of view.  Because all that really matters is what is 
within our choice, through exercise of control over our thoughts and actions, we have the power 
to determine the goodness and badness of our own lives, rather than having our well-being rest 
on forces beyond our control.  Though this perspective on oneself and the world is not easy to 
achieve, it is a tremendously liberating viewpoint on life.   
 





The text below is derived from a public domain translation of The Enchiridion by Epictetus, downloaded 
from: https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/epictetus/the-enchiridion/elizabeth-carter 
 
The Enchiridion  
 
By Epictetus  
 
Written 135 A.C.E.  
 
Translated by Elizabeth Carter 
 
1. Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, 
pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our 
control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our 
own actions.  
 
The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our 
control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you 
suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to 
others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, 
and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your 
own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will 
ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one. 
You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, 
and you not be harmed.  
 
Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be 
carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you 
must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would 
both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the 
latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by 
which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.  
 
Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, 
and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which 
you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our 
own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be 
prepared to say that it is nothing to you.  
 
2. Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are 
desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he 
who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object 
of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which 
are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you 
will never incur anything to which you are averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or 
death, or poverty, you will be wretched. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are 
not in our control, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our control. 
But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are 
not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, 
and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only the 
appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness 
and reservation.  
 
3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, 
remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most 
insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind 
yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, 
you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss 
things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.  
 
4. When you are going about any action, remind yourself what nature the action is. If you 
are going to bathe, picture to yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some 
people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. Thus 
you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and 
keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." And in the same manner with 
regard to every other action. For thus, if any hindrance arises in bathing, you will have it 
ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state 
conformable to nature; and I will not keep it if I am bothered at things that happen.  
 
5. Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form 
concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to 
Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore 
we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to 
ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his 
own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on 
himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on 
himself.  
 
6. Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be 
prideful and say, " I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful, 
and say, " I have a handsome horse," know that you are proud of what is, in fact, only the 
good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Only your reaction to the appearances of 
things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear, 
you will be proud with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own.  
 
7. Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get water you 
may along the way amuse yourself with picking up a shellish, or an onion. However, your 
thoughts and continual attention ought to be bent towards the ship, waiting for the captain 
to call on board; you must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be 
thrown into the ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an 
onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you 
must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never 
go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.  
 
8. Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do 
happen, and you will go on well.  
 
9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is 
your choice. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this 
to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as 
hindrances to something else, but not to yourself.  
 
10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a proper use of 
it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have 
against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant 
language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not 
hurry you away along with them.  
 
11. Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "I have returned it." Is your child dead? It 
is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is 
not that likewise returned? "But he who took it away is a bad man." What difference is it 
to you who the giver assigns to take it back? While he gives it to you to possess, take care 
of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel.  
 
12. If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I'll 
have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with 
hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is 
better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy.  
 
Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, 
"This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." 
When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he may 
not do what you want. But he is by no means of such importance that it should be in his 
power to give you any disturbance.  
 
13. If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to 
external things. Don't wish to be thought to know anything; and even if you appear to be 
somebody important to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your 
faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external 
things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.  
 
14. If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are 
stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that 
belong to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, 
you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice," but something else. But, if you wish to 
have your desires undisappointed, this is in your own control. Exercise, therefore, what is 
in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove 
whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let 
him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must 
necessarily be a slave.  
 
15. Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought 
around to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Does it pass by 
you? Don't stop it. Is it not yet come? Don't stretch your desire towards it, but wait till it 
reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you 
will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you don't even take 
the things which are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not 
only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, but also of their empire. For, by doing this, 
Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.  
 
16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, 
or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect 
you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the 
accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the 
judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself 
to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.  
 
17. Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to 
make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a 
poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this 
is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.  
 
18. When a raven happens to croak unluckily, don't allow the appearance hurry you away 
with it, but immediately make the distinction to yourself, and say, "None of these things 
are foretold to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or 
wife. But to me all omens are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is 
in my control to derive advantage from it."  
 
19. You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own 
control to conquer. When, therefore, you see anyone eminent in honors, or power, or in 
high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, 
and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own 
control, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don't wish to be a 
general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of 
things not in our own control.  
 
20. Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle 
which represents these things as insulting. When, therefore, anyone provokes you, be 
assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, 
not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you 
will more easily command yourself.  
 
21. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your 
eyes, but chiefly death, and you win never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly 
covet anything.  
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22. If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself from the 
very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear them say,." He is 
returned to us a philosopher all at once," and " Whence this supercilious look?" Now, for 
your part, don't have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which 
appear best to you as one appointed by God to this station. For remember that, if you 
adhere to the same point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterwards admire 
you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.  
 
23. If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please anyone, 
be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life. Be contented, then, in everything 
with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by anyone, appear so 
to yourself, and it will suffice you.  
 
24. Don't allow such considerations as these distress you. "I will live in dishonor, and be 
nobody anywhere." For, if dishonor is an evil, you can no more be involved in any evil 
by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours, 
then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after 
all, is this a dishonor? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere, when you 
ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your own control, in which you 
may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted." -- What do you 
mean by unassisted? They will not have money from you, nor will you make them 
Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things in our own control, 
and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he has not 
himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with 
the preservation of my own honor and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way 
and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own proper good that you may gain 
what is not good, consider how inequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would 
you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honor? Rather assist me, then, 
to gain this character than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but 
my country, say you, as far as depends on me, will be unassisted. Here again, what 
assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And 
what signifies that? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with 
arms. It is enough if everyone fully performs his own proper business. And were you to 
supply it with another citizen of honor and fidelity, would not he be of use to it? Yes. 
Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you, will I hold in 
the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, 
by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country 
when you are become faithless and void of shame.  
 
25. Is anyone preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being 
admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to be glad that he has 
gotten them; and if they are evil, don't be grieved that you have not gotten them. And 
remember that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire 
things not in our own control, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For 
how can he who does not frequent the door of any [great] man, does not attend him, does 
not praise him, have an equal share with him who does? You are unjust, then, and 
insatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would 
have them for nothing. For how much is lettuce sold? Fifty cents, for instance. If another, 
then, paying fifty cents, takes the lettuce, and you, not paying it, go without them, don't 
imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has the lettuce, so you have 
the fifty cents which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited 
to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a 
supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it 
is for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive 
the other, you are insatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the 
supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you don't like to praise; the 
not bearing with his behavior at coming in.  
 
26. The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we don't distinguish 
from each other. For example, when our neighbor's boy breaks a cup, or the like, we are 
presently ready to say, "These things will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own 
cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. 
Apply this in like manner to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is 
no one who would not say, "This is a human accident." but if anyone's own child happens 
to die, it is presently, "Alas I how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we 
are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.  
 
27. As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of 
evil exist in the world.  
 
28. If a person gave your body to any stranger he met on his way, you would certainly be 
angry. And do you feel no shame in handing over your own mind to be confused and 
mystified by anyone who happens to verbally attack you?  
 
29. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise 
you will begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of 
them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But 
consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it is for your advantage, engage in the 
affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your 
body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no 
cold water, nor sometimes even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your 
master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate 
your arm, turn your ankle, swallow dust, be whipped, and, after all, lose the victory. 
When you have evaluated all this, if your inclination still holds, then go to war. 
Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play like wrestlers, 
sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy when they 
have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at 
another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing 
at all. Like an ape, you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please 
you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon 
anything considerately, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made 
any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they have 
seen a philosopher and heard a man speaking like Euphrates (though, indeed, who can 
speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the 
matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider 
your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things. 
Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat and 
drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you must labor, 
you must get the better of certain appetites, must quit your acquaintance, be despised by 
your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything, 
in magistracies, in honors, in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these 
things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to 
purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, don't come here; don't, like children, be 
one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar's officers. 
These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must 
cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things 
within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.  
30. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied 
that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to 
his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is you naturally entitled, then, to a 
good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation 
towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty 
of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please. 
You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will 
find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you 
accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.  
 
31. Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right 
opinions concerning them, as existing "I and as governing the universe with goodness 
and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and 
willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For 
thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is 
not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from 
things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you 
suppose any of the things not in our own control to be either good or evil, when you are 
disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find 
fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor 
things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which 
appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes 
himself to be hurt should be happy about the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is 
impossible to be happy about the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, 
when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing 
empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the 
husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, 
revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful 
to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of 
piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and 
first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly 
manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability.  
 
32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event 
will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before 
you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own 
control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or 
aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire 
a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort 
it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder; 
then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterwards, when any 
counsel is given you, remember what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice 
you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of 
which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are 
afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, 
therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to 
consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner 
should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either 
death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, 
even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the 
temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.  
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33. Immediately prescribe some character and form of conduce to yourself, which you 
may keep both alone and in company.  
 
Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may, 
however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it, 
but not on any of the common subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic 
champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as 
either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own 
conversation bring over that of your company to proper subjects; but, if you happen to be 
taken among strangers, be silent.  
 
Don't allow your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse.  
 
Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.  
 
Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep 
your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners. 
For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected, 
he who converses with him will be infected likewise.  
 
Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, 
house, family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.  
 
As far as possible, before marriage, keep yourself pure from familiarities with women, 
and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully." But don't therefore be troublesome and full 
of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself don't.  
 
If anyone tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, don't make excuses about what is 
said of you, but answer: " He does not know my other faults, else he would not have 
mentioned only these."  
 
It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever there is a proper 
occasion for you to be there, don't appear more solicitous for anyone than for yourself; 
that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the 
conqueror, for thus you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from 
declamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, don't 
discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what does not contribute to your own 
amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck 
with the show.  
 
Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any  
authors , nor appear [at them] readily. But, if you do appear, keep your gravity and 
sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.  
 
When you are going to confer with anyone, and particularly of those in a superior station, 
represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not 
be at a loss to make a proper use of whatever may occur.  
 
When you are going to any of the people in power, represent to yourself that you will not 
find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be opened to you; 
that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it is your duty to go, bear what happens, 
and never say [to yourself], " It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a 
man dazed by external things.  
 
In parties of conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions 
and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have 
run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an 
endeavor to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar 
manners, and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance. 
Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything 
of this sort happens, if there be a proper opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances 
that way; or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be 
displeased by such talk.  
 
34. If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against 
being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some 
delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you will enjoy the 
pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed 
it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will be glad and applaud yourself if 
you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take 
heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in 
opposition to this how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a 
victory.  
 
35. When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the 
being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for, 
if you don't act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those 
who censure you wrongly?  
 
36. As the proposition, "Either it is day or it is night," is extremely proper for a 
disjunctive argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one, so, at a feast, to choose the 
largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social 
spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value 
of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behavior which 
ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.  
 
37. If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both made an ill 
figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported.  
 
38. When walking, you are careful not to step on a nail or turn your foot; so likewise be 
careful not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this 
in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.  
 
39. The body is to everyone the measure of the possessions proper for it, just as the foot 
is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move 
beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a cliff; as in the case of a 
shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and 
then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due measure, there is no 
bound.  
 
40. Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by the men. 
Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure, 
they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place ill their hopes. We should, therefore, 
fix our attention on making them sensible that they are valued for the appearance of 
decent, modest and discreet behavior.  
 
41. It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to 
be long in our exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal 
functions. These should be done incidentally and slightly, and our whole attention be 
engaged in the care of the understanding.  
 
42. When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks 
from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow 
what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a 
wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if 
anyone should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he 
who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a 
person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."  
 
43. Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it 
cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his 
injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that 
he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried.  
 
44. These reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "I 
am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better." The connection is rather this: "I am 
richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than 
you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor 
style.  
 
45. Does anyone bathe in a mighty little time? Don't say that he does it ill, but in a mighty 
little time. Does anyone drink a great quantity of wine? Don't say that he does ill, but that 
he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle from which 
anyone acts, how should you know if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the hazard of 
assenting to any appearances but such as you fully comprehend.  
 
46. Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about 
theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don't talk how persons 
ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also 
universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be 
recommended by him to philosophers, he took and- recommended them, so well did he 
bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned 
concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great 
danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you 
that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have 
begun your business. For sheep don't throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much 
they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and 
milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the 
actions produced by them after they have been digested.  
 
47. When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small 
price, don't pique yourself upon it; nor, if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, 
"I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the 
poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor, and 
bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; don't grasp statues, but, 
when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and 
tell nobody.  
 
48. The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either 
benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a 
philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a 
proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, 
says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in 
any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly 
laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he 
goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is 
set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his 
aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; 
the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or 
ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in 
ambush.  
 
49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to understand and interpret 
the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, " Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this 
person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To understand 
nature and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I 
have recourse to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret 
them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what 
remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I 
admire nothing but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian 
instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus. 
When anyone, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I 
cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.  
 
50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself. abide by them as 
they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't 
regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, 
will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements and follow the 
distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with which you 
ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them. What other master, then, do 
you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, 
but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add 
procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you 
will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and 
dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of 
living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you 
an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set 
before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be 
put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary 
preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything. attending to 
nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as 
one desirous of becoming a Socrates.  
 
51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems, 
such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the 
origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength and articulation to the other 
two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration? 
What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, 
then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. 
But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on 
the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence 
about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are 
immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.  
 
52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:  
 
"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,  
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station."  
Cleanthes  
 
"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,  
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still  
Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed  
Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven."  
Euripides, Frag. 965  
 
And this third:  
 
"0 Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, 
but hurt me they cannot."  
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Study Guide: 3. Epictetus 
 
The distinction between what is in our control and what is not in our control is a lynchpin of 
Epictetus’ thought and Stoicism more generally.  In addition to giving examples of things that 
fall under each of these headings, he also characterizes the general differences between things 
in/not in our control. In general, what is true of things in our control?  In general, what is true of 
things not in our control? 
 
What sorts of things are in our control, and what sorts of things are not, according to Epictetus?  
Do you agree with his categorizations?  If not, why not?   
 
In the third paragraph, Epictetus says “if you would both have these great things, along with 
power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but 
you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.”  
What does this suggest about Epictetus’ intended audience?  For example, is he aiming this for 
the Marcus Aurelius-es of the world (emperor of Rome), or someone who’s a slave (or former 
slave, like himself)? 
 
Why does he think that if we confine our aversion (dislike) to things which are both in our 
control and contrary to the natural use of our faculties, we will never encounter things we 
dislike?  What does this even mean?   
 
Why should we not desire things not in our control?  Is it really possible not desire things that are 
not in our control?     
 
In section 4, Epictetus offers some odd advice.  He recommends, before engaging in the action,  
to remind ourselves what the nature of the action is.  Why?  Does this work?  Try it sometime – 
see what you think.  
 
Section 5, famously, asserts that people are disturbed, “not by things, but by the principles and 
notions which they form concerning things.”  Explain what he means – illustrate with an 
example of you own what you think Epictetus has mind here. 
 
“If a captain calls, you must run the ship…” In his analogy of the captain and the ship, what is 
Epictetus claiming?  Again, think of what seems to be his intended audience.  Would this 
recommendation be more helpful and relevant to some people rather than others? 
 
How do we become free, according to Epictetus?  Is he right about this?  Make his case for him 
using an example from your own life and experience. 
 
When Epictetus says we are to “act well the character assigned to us,” who does this sound like?  
(Someone else we’ve studied?) 
 
Suppose someone says to Epictetus: my life goal is to “achieve the American dream”?  How do 
you suppose he might respond?   
 
What does Epictetus mean by “being a philosopher?”  Is there any particular philosopher he 
might have in mind in such references?   
 
Passage 26 recommends having the same kind of detached attitude regarding bad things that 
happen to ourselves as we have towards others to whom bad things happen.  For example, in 
regards to others’ misfortunes, we’ve probably all thought to ourselves, “these things will 
happen.”  So what do you think of Epictetus’ advice that we have the same attitude towards 
ourselves?   
 
Comment on the comparison between having our bodies taken from us and “handing over” one’s 
mind, described in passage 28.   
 
What does he mean by the remark: “duties are universally measured by relations?” 
 
In the last passage (32), Epictetus makes a remark that most modern readers will probably 
question.  He says “if it is among the things not in our own control, it can be no means be either 
good or evil.”  Without trying to either defend him or criticize him, explain what he must be 
assuming about good and evil to arrive at this startling conclusion.  What can be good or evil, on 
his view?    
 





Image 1: “Gautama Buddha with two basket of foods,” by Artem Beliaikin on Unsplash. Last accessed 2/12/20. 
 
Buddhism is a philosophy of life expounded by Gautama Buddha ("Buddha" means “awakened” 
or "enlightened one"), who lived and taught in northern India in the 6th century B.C. The 
Buddha was not a god and the philosophy of Buddhism does not entail a theistic world view.  
There is no divinity in Buddhism, and Buddhist practices do not include prayer, devotion, 
worship, or other activities we often associate with religion.  The teachings of the Buddha are 
aimed solely at liberating sentient beings from suffering.  To this end, Buddhists advocate 
striving towards ethical perfection and purification of the mind, accomplished by meditation, 
adopting the proper attitudes, right actions, and ridding oneself of destructive emotions like 
anger, jealousy, and greed,  
 
Buddhism’s fundamental emphasis, and the first of the 4 Noble Truths, is the conviction that all 
is dukkha (pronounced “dooka”).  Dukkha is a broad term and has no precise equivalent in 
English, although it is traditionally translated as “suffering.”  It includes all manner of 
imperfections, disappointments, frustrations, pains, and so forth; negative experiences in their 
various forms.  We humans all die.  That’s dukkha.  We all experience dissatisfactions of many 
kinds and degrees, from daily setbacks and irritations to life-crippling diseases and afflictions.  
Those are all dukkha too.  Buddhism is not, however, a dour or depressive outlook, and 
Buddhists certainly do not deny that life contains much joy and much to celebrate.  Personally, 
Buddhists tend to be happy, joyful people.  Life’s joys and pleasures, however, do not erase the 
fact suffering is an inescapable and pervasive fact of our existence, as well as the existence of 
animals.  Suffering is to be avoided and overcome by releasing oneself from the attachments that 
give rise to it.   
 
Two key metaphysical tenets are important to understanding what is distinctive about Buddhist 
ethics.  One is the belief in the fundamental continuity of all things; another is the “no-self” 
doctrine.  Both thoughts are connected to each other, as the key common insight is idea that all 
individuality and all metaphysical distinctions between people, animals and all other things are 
not really real.  Ultimately, the dividing lines and boundaries are merely illusory.  Buddhists do 
not deny that in a familiar, ordinary sense we think of ourselves as individuals distinct from each 
other, our parents and so forth.  But such common ways of thinking and talking should not be 
taken too seriously.  Ultimately, there is no firm separation between my thought and your 
thoughts, or your body and that of others, or for that matter, the border between mind and body.  
There just is, or there just is what is. 
 
The root of all suffering, says Buddhism, is attachment.  (This is the second of the 4 Noble 
Truths.)  Humans by their nature tend to be narcissistic (focused only on themselves), selfish, 
distracted, and pleasure-seeking.  While to be sure, the lives of most people contain fleeting and 
sometimes substantial pleasures, the pursuit of pleasure and self-interest leads to great 
dissatisfactions and pains.  Ultimately, lives devoted to getting for oneself – which is for the vast 
majority of us, part of what we aim at – are misguided and self-defeating.  The more we strive 
for ourselves, the worse off we tend to become.  Mundane examples of this phenomenon are a 
familiar part of our everyday lives.  We like the pleasure of eating sweet things, but they satisfy 
only temporarily.  Soon, we want more.  We crave the better job, the prettier spouse, the slicker 
car, the bigger house, but they do not satisfy for long.  Soon, we want more, better, newer.  New 
desires become the source of new cravings and pain.  The basic source of our discontent is our 
attachment to ourselves and the fulfillment of our desires.  Only by releasing ourselves from 
these attachments – overcoming our devotion to ourselves as distinct and special – can the 




1) The over-riding emphases in Buddhist ethics are the virtues of compassion and nudita, which 
can be roughly translated as “joy in the joy of others.”  While other virtues are also important as 
well, including gratitude, honesty, and charity, and there are schools of thought other than 
Buddhism that recognize the importance of these traits, compassion and nudita are particularly 
distinctive in Buddhism.  A virtue in the Buddhist sense includes not merely certain kinds of 
actions.  One can, after all, do occasional compassionate things without being a compassionate 
person.  To have the virtues of compassion and nudita, one needs two further things beyond right 
actions.  First, one has to have the proper “mindset,” so to speak.  Compassionate people act 
compassionately not for the sake of their own happiness, or to live up to some external code or a 
set of rules.  They do not do compassionate deeds to impress others or achieve “nirvana.”  
Rather, compassionate people act out of sincere and genuine love and concern for others.  
Second, the behavior of truly compassionate people reflects their deeper character.  Thinking and 
feeling in the appropriate ways are habitual and instinctive, not actions to be checked off a 
checklist or by strenuous acts of willpower.   
 
2) A second key emphasis in Buddhism worth mentioning here, and one that sets it apart from 
more western approaches to life, such as Christianity, is the emphasis on practice.   Buddhists 
advocate meditation as a way to reform the mind.  (Scientific studies show that the brain wave 
activity of lifelong meditators, such as the “happiest man in the world,” Matthieu Ricard, is 
importantly different than that of most people). Also, Buddhists stress ethics as a kind of 
fundamental life commitment and orientation.  Compare with Christianity, for instance, as 
encapsulated in John 3:16: “Whosoever believes in [Jesus, the son of God] shall not perish but 
have eternal life.”  The stress on “belief” and belief alone is unmistakable, which is not to deny 
of course that Christianity also stresses ethics.  Christians often speak as though one can be “born 
again” through a conversion experience or some other way of “coming to believe” and they 
typically think that human nature is in some sense irredeemable without the gift of God’s grace.  
Buddhists, by contrast, emphasize habitual training and life reorientation to a greater degree.   
 





The text below is edited by S. Bruton, adapted from  
“The Buddhist Core Values and Perspectives for Protection Challenges: Faith and Protection,” accessed at 
https://www.unhcr.org/50be10cb9.pdf on Feb. 2, 2020. 
 
THE BUDDHIST CORE VALUES 
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
The Basic Teachings of Buddha which are core to Buddhism are: 
• The Three Universal Truths; 
• The Four Noble Truths; and 
• The Noble Eightfold Path. 
 
II. THE THREE UNIVERSAL TRUTHS 
 
1. Nothing is lost in the universe 
2. Everything Changes 
3. The Law of Cause and Effect 
 
In Buddhism, the law of karma, says "for every event that occurs, there will follow another event 
whose existence was caused by the first, and this second event will be pleasant or unpleasant 
according as its cause was skillful or unskillful." Therefore, the law of Karma teaches that the 
responsibility for unskillful actions is borne by the person who commits them. 
 
After his enlightenment, the Buddha went to the Deer Park near the holy city of Benares and shared 
his new understanding with five holy men. They understood immediately and became his disciples. 
This marked the beginning of the Buddhist community. For the next forty-five years, the Buddha and 
his disciples went from place to place in India spreading the Dharma, his teachings. Their 
compassion knew no bounds; they helped everyone along the way, beggars, kings and slave girls.  At 
night, they would sleep where they were; when hungry they would ask for a little food. 
 
Wherever the Buddha went, he won the hearts of the people because he dealt with their true feelings. 
He advised them not to accept his words on blind faith, but to decide for themselves whether his 
teachings are right or wrong, then follow them. He encouraged everyone to have compassion for 
each other and develop their own virtue: "You should do your own work, for I can teach only the 
way." 
 
Once, the Buddha and his disciple Ananda visited a monastery where a monk was suffering from a 
contagious disease. The poor man lay in a mess with no one looking after him. The Buddha himself 
washed the sick monk and placed him on a new bed. Afterwards, he admonished the other monks: 
"Monks, you have neither mother nor father to look after you. If you do not look after each other, 
who will look after you? Whoever serves the sick and suffering, serves me." 
 
After many such cycles, if a person releases their attachment to desire and the self, they can attain 
Nirvana. This is a state of liberation and freedom from suffering. 
 
The three trainings or practices 
 
These three consist of: 
 
1. Sila: Virtue, good conduct, morality. This is based on two fundamental principles: The 
principle of equality: that all living entities are equal. The principle of reciprocity: This is  
the "Golden Rule" in Christianity - to do unto others as you would wish them to do unto  
you.  It is found in all major religions. 
 
2. Samadhi: Concentration, meditation, mental development. Developing one's mind is the 
path to wisdom which, in turn, leads to personal freedom. Mental development also 
strengthens and controls our mind; this helps us maintain good conduct. 
 
3. Prajna: Discernment, insight, wisdom, enlightenment. This is the real heart of Buddhism. 
Wisdom will emerge if your mind is pure and calm. 
 
The first two paths listed in the Eightfold Path, described below, refer to discernment; the last three 
belong to concentration; the middle three are related to virtue. 
 
III. THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS 
 
The Buddha's Four Noble Truths explore human suffering. They may be described (somewhat 
simplistically) as: 
 
1. Dukkha: Suffering exists: Life is suffering. Suffering is real and almost universal. Suffering 
has many causes: loss, sickness, pain, failure, and the impermanence of pleasure. 
2. Samudaya: There is a cause of suffering. Suffering is due to attachment. It is the desire to 
have and control things. It can take many forms: craving of sensual pleasures; the desire for 
fame; the desire to avoid unpleasant sensations, like fear, anger or jealousy. 
 
3. Nirodha: There is an end to suffering. Attachment can be overcome. Suffering ceases with 
the final liberation of Nirvana (Nibbana). The mind experiences complete freedom, 
liberation and non-attachment. It lets go of any desire or craving. 
 
4. Magga: In order to end suffering, you must follow the Eightfold Path. There is a path for 
accomplishing this. 
 
The five precepts 
 
These are rules to live by. They are somewhat analogous to the second half of the Ten 
Commandments in Judaism and Christianity -- that part of the Decalogue which describes behaviors 
to avoid. However, they are recommendations, not commandments. Believers are expected to use 
their own intelligence in deciding exactly how to apply these rules: 
 
1. Do not kill. This is sometimes translated as "not harming" or an absence of violence. 
 
2. Do not steal. This is generally interpreted as including the avoidance of fraud and economic 
exploitation. 
 
3. Do not lie. This is sometimes interpreted as including name-calling, gossip, etc. 
 
4. Do not misuse sex. For monks and nuns, this means any departure from complete celibacy. 
For the laity, adultery is forbidden, along with any sexual harassment or exploitation, 
including that within marriage. The Buddha did not discuss consensual premarital sex within 
a committed relationship, thus, Buddhist traditions differ on this. Most Buddhists, probably 
influenced by their local cultures, condemn same-sex sexual activity regardless of the nature 
of the relationship between the people involved. 
 
5. Do not consume alcohol or other drugs. The main concern here is that intoxicants cloud the 
mind. Some have included as a drug other methods of divorcing ourselves from reality -- 
e.g. movies, television, and the Internet. 
 
Those preparing for monastic life or who are not within a family are expected to avoid an additional 
five activities: 
 
6. Taking untimely meals. 
7. Dancing, singing, music, watching grotesque mime. 
8. Use of garlands, perfumes and personal adornment. 
9. Use of high seats. 
10. Accepting gold or silver. 
 
There is also a series of eight precepts which are composed of the first seven listed above, followed 
by the  eighth  and  ninth  combined  as  one.  "Ordained  Theravada  monks  promise  to  follow  
227 precepts!" THE EIGHTFOLD PATH 
 
The Buddha's Eightfold Path consists of: 
Panna: Discernment, wisdom: 
 
1. Samma ditthi: Right Understanding of the Four Noble Truths. Right View is the true 
understanding of the four noble truths. 
 
2. Samma sankappa: Right thinking; following the right path in life. Right Aspiration is the  
true desire to free oneself from attachment, ignorance, and hatefulness. 
 
These two are referred to as Prajna, or Wisdom. 
 
Sila: Virtue, morality: 
 
3. Samma vaca: Right speech: No lying, criticism, condemning, gossip, harsh language. Right 
Speech involves abstaining from lying, gossiping, or hurtful talk. 
 
4. Samma kammanta Right conduct or Right Action involves abstaining from hurtful 
behaviors, such as killing, stealing, and careless sex. These are called the Five Precepts. 
 
5. Samma ajiva: Right livelihood: Support yourself without harming others. Right Livelihood 
means making your living in such a way as to avoid dishonesty and hurting others, including 
animals. 
 
These three are referred to as Shila, or Morality. 
 
Samadhi: Concentration, meditation: 
 
6. Samma vayama: Right Effort: Promote good thoughts; conquer evil thoughts. Right Effort is 
a matter of exerting oneself in regards to the content of one's mind: Bad qualities should be 
abandoned and prevented from arising again. Good qualities should be enacted and nurtured. 
 
7. Samma sati: Right Mindfulness: Become aware of your body, mind and feelings. Right 
Mindfulness is the focusing of one's attention on one's body, feelings, thoughts, and 
consciousness in such a way as to overcome craving, hatred, and ignorance. 
 
8. Samma samadhi: Right Concentration: Meditate to achieve a higher state of consciousness. 
Right Concentration is meditating in such a way as to progressively realize a true 
understanding of imperfection, impermanence, and non-separateness 
 
There are, however, many sects of Buddhism and there are different kinds of Buddhist monks all 
over the world. The life and customs of Buddhist monks are not only different and unique but 
consist of a spiritual meaning. Their daily life follows a strict schedule that revolves around 
meditation, study of scriptures, and taking part in ceremonies. There are Buddhist shrines, Buddhist 
monasteries, where monks live, Gompas and Buddhist Stupas all over the world. 
 
Thailand is Buddhist, the highest concentration in the world, with Cambodia, Myanmar, Bhutan,  
Sri Lanka, Tibet, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Viet Nam, Japan, Macao (China) and Taiwan 
Province of China following close behind. 
 
Devotees reaffirm their faith in the five principles called Panchsheel: 
1. Do not to take life; 
2. Do not to steal; 
3. Do not to commit adultery; 
4. Do not lie; 
5. Do not to consume liquor or other intoxicants. 
 
Contributed by Ven. Phramaha Nopadol Saisuta, 
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Sermon on the Mount 
 
Below is the World English Bible (WEB) translation of Jesus’s “Sermon on the Mount” from  
The New Testament book of Matthew, Chapters 5-7.  WEB is a public domain translation of the 
Bible accessed at https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+5-7&version=WEB. 
 
5 Seeing the multitudes, he went up onto the mountain. When he had sat down, his disciples came 
to him. 2 He opened his mouth and taught them, saying, 
3 “Blessed are the poor in spirit, 
    for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. (Isaiah 57:15; 66:2) 
4 Blessed are those who mourn, 
    for they shall be comforted. (Isaiah 61:2; 66:10,13) 
5 Blessed are the gentle, 
    for they shall inherit the earth.[a] (Psalm 37:11) 
6 Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, 
    for they shall be filled. 
7 Blessed are the merciful, 
    for they shall obtain mercy. 
8 Blessed are the pure in heart, 
    for they shall see God. 
9 Blessed are the peacemakers, 
    for they shall be called children of God. 
10 Blessed are those who have been persecuted for righteousness’ sake, 
    for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. 
11 “Blessed are you when people reproach you, persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you 
falsely, for my sake. 12 Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that 
is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you. 
13 “You are the salt of the earth, but if the salt has lost its flavor, with what will it be salted? It is then 
good for nothing, but to be cast out and trodden under the feet of men. 
14 You are the light of the world. A city located on a hill can’t be hidden. 15 Neither do you light a lamp 
and put it under a measuring basket, but on a stand; and it shines to all who are in the house. 16 Even 
so, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is 
in heaven. 
17 “Don’t think that I came to destroy the law or the prophets. I didn’t come to destroy, but to 
fulfill. 18 For most certainly, I tell you, until heaven and earth pass away, not even one smallest 
letter[b] or one tiny pen stroke[c] shall in any way pass away from the law, until all things are 
accomplished. 19 Therefore, whoever shall break one of these least commandments and teach others 
to do so, shall be called least in the Kingdom of Heaven; but whoever shall do and teach them shall 
be called great in the Kingdom of Heaven. 20 For I tell you that unless your righteousness exceeds 
that of the scribes and Pharisees, there is no way you will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. 
21 “You have heard that it was said to the ancient ones, ‘You shall not murder;’ (Exodus 20:13) and 
‘Whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ 22 But I tell you that everyone who is angry 
with his brother without a cause [d] will be in danger of the judgment. Whoever says to his brother, 
‘Raca!’ [e] will be in danger of the council. Whoever says, ‘You fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of 
Gehenna.[f] 
23 “If therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has 
anything against you, 24 leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to 
your brother, and then come and offer your gift. 25 Agree with your adversary quickly while you are 
with him on the way; lest perhaps the prosecutor deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you 
to the officer, and you be cast into prison. 26 Most certainly I tell you, you shall by no means get out 
of there until you have paid the last penny.[g] 
27 “You have heard that it was said, [h] ‘You shall not commit adultery;’ Exodus 20:14 28 but I tell you 
that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his 
heart. 29 If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and throw it away from you. For it is 
more profitable for you that one of your members should perish than for your whole body to be cast 
into Gehenna.[i] 30 If your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off, and throw it away from you. 
For it is more profitable for you that one of your members should perish, than for your whole body 
to be cast into Gehenna.[j] 
31 “It was also said, ‘Whoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorce, 
(’Deuteronomy 24:1) 32 but I tell you that whoever puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual 
immorality, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries her when she is put away commits 
adultery. 
33 “Again you have heard that it was said to the ancient ones, ‘You shall not make false vows, but 
shall perform to the Lord your vows,’ (Numbers 30:2; Deuteronomy 23:21; Ecclesiastes 5:4) 34 but I 
tell you, don’t swear at all: neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; 35 nor by the earth, for it is 
the footstool of his feet; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36 Neither shall you 
swear by your head, for you can’t make one hair white or black. 37 But let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes’ and your 
‘No’ be ‘No.’ Whatever is more than these is of the evil one. 
38 “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. (’Exodus 
21:24; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21) 39 But I tell you, don’t resist him who is evil; but 
whoever strikes you on your right cheek, turn to him the other also. 40 If anyone sues you to take 
away your coat, let him have your cloak also. 41 Whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him 
two. 42 Give to him who asks you, and don’t turn away him who desires to borrow from you. 
43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor (Leviticus 19:18) and hate your 
enemy.’[k] 44 But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate 
you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your 
Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the 
just and the unjust. 46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Don’t even the 
tax collectors do the same? 47 If you only greet your friends, what more do you do than others? Don’t 
even the tax collectors[l] do the same? 48 Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven 
is perfect. 
6 “Be careful that you don’t do your charitable giving[m] before men, to be seen by them, or else you 
have no reward from your Father who is in heaven. 2 Therefore, when you do merciful deeds, don’t 
sound a trumpet before yourself, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they 
may get glory from men. Most certainly I tell you, they have received their reward. 3 But when you do 
merciful deeds, don’t let your left hand know what your right hand does, 4 so that your merciful 
deeds may be in secret, then your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly. 
5 “When you pray, you shall not be as the hypocrites, for they love to stand and pray in the 
synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men. Most certainly, I tell you, 
they have received their reward. 6 But you, when you pray, enter into your inner room, and having 
shut your door, pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward 
you openly. 7 In praying, don’t use vain repetitions as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be 
heard for their much speaking. 8 Therefore don’t be like them, for your Father knows what things 
you need before you ask him. 9 Pray like this: 
“‘Our Father in heaven, may your name be kept holy. 
10 Let your Kingdom come. 
    Let your will be done on earth as it is in heaven. 
11 Give us today our daily bread. 
12 Forgive us our debts, 
    as we also forgive our debtors. 
13 Bring us not into temptation, 
    but deliver us from the evil one. 
For yours is the Kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.’[n] 
14 “For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. 15 But if you 
don’t forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. 
16 “Moreover when you fast, don’t be like the hypocrites, with sad faces. For they disfigure their faces 
that they may be seen by men to be fasting. Most certainly I tell you, they have received their 
reward. 17 But you, when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, 18 so that you are not seen by 
men to be fasting, but by your Father who is in secret; and your Father, who sees in secret, will 
reward you. 
19 “Don’t lay up treasures for yourselves on the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where 
thieves break through and steal; 20 but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth 
nor rust consume, and where thieves don’t break through and steal; 21 for where your treasure is, 
there your heart will be also. 
22 “The lamp of the body is the eye. If therefore your eye is sound, your whole body will be full of 
light. 23 But if your eye is evil, your whole body will be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in 
you is darkness, how great is the darkness! 
24 “No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be 
devoted to one and despise the other. You can’t serve both God and Mammon. 25 Therefore I tell you, 
don’t be anxious for your life: what you will eat, or what you will drink; nor yet for your body, what 
you will wear. Isn’t life more than food, and the body more than clothing? 26 See the birds of the sky, 
that they don’t sow, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns. Your heavenly Father feeds them. 
Aren’t you of much more value than they? 
27 “Which of you by being anxious, can add one moment[o] to his lifespan? 28 Why are you anxious 
about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They don’t toil, neither do they 
spin, 29 yet I tell you that even Solomon in all his glory was not dressed like one of these. 30 But if 
God so clothes the grass of the field, which today exists and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, won’t 
he much more clothe you, you of little faith? 
31 “Therefore don’t be anxious, saying, ‘What will we eat?’, ‘What will we drink?’ or, ‘With what will 
we be clothed?’ 32 For the Gentiles seek after all these things; for your heavenly Father knows that 
you need all these things. 33 But seek first God’s Kingdom and his righteousness; and all these things 
will be given to you as well. 34 Therefore don’t be anxious for tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious 
for itself. Each day’s own evil is sufficient. 
7 “Don’t judge, so that you won’t be judged. 2 For with whatever judgment you judge, you will be 
judged; and with whatever measure you measure, it will be measured to you. 3 Why do you see the 
speck that is in your brother’s eye, but don’t consider the beam that is in your own eye? 4 Or how will 
you tell your brother, ‘Let me remove the speck from your eye,’ and behold, the beam is in your own 
eye? 5 You hypocrite! First remove the beam out of your own eye, and then you can see clearly to 
remove the speck out of your brother’s eye. 
6 “Don’t give that which is holy to the dogs, neither throw your pearls before the pigs, lest perhaps 
they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces. 
7 “Ask, and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. 8 For 
everyone who asks receives. He who seeks finds. To him who knocks it will be opened. 9 Or who is 
there among you who, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone? 10 Or if he asks for a fish, 
who will give him a serpent? 11 If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, 
how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask 
him! 12 Therefore, whatever you desire for men to do to you, you shall also do to them; for this is the 
law and the prophets. 
13 “Enter in by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is broad that leads to destruction, 
and there are many who enter in by it. 14 How[p] the gate is narrow and the way is restricted that 
leads to life! There are who find it. 
15 “Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening 
wolves. 16 By their fruits you will know them. Do you gather grapes from thorns or figs from 
thistles? 17 Even so, every good tree produces good fruit, but the corrupt tree produces evil fruit. 18 A 
good tree can’t produce evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree produce good fruit. 19 Every tree that 
doesn’t grow good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 20 Therefore by their fruits you will 
know them. 
21 “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he who 
does the will of my Father who is in heaven. 22 Many will tell me in that day, ‘Lord, Lord, didn’t we 
prophesy in your name, in your name cast out demons, and in your name do many mighty 
works?’ 23 Then I will tell them, ‘I never knew you. Depart from me, you who work iniquity.’ 
24 “Everyone therefore who hears these words of mine and does them, I will liken him to a wise man 
who built his house on a rock. 25 The rain came down, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat 
on that house; and it didn’t fall, for it was founded on the rock. 26 Everyone who hears these words of 
mine and doesn’t do them will be like a foolish man who built his house on the sand. 27 The rain 
came down, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house; and it fell—and its fall was 
great.” 
28 When Jesus had finished saying these things, the multitudes were astonished at his teaching, 29 for 
he taught them with authority, and not like the scribes. 
Footnotes: 
a. 5:5 or, land. 
b. 5:18 literally, iota 
c. 5:18 or, serif 
d. 5:22 NU omits “without a cause”. 
e. 5:22 “Raca” is an Aramaic insult, related to the word for “empty” and conveying the idea of 
empty-headedness. 
f. 5:22 or, Hell 
g. 5:26 literally, kodrantes. A kodrantes was a small copper coin worth about 2 lepta (widow’s 
mites)—not enough to buy very much of anything. 
h. 5:27 TR adds “to the ancients”. 
i. 5:29 or, Hell 
j. 5:30 or, Hell 
k. 5:43 not in the Bible, but see Qumran Manual of Discipline Ix, 21-26 
l. 5:47 NU reads “Gentiles” instead of “tax collectors”. 
m. 6:1 NU reads “acts of righteousness” instead of “charitable giving” 
n. 6:13 NU omits “For yours is the Kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.” 
o. 6:27 literally, cubit 
p. 7:14 TR reads “Because” instead of “How” 
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“France-003236- Blaise Pascal” by Dennis Jarvis is licensed by CC BY-SA 2.0 
 
Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) was a French “polymath”: a genius who made lasting contributions 
to multiple branches of knowledge.  While best known today as a mathematician, and more 
specifically, the person who essentially invented statistics and made important contributions to 
the mathematics of projective geometry, Pascal also was a prominent scientist, theologian and 
philosopher.  To this day, many computer science students are required to learn “Pascal,” a 
powerful programming language named after him, he designed and built an early calculating 
machine and designed Paris’ first public transportation system, and students in college 
Introduction to Philosophy classes often learn “Pascal’s Wager,” a clever bit of statistical 
reasoning used to show the rationality of belief in God.  His mother died when he was only 3, 
and he was raised and educated by his father Ètienne, who stepped down from his prestigious 
government job to tutor Blaise and his two sisters.  Pascal’s unusual intellectual abilities were 
obvious at an early age.   
 
Contemporary students may find the following anecdote memorable and amusing.  Though he 
was an amateur mathematician himself, Ètienne worried that the boy would be so enraptured by 
math he wouldn’t continue to pay attention to his other subjects.  So he hid his math books in a 
locked closet to keep them away from the boy in his youth.  When the boy was about 11, the 
father found Blaise behind the house doing geometry, having already worked out much of what 
Euclid had figured out centuries before.  Overcome by joy, Ètienne unlocked all of his math 
books and let his son loose on them.  By the age of 16, Pascal was presenting his work to a 
leading group of French scientists in Paris.1  
 
In his early 20s, the Pascal house was visited by two brothers, the Deschamps, who came to help 
Ètienne recover from a broken thigh. The brothers were much influenced by Saint-Cyran’s 
 
1 Thomas V. Morris, 1992. Making Sense of It All: Pascal and the Meaning of Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans). 
 
theological Christian taught.  Saint-Cyran stressed the “nothingness” of human nature and 
preached a guilt–heavy brand of Christianity.  Gloomy or not, through the influence of the 
Deschamps’, Saint-Cyran’s teachings left a heavy mark on Pascal.  He became much more 
religious after their visit, and by the time he was in his 30’s, Pascal began thinking about writing 
his own book on theology.  Though he died before the book was written – he was only 39 when 
his sickly life ended – in preparation for his book, he started a notebook in which he wrote down 
thoughts later to be used in the book.  Some of the entries are brief observations or remarks.  
Others are longer chunks, in which Pascal is developing an argument or clarifying a concept.  
Today, we know this journal as the Pensèes (“Thoughts”).  
 
Much of what is impressive about the Pensèes for today’s reader is Pascal’s striking insights into 
human nature and the human condition.  While Pascal’s low opinion of man is off-putting to 
some, his perceptiveness as to the causes of our wretchedness and our woes is startling, even 
today.  Often, these insights produce eminently quotable aphorisms (short sayings), like the well-
known aphorism: “The sole cause of man’s unhappiness is that he does not know how to stay 
quietly in his room,” an effect of our constant yearning for distraction.  Watch Americans today 
instinctively grab for their cell phones to scroll through social media feeds as soon as they walk 




1)  Pascal sees mankind’s nature as the product of two different dualities, and as being 
(potentially) part of three “orders.”  Like other animals we are have instincts and desires, but we 
also have “heart,” Pascal’s ennobling way of referring to our emotions.  But as long as we lively 
solely in these terms, as possessors of desires, instincts and passions, the mere order of nature, 
our selfishness dooms us to being wretched and miserable.  However, we also have reason and 
thought, and this makes us part of the intellectual/rational order.  Our rational capacities gives us 
natural dignity that other animals lack.  But were we consigned solely to the orders of desire and 
reason, our lives will be marked by selfishness, boredom, anxiety, and a relentless striving to 
avoid the death that surely awaits us all.  “Even if the universe were to crush him, man would 
still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying and the advantage the universe 
has over him. The universe knows nothing of this. Thus, all our dignity consists in thought.”  So, 
while thought gives us a dignity and value other creatures lack, reason and instinct alone won’t 
save us from wretchedness. 
 
However, we also are at least potentially part of the third, higher order, the spiritual order, or 
what Pascal sometimes calls the order of charity.  We are not just natural beings, through God’s 
grace we can be favored and saved in a way other animals are not.  Passage 234: “The heart has 
its order, the mind has its own, which uses principles and demonstrations… Jesus Christ and St. 
Paul possess the order of charity, not of the mind, for they wished to humble, not to teach….” 
Through this order of grace, an “order” that is not really within our control but is given to us as a 
free gift from God, life can become meaningful and worthwhile.  Until we accept God’s grace, 
we are locked in the prison of our own selfishness, captives of the dual natural capacities for 
desire and reason.   
 
2) In his ethics, Pascal can be seen as charting a middle ground between the skepticism of 
Montaigne and the dogmatic rigor of Stoics like Epictetus.  Pascal’s French predecessor, 
Montaigne, doubted the capacity of reason as a guide to goodness and meaning in life.  In 
response, he suggested that the best policy was simply to follow our natural inclinations, avoid 
excesses, and not worry too much.  (cf. Apology for Raymond Sebond). Against this kind of 
permissive self-indulgence, Pascal fundamentally sides with the Stoic emphasis on moral effort 
and the condemnation of passion.  However, Pascal disagrees with Stoic position that right 
reason is sufficient as a guide and salvific path.   
 



















































Hence	 it	 happens	 that	 if	 any	have	 some	 interest	 in	being	 loved	by	us,	 they	are	 averse	 to	














































































































been	 hunting	 so	 hotly	 for	 the	 last	 six	 hours.	 He	 requires	 nothing	more.	 However	 full	 of	
sadness	a	man	may	be,	he	is	happy	for	the	time,	if	you	can	prevail	upon	him	to	enter	into	
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For	the	knowledge	of	 first	principles,	as	space,	 time,	motion,	number,	 is	as	sure	as	any	of	
those	which	we	get	from	reasoning.	And	reason	must	trust	these	intuitions	of	the	heart,	and	
must	base	 them	on	every	argument.	 (We	have	 intuitive	knowledge	of	 the	 tri-dimensional	
nature	of	space,	and	of	the	infinity	of	number,	and	reason	then	shows	that	there	are	no	two	
square	numbers	one	of	which	is	double	of	the	other.	Principles	are	intuited,	propositions	are	







But	 nature	 has	 refused	 us	 this	 boon.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 she	 has	 given	 us	 but	 very	 little	
knowledge	of	this	kind;	and	all	the	rest	can	be	acquired	only	by	reasoning.	
Therefore,	 those	 to	whom	God	has	 imparted	religion	by	 intuition	are	very	 fortunate,	and	
justly	convinced.	But	to	those	who	do	not	have	it,	we	can	give	it	only	by	reasoning,	waiting	




The	 heart	 has	 its	 own	 order;	 the	 intellect	 has	 its	 own,	 which	 is	 by	 principle	 and	
demonstration.	 The	 heart	 has	 another.	 We	 do	 not	 prove	 that	 we	 ought	 to	 be	 loved	 by	
enumerating	in	order	the	causes	of	love;	that	would	be	ridiculous.	
Jesus	Christ	and	Saint	Paul	employ	the	rule	of	love,	not	of	intellect;	for	they	would	warm,	not	





Man	 is	 but	 a	 reed,	 the	most	 feeble	 thing	 in	 nature;	 but	 he	 is	 a	 thinking	 reed.	 The	 entire	
universe	need	not	arm	itself	to	crush	him.	A	vapour,	a	drop	of	water	suffices	to	kill	him.	But,	
if	the	universe	were	to	crush	him,	man	would	still	be	more	noble	than	that	which	killed	him,	































The	greatness	 of	man.—The	greatness	of	man	 is	 so	 evident,	 that	 it	 is	 even	proved	by	his	













































But	 if	 there	 were	 three	 lives	 to	 gain,	 you	 would	 have	 to	 play	 (since	 you	 are	 under	 the	
necessity	 of	 playing),	 and	 you	would	 be	 imprudent,	when	 you	 are	 forced	 to	 play,	 not	 to	
chance	your	life	to	gain	three	at	a	game	where	there	is	an	equal	risk	of	loss	and	gain.	But	






























Follow	the	way	by	which	they	began;	by	acting	as	 if	 they	believed,	 taking	the	holy	water,	


















be	 deceived	 on	 this	 occasion	 as	 before.	 And	 thus,	 while	 the	 present	 never	 satisfies	 us,	









earth,	 the	 elements,	 plants,	 cabbages,	 leeks,	 animals,	 insects,	 calves,	 serpents,	 fever,	







































If	 the	members	 of	 natural	 and	 civil	 communities	 tend	 towards	 the	weal	 of	 the	body,	 the	
communities	 themselves	 ought	 to	 look	 to	 another	more	 general	 body	 of	which	 they	 are	
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Study Guide: 4. Pascal 
 
Pascal thinks our self-love and human Ego is a chief source of our misery and our morally 
depraved (sinful, corrupt) condition.  Describe some of the many ways Pascal thinks this self-
love shapes our tendencies, actions, and instincts.   
 
How is our heart different from a “heart full of equity and justice”? 
 
How is it that human society is “founded on mutual deceit”?  What does Pascal mean by this, 
and is he right?   
 
How do we seek diversion, and what are we seeking diversion from?  
 
In what does mankind’s whole dignity, whole merit, and whole duty consist? 
 
Comment on Pascal’s analysis of pride and vanity.  Are they useful qualities, or admirable traits?  
Are Pascal’s views on these matters in sync with what American pop culture values and 
admires?  Why or why not?   
 
One of Pascal’s better-known and loved aphorisms is his claim that “the heart has its reasons, 
which reason does not know.”  What’s the relevance of that to Pascal’s larger views about how 
we should live?   
 
How many orders are there?  What is an order, after all?  Describe Pascal’s concept of an order 
for someone who may not be familiar with this use of the term.   
 
On what grounds does Pascal criticize Stoicism?   
 
What does Pascal mean by the following: “The greatness of man is great in that he knows 
himself to be miserable.  A tree does not know itself to be miserable.  It is then being miserable 
to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.”  In 
what sense could it be “great” to know oneself to be miserable?   
 
When Pascal argues that “God is, or He is not,” but that “reason can decide nothing here,” what’s 
the point?  Should we believe in God, and on what basis?   
 
Can mankind become happy “on his own”?  Comment on Pascal’s notion of “the true and only 
virtue.” 
Frankl -- Historical Background and Key Themes 
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Viktor Frankl (1905 – 1997) was an Austrian neurologist, psychiatrist, author, and Holocaust 
survivor.  He founded “logotherapy” (“healing through meaning”), a novel form of 
psychotherapy.  While he authored almost 40 books, he is best-known for the perennial best-
seller Man’s Search for Meaning, which describes his experience and insights from having been 
a prisoner at several different Nazi concentration camps.   
 
Prior to being sent to the concentration camps because he was Jewish, Frankl had risen to the 
head of neurology at Vienna’s Rothchild Hospital.  Following his liberation from the camps, he 
established a private practice, became head of neurology at Vienna Policlinic Hospital, authored 
books, and later became highly sought after as a lecturer and public speaker.  By the end of his 
life, he’d received 29 honorary doctoral degrees, and was internationally beloved. In 1991, 
Man’s Search for Meaning was listed as “one of the ten most influential books in the U.S.” by 
the Library of Congress. 
 
The key idea in logotherapy is that the search for meaning in life is the primary motivational 
force human beings.  The “therapy” involves helping clients find meaning in their own life and 
practicing ways to purse meaningful goals.  As identified in later writings, Frankl recognized 
three chief ways of finding meaning: 1) making a difference in the world through our actions and 
creative activities (“Creative Values”), 2) experiencing things of value (e.g., beauty, love) or 
encountering people (love) (“Experiential Values), 3) Maintaining a courageous and admirable 




1)  As described above, Frankl’s life recommendations focus on the importance of finding and 
pursuing meaning in life.  However, he is not dogmatic about what meaning consists in, 
acknowledging that individuals have to find meaning for themselves.  His emphasis on meaning 
is captured in his favorite of Nietzsche’s aphorisms: “those who have a ‘why’ to live can bear 
with almost any ‘how’.”  He does not believe that becoming happy or achieving success are 
worthwhile life goals; the more these became the focus of our lives, the more they will elude us.  
“Success, like happiness,” cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the 
unintended side effect of one’s personal dedication to a cause greater.”  
   
2) Echoing a theme from Stoicism, Frankl emphasizes the importance of choosing one’s attitude.  
“Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms – to choose 
one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”  Faced with years in 
concentration camps, living with minimal basis for hope and little or no control over the most 
basic aspects of life, Frankl’s conclusion was, “When we are no longer able to change a 
situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.” Even suffering itself can be re-purposed in a 
quest for meaning: “In some ways suffering cease to be suffering at the moment it finds a 
meaning, such as the meaning of a sacrifice.”    
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Study Guide: 5. Frankl 
 
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning 
 
Reading Chunk Number 1: Experiences in a Concentration Camp (beginning) up to the 
paragraph that begins: “Apathy, the main symptom of the second phase….” 
 
Questions: 
What/who were the Capos?   
What/who are the SS? 
How are the prisoners known to the guards, e.g., by last names, derogatory nick names, numbers, 
ID badges, or what? 
Frankl says there are various stages of reaction prisoners go through in adjusting to the reality of 
being in the camp.  How many?   
The majority of prisoners upon first arrival to the camp were sent where?   
Frankl’s most possession, which he tries in vain to keep from being seized by the greedy and 
cruel guards, is ___________. 
Dostoyesky, famed Russian author, is remembered by Frankl to have claimed that man can 
___________. 
The first phase of adjusting to camp life, Frankl claims, is characterized by _____________. 
Prior to being sent to the camp, Frankl’s work as a doctor was at _______________ 
The prisoners’ food, what little they received, typically consisted of ____________ 
 
Reading Chunk Number 2: The paragraph that begins: “Apathy, the main symptom of the second 
phase….” up to the paragraph that begins: “Long after I had resumed….”.  
 
One thing that was constantly in the minds and dreams of the most prisoners was…. 
Frankl came to grasp what he describes as the greatest secret that human poetry and human 
thought have to impart: the salvation of man is through ________. 
“In a position of utter desolation, when man cannot express himself in positive action, when his 
only achievement may consist in enduring his sufferings in the right way – an honorable way – 
in such a position man can, through loving contemplation of the image he carries 
of___________, achieve fulfillment.” 
“For the first time in my life, I was able to understand the meaning of the words, ‘The angels are 
lost in perpetual contemplation of an infinite _______’”. 
Later on in his internment, Frankl wonders if his wife:  
Prisoners lost/did not entirely lose their appreciation for beauty? 
The lack of a chimney at a camp signals________. 
Frankl’s closest friend in the camp was________. 
“Delousing,” as he describes it, was needed to _________. 
 
Reading Chunk #3: The paragraph that begins: “Long after I had resumed normal life again (that 
means a long time after my release from camp)…..” up to the paragraph that begins: “We have 
stated that that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoner’s inner self…” 
1. Despite being in the “sick quarters” at the time, Frankl, volunteered to___________. 
2. When living in a world that made individuals into “objects to be exterminated,” Frankl 
compares the threatened loss of personal identity to being________________. 
3. Frankl helped to hide 3 men from a transport headed to Dachau by helping conceal them in 
_________. 
4. In order to save his brother from being transferred to another camp, one young prisoner had 
to____. 
5. In the tragic little tale of the servant trying to flee Death, the servant tries to evade 
by_________. 
6. The first sign of the outsiders who would rescue them was___________________. 
7. Those who had escaped just before the white flag of surrender was raised was a group that 8. 
Frankl narrowly missed being a part of.  The group ended up______. 
9. Even under the most severe mental and physical stress, Frank affirms that man always retains 
a last “spiritual” freedom, which is the freedom to__________. 
10. Dostoevsky claimed that the one things he dreaded was _______________. 
11. Their spiritual freedom that makes life purposeful and meaningful is the last inner freedom to 
___________. 
12. The young woman who was about to die describes the only friend she had in those last days.  
The friend, who she talked to____________. 
     
Reading Chunk #4: The paragraph that begins: “We have stated that that which was ultimately 
responsible for the state of the prisoner’s inner self…..” through to the end of Part I, and short 
selections from Part II (Logotherapy). 
 
1. “Only people who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to _______ 
eventually fell victim to the camp’s degenerating influences.”  
2. One of the keys to survival, and holding onto to a sense of one’s ultimate meaning in life, was 
the ability to see ____________. 
4. Frankl quotes Spinoza, the great 17th Jewish philosopher, as claiming that the emotion of 
suffering ceases to be suffering as soon as we ______________.   
5. The prisoners who lost their faith in the future ____________. 
6. Frankl tells a striking story of a prisoner who dreamed that their camp would be rescued 
March 30, 1945.  On the 30th, the day his dream had predicted, as it became clear that they would 
not be rescued that day after all, the prisoner _________________.   
7. Nietzche’s words (again): He who has a why to live can bear with almost any _______.  
8. What mattered, in the end, was not what they the prisoners expected from life, but from “what 
life expected from us.” By this point, Frankl means to stress the importance of each individual’s 
___________________-.  
9. Frankl thinks man’s “destiny” is ___________________.  
10. The camp had a strict rule forbidding interference with those _____________.  
11. Frankl also cites the famous Nietzsche quote: “That which does not kill me,….”  
12. The “third stage” of the prisoners’ reactions to camp life was _________.   
13.  The two “races” of men in the world are the “race” of ______ men and the “race” of 
________ men.  
14. Frankl cites the principle that no one has a right to do wrong, not even if wrong has been 
done to them in reaction to a fellow prisoner who tries to rationalize __________.   
15. In their homecoming, the wonderful feeling the surviving prisoners experienced was the 
feeling that there is nothing he need fear any more, except __________. 
16.  Logotherapy sees the essence of human existence in __________.   
 
Pascal thinks our self-love and human Ego is a chief source of our misery and our morally 
depraved (sinful, corrupt) condition.  Describe some of the many ways Pascal thinks this self-
love shapes our tendencies, actions, and instincts.   
 
How is our heart different from a “heart full of equity and justice”? 
 
How is it that human society is “founded on mutual deceit”?  What does Pascal mean by this, 
and is he right?   
 
How do we seek diversion, and what are we seeking diversion from?  
 
In what does mankind’s whole dignity, whole merit, and whole duty consist? 
 
Comment on Pascal’s analysis of pride and vanity.  Are they useful qualities, or admirable traits?  
Are Pascal’s views on these matters in sync with what American pop culture values and 
admires?  Why or why not?   
 
One of Pascal’s better-known and loved aphorisms is his claim that “the heart has its reasons, 
which reason does not know.”  What’s the relevance of that to Pascal’s larger views about how 
we should live?   
 
How many orders are there?  What is an order, after all?  Describe Pascal’s concept of an order 
for someone who may not be familiar with this use of the term.   
 
On what grounds does Pascal criticize Stoicism?   
 
What does Pascal mean by the following: “The greatness of man is great in that he knows 
himself to be miserable.  A tree does not know itself to be miserable.  It is then being miserable 
to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.”  In 
what sense could it be “great” to know oneself to be miserable?   
 
When Pascal argues that “God is, or He is not,” but that “reason can decide nothing here,” what’s 
the point?  Should we believe in God, and on what basis?   
 
Can mankind become happy “on his own”?  Comment on Pascal’s notion of “the true and only 
virtue.” 
Schopenhauer – Historical Background and Key Themes 
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Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860 CE) is often called the most pessimistic philosopher in 
history, and for good reason. He is also the first western philosopher to have taken seriously (and 
to have been seriously influenced by) eastern philosophy. His master work, The World as Will 
and Representation, was written and published when Schopenhauer was a young man.  However, 
it was virtually ignored through most of his life.  His accomplishments brought him recognition 
and fame only in his 60’s, and arguably, his work has never received the respect and attention it 
deserves.  But he has been a profound influence on some important figures, including the great 
German opera composer, Richard Wagner, and a keen admirer of both Schopenhauer and 
Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as the great physicists Albert Einstein and Erwin 
Schrödinger.   
 
The details of Schopenhauer’s views are tied to his unique metaphysical conception of the world. 
Schopenhauer followed his great German predecessor, Immanuel Kant, in drawing an important 
distinction between the world as it is “in itself” (that is, independent of how we understand it) 
and the world as we experience it. (The former is the noumenal world, the latter is the 
phenomenal world.) As for Kant, Schopenhauer thought of the phenomenal world as a world 
structured by our sense experience; it is a world that exists in space and time, governed by laws 
of cause and effect. It is the world we see, hear, feel, and so forth.  Departing from Kant, 
Schopenhauer thought of the world in itself as consisting of a blind, purposeless energy, a 
“drive” or a “striving” he called the “Will.” The Will is a kind of relentless and senseless force, 
all-encompassing and always operative.  For human beings, the underlying reality of this 
universal Will manifests itself as raw desires, impulses, and cravings, such as we see in every 
organic being’s striving to survive. Creatures continue living by competing relentlessly: “dog eat 
dog,” as we often say.  Animals endure only as long as they can consume other beings and avoid 
being consumed by creatures that are bigger, stronger, and more ruthless.  On a human level, this 
striving is manifested in our attitudes towards the natural world – as a world there to be exploited 
for our own benefit – and in basic human desires for food and sex and power.  In a curious way, 
Schopenhauer largely agrees with the Buddhist doctrine of “no self.”  What each of us really is is 
a collection of cravings, instincts, and urges.  Neither is there is a God; “the original sin,” he 
thinks, “is the crime of existence itself.” 
 
Schopenhauer draws several important conclusions about how we should live based on this 
rather dismal picture.  First, he thinks our existence, and the existence of all animals, is 
essentially a life of suffering.  What makes our fate even worse than that of the “brutes” is that 
we’re acutely conscious of our sufferings and anticipate them.  (Animals enjoy blissful ignorance 
to a significant degree.)  On this point, he and Pascal are in full agreement.  Also, our capacity 
for boredom, largely unknown to brutes, makes our lot much worse.  To be sure, through our 
acquisitions, we may attain fleeting satisfactions and a temporary respite from our own relentless 
drives.  But such pleasures are short-lived; soon we become slaves to different, even stronger 
cravings.   
 
Second, for Schopenhauer, there are only two antidotes to this suffering: compassion, and the 
temporary relief that comes from aesthetic experience (art, music, literature, and so forth). Each 
in their own way, compassion and art have the ability to take people “outside” of themselves, as 
it were, and distract them from their own miserable conditions. Similar to Buddhists, 
Schopenhauer thought caring and compassionate concern for others was important because 
there’s ultimately no meaningful distinction to be made between different things.  At bottom, we 
are all part of the same, amorphous “oneness” of being.  As for Buddhists, harming others is just 
a less obvious way of harming oneself.  Kind people seem to know a sort of “deep down” truth: 
when it is all said and done, the distinction between living creatures is an illusion.  Compassion 
is “selfless,” we sometimes say, and in this description there is wisdom.  The kind person shows 
an ego-less connection to others.  Release from the demands of one’s own ego, one’s own 
striving self, is a relief.    
   
Key Themes 
 
1. All is Suffering 
 
Suffering is the substance of life; death is the only true escape.  As he wrote in The Wisdom of 
Life, “the most general survey shows us that the two foes of human happiness are pain and 
boredom.  We may go further; and say that in the degree in which we are fortunate enough to get 
away from the one, we approach the other.  Life presents, in fact, a more or less violent 
oscillation between the two.”  We struggle to rid ourselves from pain, but almost as soon as a 
temporary asylum from pain is attained, we find ourselves bored.  The boredom is merely a 
different way of being dissatisfied.    
 
2. Compassion is the key ethical virtue; Escape through the arts 
 
Like Buddhists, Schopenhauer was not a fan of ascetic self-denial.  The ascetic life is a life of 
self-induced, pointless pain.  Asceticism, which was an important aspect of many early 
Christians’ practice of spirituality, reflects a kind of life-denying hatred of existence that he 
thinks is fundamental to the Christian, “New Testament” understanding of the world.  Neither 
would Schopenhauer have been a fan of the materialist consumerism of contemporary America.  
The life of self-gratification, far from freeing ourselves from ourselves, only immerses us more 
deeply in our primitive drives.  Compassion, a way of living for others, is one way out.  But we 
also have another means of relief at our disposal: the arts.  Schopenhauer thought music was the 
highest form of art, because unlike literature, for example, it is not trying to portray or represent 
anything besides itself.  “Because it’s not ‘mimetic,’ or a copy of anything else as, say painting 
is, music depicts the will itself.”  Music is pure expression, a “true universal language” 
understood everywhere.  The great composer “reveals the innermost nature of the world, and 
expresses the profoundest wisdom, in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand.”  
(It’s little mystery that Wagner, the great composer and an individual hardly lacking in ego, 
thought Schopenhauerian philosophy was quite grand.) 
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On the Sufferings of the World 
Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its 
aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the 
world, and originates in needs and necessities inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose 
at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be 
something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule. 
I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring 
evil to be negative in its character. Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence 
felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his 
position by using a palpable and paltry sophism.[1] It is the good which is negative; in other 
words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought 
to an end. 
This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not nearly so pleasant as we expected, 
and pain very much more painful. 
The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or, at any rate, there is an even 
balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see shortly whether this statement is true, let 
him compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other. 
The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will be the thought of other people 
who are in a still worse plight than yourself; and this is a form of consolation open to every one. 
But what an awful fate this means for mankind as a whole! 
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We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out 
first one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of the 
evil Fate may have presently in store for us--sickness, poverty, mutilation, loss of sight or reason. 
No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is continually pressing upon us, 
never letting us take breath, but always coming after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any 
moment Time stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom. 
But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst asunder if the pressure of the 
atmosphere was removed, so, if the lives of men were relieved of all need, hardship and 
adversity; if everything they took in hand were successful, they would be so swollen with 
arrogance that, though they might not burst, they would present the spectacle of unbridled folly--
nay, they would go mad. And I may say, further, that a certain amount of care or pain or trouble 
is necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast is unstable and will not go straight. 
Certain it is that work, worry, labor and trouble, form the lot of almost all men their whole life 
long. But if all wishes were fulfilled as soon as they arose, how would men occupy their lives? 
what would they do with their time? If the world were a paradise of luxury and ease, a land 
flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack obtained his Jill at once and without any 
difficulty, men would either die of boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars, 
massacres, and murders; so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on itself than it 
has now to accept at the hands of Nature. 
In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children in a theatre before the 
curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the play to begin. It is a 
blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times 
when children might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as 
yet all unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless, every man desires to reach old 
age; in other words, a state of life of which it may be said: "It is bad to-day, and it will be worse 
to-morrow; and so on till the worst of all." 
If you try to imagine, as nearly as you can, what an amount of misery, pain and suffering of 
every kind the sun shines upon in its course, you will admit that it would be much better if, on 
the earth as little as on the moon, the sun were able to call forth the phenomena of life; and if, 
here as there, the surface were still in a crystalline state. 
Again, you may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing the blessed calm of non-
existence. And, in any case, even though things have gone with you tolerably well, the longer 
you live the more clearly you will feel that, on the whole, life is a disappointment, nay, a cheat. 
If two men who were friends in their youth meet again when they are old, after being separated 
for a life-time, the chief feeling they will have at the sight of each other will be one of complete 
disappointment at life as a whole; because their thoughts will be carried back to that earlier time 
when life seemed so fair as it lay spread out before them in the rosy light of dawn, promised so 
much--and then performed so little. This feeling will so completely predominate over every other 
that they will not even consider it necessary to give it words; but on either side it will be silently 
assumed, and form the ground-work of all they have to talk about. 
He who lives to see two or three generations is like a man who sits some time in the conjurer's 
booth at a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were 
meant to be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, their 
effect is gone. 
While no man is much to be envied for his lot, there are countless numbers whose fate is to be 
deplored. 
Life is a task to be done. It is a fine thing to say defunctus est; it means that the man has done his 
task. 
If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race 
continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as 
to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden 
upon it in cold blood. 
I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless--because I speak the truth; and 
people prefer to be assured that everything the Lord has made is good. Go to the priests, then, 
and leave philosophers in peace! At any rate, do not ask us to accommodate our doctrines to the 
lessons you have been taught. That is what those rascals of sham philosophers will do for you. 
Ask them for any doctrine you please, and you will get it. Your University professors are bound 
to preach optimism; and it is an easy and agreeable task to upset their theories. 
I have reminded the reader that every state of welfare, every feeling of satisfaction, is negative in 
its character; that is to say, it consists in freedom from pain, which is the positive element of 
existence. It follows, therefore, that the happiness of any given life is to be measured, not by its 
joys and pleasures, but by the extent to which it has been free from suffering--from positive evil. 
If this is the true standpoint, the lower animals appear to enjoy a happier destiny than man. Let us 
examine the matter a little more closely. 
However varied the forms that human happiness and misery may take, leading a man to seek the 
one and shun the other, the material basis of it all is bodily pleasure or bodily pain. This basis is 
very restricted: it is simply health, food, protection from wet and cold, the satisfaction of the 
sexual instinct; or else the absence of these things. Consequently, as far as real physical pleasure 
is concerned, the man is not better off than the brute, except in so far as the higher possibilities of 
his nervous system make him more sensitive to every kind of pleasure, but also, it must be 
remembered, to every kind of pain. But then compared with the brute, how much stronger are the 
passions aroused in him! what an immeasurable difference there is in the depth and vehemence 
of his emotions!--and yet, in the one case, as in the other, all to produce the same result in the 
end: namely, health, food, clothing, and so on. 
The chief source of all this passion is that thought for what is absent and future, which, with 
man, exercises such a powerful influence upon all he does. It is this that is the real origin of his 
cares, his hopes, his fears--emotions which affect him much more deeply than could ever be the 
case with those present joys and sufferings to which the brute is confined. In his powers of 
reflection, memory and foresight, man possesses, as it were, a machine for condensing and 
storing up his pleasures and his sorrows. But the brute has nothing of the kind; whenever it is in 
pain, it is as though it were suffering for the first time, even though the same thing should have 
previously happened to it times out of number. It has no power of summing up its feelings. 
Hence its careless and placid temper: how much it is to be envied! But in man reflection comes 
in, with all the emotions to which it gives rise; and taking up the same elements of pleasure and 
pain which are common to him and the brute, it develops his susceptibility to happiness and 
misery to such a degree that, at one moment the man is brought in an instant to a state of delight 
that may even prove fatal, at another to the depths of despair and suicide. 
If we carry our analysis a step farther, we shall find that, in order to increase his pleasures, man 
has intentionally added to the number and pressure of his needs, which in their original state 
were not much more difficult to satisfy than those of the brute. Hence luxury in all its forms; 
delicate food, the use of tobacco and opium, spirituous liquors, fine clothes, and the thousand 
and one things than he considers necessary to his existence. 
And above and beyond all this, there is a separate and peculiar source of pleasure, and 
consequently of pain, which man has established for himself, also as the result of using his 
powers of reflection; and this occupies him out of all proportion to its value, nay, almost more 
than all his other interests put together--I mean ambition and the feeling of honor and shame; in 
plain words, what he thinks about the opinion other people have of him. Taking a thousand 
forms, often very strange ones, this becomes the goal of almost all the efforts he makes that are 
not rooted in physical pleasure or pain. It is true that besides the sources of pleasure which he has 
in common with the brute, man has the pleasures of the mind as well. These admit of many 
gradations, from the most innocent trifling or the merest talk up to the highest intellectual 
achievements; but there is the accompanying boredom to be set against them on the side of 
suffering. Boredom is a form of suffering unknown to brutes, at any rate in their natural state; it 
is only the very cleverest of them who show faint traces of it when they are domesticated; 
whereas in the case of man it has become a downright scourge. The crowd of miserable wretches 
whose one aim in life is to fill their purses but never to put anything into their heads, offers a 
singular instance of this torment of boredom. Their wealth becomes a punishment by delivering 
them up to misery of having nothing to do; for, to escape it, they will rush about in all directions, 
traveling here, there and everywhere. No sooner do they arrive in a place than they are anxious to 
know what amusements it affords; just as though they were beggars asking where they could 
receive a dole! Of a truth, need and boredom are the two poles of human life. Finally, I may 
mention that as regards the sexual relation, a man is committed to a peculiar arrangement which 
drives him obstinately to choose one person. This feeling grows, now and then, into a more or 
less passionate love,[2] which is the source of little pleasure and much suffering. 
It is, however, a wonderful thing that the mere addition of thought should serve to raise such a 
vast and lofty structure of human happiness and misery; resting, too, on the same narrow basis of 
joy and sorrow as man holds in common with the brute, and exposing him to such violent 
emotions, to so many storms of passion, so much convulsion of feeling, that what he has suffered 
stands written and may be read in the lines on his face. And yet, when all is told, he has been 
struggling ultimately for the very same things as the brute has attained, and with an 
incomparably smaller expenditure of passion and pain. 
But all this contributes to increase the measures of suffering in human life out of all proportion to 
its pleasures; and the pains of life are made much worse for man by the fact that death is 
something very real to him. The brute flies from death instinctively without really knowing what 
it is, and therefore without ever contemplating it in the way natural to a man, who has this 
prospect always before his eyes. So that even if only a few brutes die a natural death, and most of 
them live only just long enough to transmit their species, and then, if not earlier, become the prey 
of some other animal,--whilst man, on the other hand, manages to make so-called natural death 
the rule, to which, however, there are a good many exceptions,--the advantage is on the side of 
the brute, for the reason stated above. But the fact is that man attains the natural term of years 
just as seldom as the brute; because the unnatural way in which he lives, and the strain of work 
and emotion, lead to a degeneration of the race; and so his goal is not often reached. 
The brute is much more content with mere existence than man; the plant is wholly so; and man 
finds satisfaction in it just in proportion as he is dull and obtuse. Accordingly, the life of the 
brute carries less of sorrow with it, but also less of joy, when compared with the life of man; and 
while this may be traced, on the one side, to freedom from the torment of care and anxiety, it is 
also due to the fact that hope, in any real sense, is unknown to the brute. It is thus deprived of 
any share in that which gives us the most and best of our joys and pleasures, the mental 
anticipation of a happy future, and the inspiriting play of phantasy, both of which we owe to our 
power of imagination. If the brute is free from care, it is also, in this sense, without hope; in 
either case, because its consciousness is limited to the present moment, to what it can actually 
see before it. The brute is an embodiment of present impulses, and hence what elements of fear 
and hope exist in its nature--and they do not go very far--arise only in relation to objects that lie 
before it and within reach of those impulses: whereas a man's range of vision embraces the 
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Following upon this, there is one respect in which brutes show real wisdom when compared with 
us--I mean, their quiet, placid enjoyment of the present moment. The tranquillity of mind which 
this seems to give them often puts us to shame for the many times we allow our thoughts and our 
cares to make us restless and discontented. And, in fact, those pleasures of hope and anticipation 
which I have been mentioning are not to be had for nothing. The delight which a man has in 
hoping for and looking forward to some special satisfaction is a part of the real pleasure 
attaching to it enjoyed in advance. This is afterwards deducted; for the more we look forward to 
anything, the less satisfaction we find in it when it comes. But the brute's enjoyment is not 
anticipated, and therefore, suffers no deduction; so that the actual pleasure of the moment comes 
to it whole and unimpaired. In the same way, too, evil presses upon the brute only with its own 
intrinsic weight; whereas with us the fear of its coming often makes its burden ten times more 
grievous. 
It is just this characteristic way in which the brute gives itself up entirely to the present moment 
that contributes so much to the delight we take in our domestic pets. They are the present 
moment personified, and in some respects they make us feel the value of every hour that is free 
from trouble and annoyance, which we, with our thoughts and preoccupations, mostly disregard. 
But man, that selfish and heartless creature, misuses this quality of the brute to be more content 
than we are with mere existence, and often works it to such an extent that he allows the brute 
absolutely nothing more than mere, bare life. The bird which was made so that it might rove over 
half of the world, he shuts up into the space of a cubic foot, there to die a slow death in longing 
and crying for freedom; for in a cage it does not sing for the pleasure of it. And when I see how 
man misuses the dog, his best friend; how he ties up this intelligent animal with a chain, I feel 
the deepest sympathy with the brute and burning indignation against its master. 
We shall see later that by taking a very high standpoint it is possible to justify the sufferings of 
mankind. But this justification cannot apply to animals, whose sufferings, while in a great 
measure brought about by men, are often considerable even apart from their agency.[3] And so 
we are forced to ask, Why and for what purpose does all this torment and agony exist? There is 
nothing here to give the will pause; it is not free to deny itself and so obtain redemption. There is 
only one consideration that may serve to explain the sufferings of animals. It is this: that the will 
to live, which underlies the whole world of phenomena, must, in their case satisfy its cravings by 
feeding upon itself. This it does by forming a gradation of phenomena, every one of which exists 
at the expense of another. I have shown, however, that the capacity for suffering is less in 
animals than in man. Any further explanation that may be given of their fate will be in the nature 
of hypothesis, if not actually mythical in its character; and I may leave the reader to speculate 
upon the matter for himself…. 
According to the doctrines of Buddhism, the world came into being as the result of some 
inexplicable disturbance in the heavenly calm of Nirvana, that blessed state obtained by 
expiation, which had endured so long a time--the change taking place by a kind of fatality. This 
explanation must be understood as having at bottom some moral bearing; although it is 
illustrated by an exactly parallel theory in the domain of physical science, which places the 
origin of the sun in a primitive streak of mist, formed one knows not how. Subsequently, by a 
series of moral errors, the world became gradually worse and worse--true of the physical orders 
as well--until it assumed the dismal aspect it wears to-day. Excellent!... But that a God like 
Jehovah should have created this world of misery and woe, out of pure caprice, and because he 
enjoyed doing it, and should then have clapped his hands in praise of his own work, and declared 
everything to be very good--that will not do at all! In its explanation of the origin of the world, 
Judaism is inferior to any other form of religious doctrine professed by a civilized nation; and it 
is quite in keeping with this that it is the only one which presents no trace whatever of any belief 
in the immortality of the soul.[4] 
Even though Leibnitz' contention, that this is the best of all possible worlds, were correct, that 
would not justify God in having created it. For he is the Creator not of the world only, but of 
possibility itself; and, therefore, he ought to have so ordered possibility as that it would admit of 
something better. 
There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work 
of an all-wise, all-good, and, at the same time, all-powerful Being; firstly, the misery which 
abounds in it everywhere; and secondly, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, 
who is a burlesque of what he should be. These things cannot be reconciled with any such belief. 
On the contrary, they are just the facts which support what I have been saying; they are our 
authority for viewing the world as the outcome of our own misdeeds, and therefore, as something 
that had better not have been. Whilst, under the former hypothesis, they amount to a bitter 
accusation against the Creator, and supply material for sarcasm; under the latter they form an 
indictment against our own nature, our own will, and teach us a lesson of humility. They lead us 
to see that, like the children of a libertine, we come into the world with the burden of sin upon 
us; and that it is only through having continually to atone for this sin that our existence is so 
miserable, and that its end is death. 
There is nothing more certain than the general truth that it is the grievous sin of the world which 
has produced the grievous suffering of the world. I am not referring here to the physical 
connection between these two things lying in the realm of experience; my meaning is 
metaphysical. Accordingly, the sole thing that reconciles me to the Old Testament is the story of 
the Fall. In my eyes, it is the only metaphysical truth in that book, even though it appears in the 
form of an allegory. There seems to me no better explanation of our existence than that it is the 
result of some false step, some sin of which we are paying the penalty…  
[Consider] the Christian idea of death and the Christian coffin, draped in mournful black and 
surmounted with a crucifix! It points to a symbol of suffering and death, points to the denial of 
the will to live, to redemption from this world, the domain of death and devil. The contrast which 
the New Testament presents when compared with the Old, according to the ecclesiastical view of 
the matter, is just that existing between my ethical system and the moral philosophy of Europe. 
The Old Testament represents man as under the dominion of Law, in which, however, there is no 
redemption. The New Testament declares Law to have failed, frees man from its 
dominion,[6] and in its stead preaches the kingdom of grace, to be won by faith, love of neighbor 
and entire sacrifice of self. This is the path of redemption from the evil of the world. The spirit of 
the New Testament is undoubtedly asceticism, however your protestants and rationalists may 
twist it to suit their purpose. Asceticism is the denial of the will to live; and the transition from 
the Old Testament to the New, from the dominion of Law to that of Faith, from justification by 
works to redemption through the Mediator, from the domain of sin and death to eternal life in 
Christ, means, when taken in its real sense, the transition from the merely moral virtues to the 
denial of the will to live. My philosophy shows the metaphysical foundation of justice and the 
love of mankind, and points to the goal to which these virtues necessarily lead, if they are 
practised in perfection. At the same time it is candid in confessing that a man must turn his back 
upon the world, and that the denial of the will to live is the way of redemption. It is therefore 
really at one with the spirit of the New Testament, whilst all other systems are couched in the 
spirit of the Old; that is to say, theoretically as well as practically, their result is Judaism--mere 
despotic theism. In this sense, then, my doctrine might be called the only true Christian 
philosophy--however paradoxical a statement this may seem to people who take superficial 
views instead of penetrating to the heart of the matter. 
If you want a safe compass to guide you through life, and to banish all doubt as to the right way 
of looking at it, you cannot do better than accustom yourself to regard this world as a 
penitentiary, a sort of a penal colony, or [Greek: ergastaerion] as the earliest philosopher called 
it.[7] Vanini puts it forcibly. Man, he says, is so full of every kind of misery that, were it not 
repugnant to the Christian religion, I should venture to affirm that if evil spirits exist at all, they 
have posed into human form and are now atoning for their crimes.[10]And true Christianity--
using the word in its right sense--also regards our existence as the consequence of sin and error. 
If you accustom yourself to this view of life you will regulate your expectations accordingly, and 
cease to look upon all its disagreeable incidents, great and small, its sufferings, its worries, its 
misery, as anything unusual or irregular; nay, you will find that everything is as it should be, in a 
world where each of us pays the penalty of existence in his own peculiar way. Amongst the evils 
of a penal colony is the society of those who form it; and if the reader is worthy of better 
company, he will need no words from me to remind him of what he has to put up with at present. 
If he has a soul above the common, or if he is a man of genius, he will occasionally feel like 
some noble prisoner of state, condemned to work in the galleys with common criminals; and he 
will follow his example and try to isolate himself. 
In general, however, it should be said that this view of life will enable us to contemplate the so-
called imperfections of the great majority of men, their moral and intellectual deficiencies and 
the resulting base type of countenance, without any surprise, to say nothing of indignation; for 
we shall never cease to reflect where we are, and that the men about us are beings conceived and 
born in sin, and living to atone for it. That is what Christianity means in speaking of the sinful 
nature of man. 
Pardon's the word to all![11] Whatever folly men commit, be their shortcomings or their vices 
what they may, let us exercise forbearance; remembering that when these faults appear in others, 
it is our follies and vices that we behold. They are the shortcomings of humanity, to which we 
belong; whose faults, one and all, we share; yes, even those very faults at which we now wax so 
indignant, merely because they have not yet appeared in ourselves. They are faults that do not lie 
on the surface. But they exist down there in the depths of our nature; and should anything call 
them forth, they will come and show themselves, just as we now see them in others. One man, it 
is true, may have faults that are absent in his fellow; and it is undeniable that the sum total of bad 
qualities is in some cases very large; for the difference of individuality between man and man 
passes all measure. 
In fact, the conviction that the world and man is something that had better not have been, is of a 
kind to fill us with indulgence towards one another. Nay, from this point of view, we might well 
consider the proper form of address to be, not Monsieur, Sir, but my fellow-sufferer, my 
companion in misery! This may perhaps sound strange, but it is in keeping with the facts; it puts 
others in a right light; and it reminds us of that which is after all the most necessary thing in life--
the tolerance, patience, regard, and love of neighbor, of which everyone stands in need, and 
which, therefore, every man owes to his fellow. 
Footnotes[edit] 
1. ↑ Translator's Note, cf. Thèod, §153.--Leibnitz argued that evil is a negative quality--i.e., the absence 
of good; and that its active and seemingly positive character is an incidental and not an essential part 
of its nature. Cold, he said, is only the absence of the power of heat, and the active power of 
expansion in freezing water is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The fact is, 
that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an increase of repulsion amongst its molecules; 
and Schopenhauer is quite right in calling the whole argument a sophism. 
2. ↑ I have treated this subject at length in a special chapter of the second volume of my chief work. 
3. ↑ Cf. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. ii. p. 404. 
4. ↑ See Parerga, vol. i. pp. 139 et seq. 
5. ↑ Translator's Note.--Matthias Claudius (1740-1815), a popular poet, and friend 
of Klopstock, Herder and Leasing. He edited the Wandsbecker Bote, in the fourth part of which 
appeared the treatise mentioned above. He generally wrote under the pseudonym of Asmus, and 
Schopenhauer often refers to him by this name. 
6. ↑ Cf. Romans vii; Galatians ii, iii. 
7. ↑ Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. L. iii, c, 3, p. 399. 
8. ↑ Augustine de cìvitate Dei., L. xi. c. 23. 
9. ↑ Cf. Fragmenta de philosophia. 
10. ↑ De admirandis naturae arcanis; dial L. p. 35. 
11. ↑ "Cymbeline," Act v. Sc. 5. 
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Nietzsche is a German philosopher from the late 19th century (1844 – 1900), an exciting 
intellectual rebel whose work is reactionary, passionate and often difficult to interpret.  He lived 
a very sickly life and suffered extended periods of intense physical pain.  He became mostly 
blind and eventually went insane, quite possibly as a result of the syphilis he was infected with in 
his youth.  While for a time he planned on following his father’s footsteps in the ministry, soon 
he abandoned that idea. His early academic training was focused in philology and classics, and 
he was an accomplished scholar of Ancient Greek literature, drama and philosophy. In fact, he 
earned his doctorate degree in philology from University of Leipzig and was appointed as a 
professor at the University of Basel at the age of 25.  Soon enough, however, he took leave of his 
university duties and for most of his adult life he was quite poor, subsisting on minimal residual 
support from his former teaching position, generosity of family, friends, and meager earnings 
from his books.  His writings not particularly popular in his own life, however.   
 
Nietzsche never married.  For a time, he was very close to the great German romantic operatic 
composer, Richard Wagner and Wagner’s wife Cosima.  While the relationship with Wagner left 
lasting marks on Nietzsche, they had a falling out, leading to enduring bitterness.  For much of 
the 20th century, Nietzsche’s reputation as a philosopher was undermined by the ways his sister 
Elizabeth distorted his views after his death.  She was quite selfish and racist – no other way to 
describe it.  Among other scurrilous activities, she encouraged the Nazis to make use of 
Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” in their propaganda.  While Nietzsche does in fact 
make much of the “will to power,” what he meant by it and what the Nazis used it to mean were 
completely different.  Nietzsche is also famous for having written that “God is dead.”  This, too, 
is usually misunderstood as a remark about God’s actual existence (or rather, non-existence).  In 
fact, the target of Nietzsche’s quip was the “deadness” of much Christian belief.  That is, he’s 
criticizing Christians for the decadent and lifeless nature of their religious practices.  (Think of 
the ruthless business person who sits piously and quietly in the pew at Sunday morning worship 
service, and who may say grace at Thanksgiving dinner, but whose life otherwise seems 
unaffected by professed religious beliefs.) 
 
Nietzsche’s writings tend to be highly aphoristic.  (An aphorism is a short saying, often 
superficially puzzling or obscure in its meaning.)  In part, this is because his poor eyesight and 
painful ailments often made it difficult for him to write more than a sentence or two at a time.  In 
part, it is also due to the fact that Nietzsche tries to provoke the reader into engagement with his 
ideas.  Aphorisms are a useful way to get people to think for themselves.  Nietzsche thought 
most people lived their lives as thoughtless conformists and mindless drones.  He unabashedly 
praises the rare few who are willing to break the mold and push themselves relentlessly in a 
quest to become better and better versions of themselves.  One of his own favorite maxims was 
Pindar’s “become what you are.”  Of course in a trivial sense, each of us already is who we are.  




1. Ethics of Self-Mastery 
 
Early in his philosophical development, Nietzsche was much impressed by Schopenhauer’s 
pessimistic determinism and his notion that all life is suffering.  Schopenhauer’s recommended 
response, as Nietzsche saw it, was the essentially romantic notion that we should escape into the 
arts.  (Schopenhauer particularly valued musical experiences in this connection.)  While 
Nietzsche certainly shared this enthusiasm for the arts, his mature ethics are an attempt to ground 
meaning in life in something beyond this kind of escapism.  Rather than try to avoid suffering, 
we should “turn into it,” as it were.  Embrace the suffering and the challenges it presents.  One of 
Nietzsche’s best-known aphorisms is: “Whatever does not kill me makes me stronger.”  And that 
which makes me stronger, should be valued.   
 
In some of Nietzsche’s best-known works, he praises the “Übermensch” [“overman,” or “above-
man,”].  This mysterious character surpasses the herd-like mediocrity of those around him and 
becomes a new type of person, eager to defy conventional norms and passive conformity. The 
Übermensch attains a “will to power” not through the domination over others, but through self-
mastery.  He (or “she,” although Nietzsche was in fact quite sexist) lives by his own rules, 
embraces every challenge as a chance to become better and stronger, as someone who reshapes 
social values rather than succumbs to them.  Much of Nietzsche’s condemnation of Christianity 
stems from revulsion at the thought of people submissively resigning themselves to their lowly 
positions.  It’s not the meek who shall inherit the earth, or those who beg forgiveness for their 
inherent wretchedness, but rather those willing to “recreate values” and blaze their own trails.  
His is not an ethic of being “nice” or “kind,” or seeking happiness – although this is not to say 
that Nietzsche advocates “being mean to people” or that we should actively try to make 
ourselves miserable.  We should be hard on ourselves, but this does not mean we should live in 
endless masochism.  Rather, life is to be eagerly embraced in all its glory, pain, and difficulty; 
life is to be affirmed.   
 
2. Eternal Recurrence 
 
Another one of Nietzsche’s ideas that has been widely misunderstood is his concept of the 
eternal recurrence, according to which all events in history will continue to occur over and over 
again unchanged in an endless loop for all eternity.  The common misunderstanding is to think 
that Nietzsche is making a prediction about how things will play out from now until infinity.  But 
a more plausible interpretation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is that we should live our 
lives such that we would be eager to have them replayed over and over again until eternity.  This 
is say, it’s not so much a view about how things will be as it a view about how we should live.  
Live at all times in a way you would want to recur again and again from now until eternity.   
    






I am the first German to have mastered the aphorism, and aphorisms are a form of eternity.  It is 
my ambition to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a whole book – what 
everyone else does not say in a whole book. (Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an 
Untimely Man,” Sec. 51) 
 
Man is a rope fastened between animal and superman – a rope over an abyss. (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part I, Sec. 4) 
 
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he does not become a monster himself.  And if 
you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes back into you. (Beyond Good and Evil, 
“Epigrams and Entra’actes,” 146) 
 
Art is the supreme task, the truly metaphysical activity in this life. (The Birth of Tragedy, 
foreword to “Richard Wagner.”)   
 
Even gods can’t escape boredom. (The Antichrist, Sec. 48) 
 
Isn’t life a hundred times too short to be bored? (Beyond Good and Evil, “Our Virtues,” Section 
227) 
 
The objective of all human arrangements is through distracting one’s thoughts to cease to be 
aware of life. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Section 227) 
 
Haste is universal because everyone is in flight from himself. (Untimely Meditations, 
Schopenhauer as Educator,” Section 5)   
 
Christianity is a romantic hypochondria for those unsteady on their feet. (Notebook 10, Autumn 
1887, 127) 
 
The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of the heart – not something that comes “upon the earth” 
or “after death.” (The Antichrist, Sec. 39) 
 
St. Luke 18 verse 14 improved – He that humbleth himself wishes to be exalted. (Human, All 
Too Human, “On the History of Moral Sensations,” Section 87) 
 
I am not a man, I am dynamite. (Ecce Homo, “Why I Am a Destiny,” Sec. 1) 
 
My formula for human greatness: amor fati, love your fate.  Want nothing different, neither 
backward or forward for all eternity.  Not just to tolerate necessity – but to love it… (Ecce 
Homo, “Why I Am so Clever,” Section 10) 
 
God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves to thousands of years in which 
his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. (The Gay 
Science, Book III, sec. 108)   
 
 God is dead!  God remains dead!  And we have killed him.  How shall we comfort ourselves, the 
murderers of all murderers?  What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet 
owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us?  What water is 
there for us to clean ourselves?  What festivals of atonements, what sacred games shall we 
have to invent?  Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?  Must we ourselves not 
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (The Gay Science, Book III, sec. 125)   
 
Is man God’s mistake, or is God man’s mistake? (Twilight of the Idols¸”Epigrams and Maxims,” 
sect.  7)   
 
Become what you are. (The Gay Science, Book III. Sec. 270) 
 
Man is a bridge, not a goal. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part I, Sec.  4)   
 
No one can construct for you the bridge on which you must cross the stream of life, no one but 
you alone. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sect. 1) 
 
Life itself is will to power. (Beyond Good and Evil, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers,” Sec. 
13)   
 
Live dangerously!  Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! (The Gay Science, Book IV, 
Section 283) 
 
To give birth to a dancing star one must first have chaos within. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
“Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part 1, Sec. 5) 
 
We want to be poets of our life – first of all in the smallest most everyday matters. (The Gay 
Science, Book IV Sec. 299)  
 
What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger. (Twilight of the Idols, Epigrams and Maxims, Sec. 8) 
 
He who has a why? in life can tolerate almost any how? (Twilight of the Idols, (Epigrams and 
Maxims, Sec. 12) 
 
Man does not strive for happiness; only the Englishman does that. (Twilight of the Idols, 
Epigrams and Maxims, Sec. 12) 
 
One should take a bold and dangerous line with existence; whatever happens, we’re bound to 
lose it. (Untimely Medications, “Schopenhauer as Education,” Sec. 1) 
 
How can a man know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled, and if the hare has seven skins, 
man can slough off seventy times seven and still be able to say: “this is really you, this is no 
longer outer shell.” (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 1) 
 
No victor believes in chance. (The Gay Science Book III, Sec. 258)   
 
The advantage of a bad memory is that one can enjoy the same good thing for the first time 
several times. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 580)    
 
Virtue no longer meets with any belief; its attraction has disappeared.  Someone would have to 
think of way of marketing it afresh, perhaps as an unusual form of adventure and excess.  
(Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, 135)   
 
Some men have sighed over the abduction of their wives, but more over the fact that nobody 
wished to abduct them. (Human, All Too Human, “Woman and Child,” Section 388) 
 
Even if the existence of a metaphysical world were demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of 
it would be as useless as knowledge of the chemical composition of water to a shipwrecked 
sailor. (Human, All Too Human, “Of First and Last Things,” Sec. 9)   
 
Without music, life would be a mistake.  Germans even imagine God singing songs. (Twilight of 
the Idols, “Epigrams and Maxims,” 33) 
 
Deutschland, Deutschland, uber Alles,” I’m afraid that was the end of German philosophy.  
(Twilight of the Idols, “What the Germans Lack,” Sec. 1) 
 
For even if I am bad German, I am at all events a very good European,” (Letter to his mother, 
August 1886)   
 
To live alone one must be an animal or a god, says Aristotle.  But you can be both – a 
philosopher. (Twilight of the Idols, “Epigrams and Maxims,” Sect. 3)   
 
Today’s philosophers want to enjoy the divine principle of incomprehensibility. (Daybreak, 
Book V, Sec. 544) 
 
Mystical explanations are considered deep, the truth is they are not even shallow. (The Gay 
Science, Book III, Sec. 126)   
 
Philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the inward cave, 
the labyrinth of the heart – and that annoys the tyrants. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as 
Educator,” Sec. 3) 
 
Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings – always darker, emptier, simpler. (The Gay Science, 
Book III, Sec. 179) 
 
The Socratic equation: reason = virtue = happiness was opposed to all the instincts of the earlier 
Greeks. (Twilight of the Idols, “The Problem of Socrates,” sec. 4) 
 
You repay a teacher badly by becoming merely a pupil. (Ecce Homo, Foreword, sect. 4) 
 
How to ruin a youth: instruct him to hold in high esteem only those who think like him.  
(Daybreak, Book IV, Sec. 297) 
 
Morality is herd instinct in the individual. (The Gay Science, Book III, Sec. 116)   
  
Every one who has ever built a “new heaven” only mustered the power he needed trough his own 
hell. (On the Genealogy of Morality, Essay 3, Sec. 10)    
 
No one talks more passionately about his rights than he who in the depths of his soul doubts 
whether he has any. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 597) 
 
Possession usually diminishes the possession. (The Gay Science, Book I, Sec. 14) 
 
One possesses one’s opinions the way one possesses fish – insofar, that is, that one possesses a 
fishpond.  One has to go fishing and be lucky – then one has one’s own fish, one’s own opinions.  
I am speaking here of living fish.  Others are content to possess a cabinet of stuffed fish – and in 
their heads, convictions. (Human, All Too Human, Book IV, “The Wanderer and His Shadow.”)  
 
Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies. (Human, All Too Human, “Man 
Alone with himself,” Sec. 483) 
 
People live in an age of corruption are witty and slanderous, they known that there are other 
kinds of murder than by dagger or assault, they also know that whatever is well said is believed.  
(The Gay Science, Book I, Section 23) 
 
The most perfidious way of harming a cause consists of defending it deliberately with faulty 
arguments. (The Gay Science, Book III, Sec. 191) 
 
Without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and most ancient part of human history 
teaches – and in punishment there is so much that is festive! (On the Genealogy of Morality, 
Essay 2, Sec. 6) 
 
To see other suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more. (On the Genealogy of 
Morality, Essay 2, Sec. 6)    
 
The distinction that lies in being unhappy (as if to feel happy were a sign of shallowness, lack of 
ambition, ordinariness) is so great that when someone says, “But how happy you must be!” we 
usually protest. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec.  534) 
 
For those who need consolation no means of consolation is so effective as the assertion that in 
their case no consolation is possible: it implies to great a degree of distinction that they at once 
hold up their heads again. (Daybreak, Book IV, Sec. 380) 
 
Sex: the thorn and stake of all body-despisers for it mocks and makes fools of all teachers… 
Sex: the slow fire on which the rabble are stewed in lust… 
Sex: innocent and free for free hearts… 
Sex: I shall fence my thoughts and my heart so pigs and pilfered not break in… (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Part III, “On the Three Evils,” Sec. 2)   
 
The state wants men to render it the same idolatry they used to render the church. (Untimely 
Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4) 
 
Everything the state says is a lie, and everything it has it has stolen. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra¸ 
Part I, “On the New Idol”) 
 
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters.  Coldly it lies; and this lie slips from its 
mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I, “On the New Idol”)  
 
Philosophy, so far as I have understood it and lived it so far, is living freely in ice and high 
mountains.  (Ecce Homo, Preface, Section 3) 
 
Even the most beautiful scenery is no longer assured of our love after we have lived in it for 
three months, and some distant coast attracts our avarice. (The Gay Science, Book I, Sec. 14)   
 
Never trust a thought that occurs to you indoors. (Ecce Homo, “Why I Am so Clever,” Sec. 1) 
 
There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena. (Beyond Good and 
Evil, “Epigrams and Entr’actes,” Sec. 108) 
 
The fact that something happens regularly and predictably does not mean that it happens 
necessarily. (Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, 91) 
 
The irrationality of a thing is no argument against it – rather a condition of it. (Human, All Too 
Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 515) 
 
There are no facts, only interpretations. (Notebooks, Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, Sec. 91) 
 
Overwork, inquisitiveness and compassion – our modern vices. (Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, Sec. 
141) 
 
It is the misfortune of active men that their activity is almost always a bit irrational.  For 
example, one must not enquire of the cash-amassing banker what the purpose for his restless 
activity is: it is irrational.  Active people roll like a stone, conforming to the stupidity of 
mechanics. (Human, All Too Human, “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” Sec. 283) 
 
Today as always, men fall into two groups: slaves and free men.  Whoever does not have two-
thirds of his day for himself is a slave, whatever he may be: a statesman, a businessman, an 
official, or a scholar. (Human, All Too Human, “Token of Higher and Lower Culture,” Sec. 283) 
 
Whoever lives for the same of combat has an interest in the enemy staying alive. (Human, All 
Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 531) 
 
Only those with very large lungs have the right to write long sentences. (“Rules of Writing” set 
out to Lou Salomé) 
 
Thoughts in a poem.  The poet presents his thoughts festively, on the carriage of rhythm: usually 
because they could not walk. (Human, All Too Human, From the Souls of artists and Writers,” 
Sec. 189)   
  
The waters of religion are ebbing away, leaving swamps and stagnant pools; the nations are 
drawing away from each other in the most hostile fashion, longing to tear each other to pieces.  
(Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4) 
 
 If it is true that the forest are going to get thinner, might time come when libraries should be 
used for firewood?  Since most books are born out of smoke and vapor of the brain, maybe they 
should return to that state.  If they have no fire in them, fire should punish them for it. (Untimely 
Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4) 
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49.
THE NEW FUNDAMENTAL FEELING: OUR FINAL CORRUPTIBILITY.—In 
former times people sought to show the feeling of man's greatness 
by pointing to his divine descent. This, however, has now 
become a forbidden path, for the ape stands at its entrance, 
and likewise other fearsome animals, showing their teeth in a 
knowing fashion, as if to say, No further this way! Hence people 
now try the opposite direction: the road along which humanity 
is proceeding shall stand as an indication of their greatness and 
their relationship to God. But alas! this, too, is useless! At the far 
end of this path stands the funeral urn of the last man and grave-
digger (with the inscription, Nihil humani a me alienum puto). 
To whatever height mankind may have developed—and perhaps
in the end it will not be so high as when they began!—there is as 
little prospect of their attaining to a higher order as there is for 
the ant and the earwig to enter into kinship with God and 
eternity at the end of their career on earth. What is to come will 
drag behind it that which has passed: why should any little star, 
or even any little species on that star, form an exception to that 
eternal drama? Away with such sentimentalities!




A PROPOSAL.—If, according to the arguments of Pascal and 
Christianity, our ego is always hateful, how can we permit and 
suppose other people, whether God or men, to love it? It would 
be contrary to all good principles to let ourselves be loved when 
we know very well that we deserve nothing but hatred—not to 
speak of other repugnant feelings. “But this is the very Kingdom
of Grace.” Then you look upon your love for your neighbour as 
a grace? Your pity as a grace? Well, then, if you can do all this, 
there is no reason why you should not go a step further: love 
yourselves through grace, and then you will no longer find your 
God necessary, and the entire drama of the Fall and Redemption 
of mankind will reach its last act in yourselves!
80.
THE COMPASSIONATE CHRISTIAN.—A Christian's 
compassion in the presence of his neighbour's suffering has 
another side to it: viz. his profound suspicion of all the joy of his 
neighbour, of his neighbour's joy in everything that he wills and 






OUR VALUATIONS.—All actions may be referred back to 
valuations, and all valuations are either one's own or adopted,
the latter being by far the more numerous. Why do we adopt them? 
Through fear, i.e. we think it more advisable to pretend
that they are our own, and so well do we accustom ourselves to
do so that it at last becomes second nature to us. A valuation
of our own, which is the appreciation of a thing in accordance
with the pleasure or displeasure it causes us and no one else,
is something very rare indeed!—But must not our valuation of
our neighbour—which is prompted by the motive that we adopt [101] 
his valuation in most cases—proceed from ourselves and by our
own decision? Of course, but then we come to these decisions 
during our childhood, and seldom change them. We often 
remain during our whole lifetime the dupes of our childish and 
accustomed judgments in our manner of judging our fellow-men
(their minds, rank, morality, character, and reprehensibility), and
we find it necessary to subscribe to their valuations.
Book II. 101
114.
ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUFFERER.—The state of sick men
who have suffered long and terribly from the torture inflicted upon 
them by their illness, and whose reason has nevertheless not been in any 
way affected, is not without a certain amount of value
in our search for knowledge—quite apart from the intellectual 
benefits which follow upon every profound solitude and every 
sudden and justified liberation from duties and habits. The man
who suffers severely looks forth with terrible calmness from
his state of suffering upon outside things: all those little lying 
enchantments, by which things are usually surrounded when
seen through the eye of a healthy person, have vanished from
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the sufferer; his own life even lies there before him, stripped of
all bloom and colour. If by chance it has happened that up to
then he has lived in some kind of dangerous fantasy, this extreme
disenchantment through pain is the means, and possibly the only
means, of extricating him from it. (It is possible that this is
what happened to the Founder of Christianity when suspended
from the Cross; for the bitterest words ever pronounced, “My
God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” if understood in
their deepest sense, as they ought to be understood, contain the
evidence of a complete disillusionment and enlightenment in[117]
regard to the deceptions of life: in that moment of supreme
suffering Christ obtained a clear insight into Himself, just as in
the poet's narrative did the poor dying Don Quixote.)
The formidable tension of the intellect that wishes to hold
its own against pain shows everything that one now looks upon
in a new light, and the inexpressible charm of this new light
is often powerful enough to withstand all the seductiveness of
suicide and to make the continuation of life seem very desirable
to the sufferer. His mind scornfully turns to the warm and
comfortable dream-world in which the healthy man moves about
thoughtlessly, and he thinks with contempt of the noblest and
most cherished illusions in which he formerly indulged. He
experiences delight in conjuring up this contempt as if from the
depths of hell, and thus inflicting the bitterest sufferings upon his
soul: it is by this counterpoise that he bears up against physical
suffering—he feels that such a counterpoise is now essential! In
one terrible moment of clear-sightedness he says to himself, “Be
for once thine own accuser and hangman; for once regard thy
suffering as a punishment which thou hast inflicted on thyself!
Enjoy thy superiority as a judge: better still, enjoy thine own will
and pleasure, thy tyrannical arbitrariness! Raise thyself above
thy life as above thy suffering, and look down into the depth of
reason and unreason!”
Our pride revolts as it never did before, it experiences an
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incomparable charm in defending life against such a tyrant as
suffering and against all the insinuations of this tyrant, who
would fain urge us to give evidence against life,—we are taking [118]
the part of life in the face of this tyrant. In this state of mind
we take up a bitter stand against all pessimism in order that it
may not appear to be a consequence of our condition, and thus
humiliate us as conquered ones. The charm of being just in our
judgments was also never greater than now; for now this justice
is a triumph over ourselves and over so irritated a state of mind
that unfairness of judgment might be excused,—but we will not
be excused, it is now, if ever, that we wish to show that we need
no excuse. We pass through downright orgies of pride.
And now appears the first ray of relief, of recovery, and one
of its first effects is that we turn against the preponderance of
our pride: we call ourselves foolish and vain, as if we had
undergone some unique experience. We humiliate ungratefully
this all-powerful pride, the aid of which enabled us to endure
the pain we suffered, and we call vehemently for some antidote
for this pride: we wish to become strangers to ourselves and to
be freed from our own person after pain has forcibly made us
personal too long. “Away with this pride,” we cry, “it was only
another illness and convulsion!” Once more we look longingly
at men and nature and recollect with a sorrowful smile that now
since the veil has fallen we regard many things concerning them
in a new and different light,—but we are refreshed by once more
seeing the softened lights of life, and emerge from that fearfully
dispassionate daylight in which we as sufferers saw things and
through things. We do not get angry when we see the charms [119]
of health resume their play, and we contemplate the sight as if
transformed, gently and still fatigued. In this state we cannot




LITTLE UNCONVENTIONAL ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY!—To act 
occasionally in matters of custom against our own better 
judgments; to yield in practice while reserving our own 
intellectual liberty; to behave like everybody else and thus 
to show ourselves amiable and considerate to all, to compensate 
them, as it were, even if only to some extent, for our 
unconventional opinions—all this among many tolerably liberal-
minded men is looked upon not only as permissible but even 
as “honourable,” “humane,” “tolerant,” and “unpedantic,” or 
whatever fine words may be used to lull to sleep the intellectual 
conscience. So, for example, one man, although he may be an 
atheist, has his infant baptized in the usual Christian fashion; 
another goes through his period of military service, though he 
may severely condemn all hatred between nations; and a third 
runs into the Church with a girl because she comes from a 
religious family, and makes his vows to a priest without feeling 
ashamed of it. “It is of no importance if one of us does what 
every one else does and has done”—so says ignorant prejudice!
What a profound mistake! For nothing is of greater importance 
than that a powerful, long-established, and irrational custom 
should be once again confirmed by the act of some one who is 
recognised as rational. In this way the proceeding is thought to 
be sanctioned by reason itself! All honour to your opinions! but 
little unconventional actions are of still greater value.
Book III. 143
163.
AGAINST ROUSSEAU.—If it is true that there is something 
contemptible about our civilisation, we have two alternatives: of 
concluding with Rousseau that, “This despicable civilisation is
to blame for our bad morality,” or to infer, contrary to Rousseau's view, 
that “Our good morality is to blame for this contemptible civilisation. 
Our social conceptions of good and evil, weak and effeminate as they 
are, and their enormous influence over both
body and soul, have had the effect of weakening all bodies and souls 
and of crushing all unprejudiced, independent, and self-reliant men, 
the real pillars of a strong civilisation: wherever we still find the evil 
morality to-day, we see the last crumbling ruins of these pillars.” Thus 
let paradox be opposed by paradox! It is quite impossible for the truth 
to lie with both sides: and can we say, indeed, that it lies with either? 
Decide for yourself.
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251.
STOICAL.—The Stoic experiences a certain sense of cheerfulness 
when he feels oppressed by the ceremonial which he has 
prescribed for himself: he enjoys himself then as a ruler.
252.
CONSIDER.—The man who is being punished is no longer he who 
has done the deed. He is always the scapegoat.
Book IV. 211
262.
THE DEMON OF POWER.—Neither necessity nor desire, but the 
love of power, is the demon of mankind. You may give men 
everything possible—health, food, shelter, enjoyment—but they 
are and remain unhappy and capricious, for the demon waits and 
waits; and must be satisfied. Let everything else be taken away 
from men, and let this demon be satisfied, and then they will 
nearly be happy—as happy as men and demons can be; but why 
do I repeat this? Luther has already said it, and better than I have 
done, in the verses:
“And though they take our life, 
Goods, honour, children, wife, 
Yet is their profit small, 
These things shall vanish all, 
The Kingdom it remaineth.”
The Kingdom! there it is again!
Book IV. 251
370.
TO WHAT EXTENT THE THINKER LOVES HIS ENEMY.—Make it a rule never 
to withhold or conceal from yourself anything that may be [291] 
thought against your own thoughts. Vow it! This is the essential 
requirement of honest thinking. You must undertake such a 
campaign against yourself every day. A victory and a conquered 
position are no longer your concern, but that of truth—and your defeat 
also is no longer your concern!
Book V. 293
475.  BECOMING HEAVY.—You know him not; whatever weights he
may attach to himself he will nevertheless be able to raise them all
with him. But you, judging from the weak flapping of your own 
wings, come to the conclusion that he wishes to remain below, 
merely because he does burden himself with those weights.
477.
FREED FROM SCEPTICISM.—
A. Some men emerge from a general moral scepticism bad-
tempered and feeble, corroded, worm-eaten, and even partly 
consumed—but I on the other hand, more courageous and 
healthier than ever, and with my instincts conquered once more. 
Where a strong wind blows, where the waves are rolling angrily,
and where more than usual danger is to be faced, there I feel 
happy. I did not become a worm, although I often had to work
and dig like a worm.
B. You have just ceased to be a sceptic; for you deny!
Book V. 297
484.
GOING OUR OWN WAY.—When we take the decisive step, and make 
up our minds to follow our own path, a secret is suddenly revealed to 
us: it is clear that all those who had hitherto been friendly to us and 
on intimate terms with us judged themselves
to be superior to us, and are offended now. The best among them
are indulgent, and are content to wait patiently until we once more 
find the “right path”—they know it, apparently. Others make fun 
of us, and pretend that we have been seized with a temporary 
attack of mild insanity, or spitefully point out some seducer. The 
more malicious say we are vain fools, and do their
best to blacken our motives; while the worst of all see in us their 
greatest enemy, some one who is thirsting for revenge after many years 
of dependence,—and are afraid of us. What, then, are we
to do? My own opinion is that we should begin our sovereignty
by promising to all our acquaintances in advance a whole year's 
amnesty for sins of every kind.
A. But why this solitude?
B. I am not angry with anybody. But when I am alone it
seems to me that I can see my friends in a clearer and rosier light
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522.
WISDOM WITHOUT EARS.—To hear every day what is said about 
us, or even to endeavour to discover what people think of us, will 
in the end kill even the strongest man. Our neighbours permit us 
to live only that they may exercise a daily claim upon us! They 
certainly would not tolerate us if we wished to claim rights over 
them, and still less if we wished to be right! In short, let us offer 




THE FOUR VIRTUES.—Honest towards ourselves, and to all and 
everything friendly to us; brave in the face of our enemy; 
generous towards the vanquished; polite at all times: such do the 
four cardinal virtues wish us to be.
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567.
IN THE FIELD.—“We should take things more cheerfully than they 
deserve; especially because for a very long time we have taken 
them more seriously than they deserved.” So speak the brave 
soldiers of knowledge.
568.
POET AND BIRD.—The bird Phœnix showed the poet a glowing 
scroll which was being gradually consumed in the flames. “Be
not alarmed,” said the bird, “it is your work! It does not contain
the spirit of the age, and to a still less extent the spirit of those
who are against the age: so it must be burnt. But that is a good 
sign. There is many a dawn of day.”
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573.
CASTING ONE'S SKIN.—The snake that cannot cast its skin
perishes. So too with those minds which are prevented from
changing their views: they cease to be minds.
574.
NEVER FORGET!—The higher we soar the smaller we appear to
those who cannot fly.
575.
WE AERONAUTS OF THE INTELLECT.—All those daring birds that
soar far and ever farther into space, will somewhere or other
be certain to find themselves unable to continue their flight,
and they will perch on a mast or some narrow ledge—and will
be grateful even for this miserable accommodation! But who
could conclude from this that there was not an endless free space
stretching far in front of them, and that they had flown as far as
they possibly could? In the end, however, all our great teachers
and predecessors have come to a standstill, and it is by no means
in the noblest or most graceful attitude that their weariness has
brought them to a pause: the same thing will happen to you and
me! but what does this matter to either of us? Other birds will[395]
fly farther! Our minds and hopes vie with them far out and on
high; they rise far above our heads and our failures, and from
this height they look far into the distant horizon and see hundreds
of birds much more powerful than we are, striving whither we
ourselves have also striven, and where all is sea, sea, and nothing
but sea!
Book V. 345
And where, then, are we aiming at? Do we wish to cross
the sea? whither does this over-powering passion urge us, this
passion which we value more highly than any other delight?
Why do we fly precisely in this direction, where all the suns of
humanity have hitherto set? Is it possible that people may one
day say of us that we also steered westward, hoping to reach
India—but that it was our fate to be wrecked on the infinite? Or,
my brethren? or—?
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Study Guide: 6. Nietzsche 
 
Describe Nietzsche’s criticism of Pascal and Christianity in general in section 79.  What, exactly, 
is the criticism? 
 
Give an example of the kind of “valuation” Nietzsche might be thinking of in section 104. 
 
Section 114 provides a glimpse of Nietzsche’s own sufferings, and an early attempt of his to 
express some of the ideas that later become sloganized in the “will to power.”  How do the 
metaphors of “accuser and hangman” and “superiority as a judge,” express Nietzsche’s 
perspective on suffering?  
 
What are the two alternative ways of making sense of our “contemptible civilization” described 
in section 163?  What does Nietzsche find contemptible about our civilization?   
 
Comment on the “demon of mankind” criticized in section 262.   
 
The “essential requirement of honest thinking,” as Nietzsche describes it in section 370, is what?  
Is he right?  Would he say honest thinking is an obligation?  Why not just think whatever you 
want – what’s the harm? 
 
What is the “decisive step” of section 484?  In your view, do many people take this decisive 
step?  Is there a discrepancy between people who might say they’ve taken the step from those 
who actually have taken it?   
 
In one of Nietzsche’s best-known books, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the hero character goes away 
by himself for years.  In some of the passages in these sections, Nietzsche gives some hints as to 
why Zarathustra may have gone away.  What do you think? 
 
Nietzsche’s list of the “four virtues” may seem surprising in light of his scathing critiques of 
Christianity, given that there would seem to be similarities between Nietzsche’s list and some 
vaunted Christian values?  Comment on similarities and differences. 
 
Snakes that cannot cast their skins are like…. what? 
 





Aristotle, public domain image, available at: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575.jpg 
 
The great Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 to 322 B.C.E.) studied at Plato’s Academy and went 
on to be one of the most influential and creative philosophers of all time.  Among his many, 
extraordinary accomplishments, Aristotle invented what we now know of as logic, the study of 
good reasoning.  Aristotle distinguished between good reasoning and bad reasoning by analyzing 
simple argument forms called syllogisms.  Syllogisms are short arguments with two premises 
and a conclusion.  Here’s a standard example: 
 
All humans are mortal. 
Socrates is a human.  
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.   
 
The first premise, “All humans are mortal,” states a general claim.  In this case, it states a general 
claim about humans.  The second premise, “Socrates is a human,” that ties something particular 
(Socrates) to the general type of thing that is the subject of the first premise (humans). These two 
premises, taken together, imply the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. 
 
Another one of Aristotle’s great innovations in logic was the distinction between theoretical and 
practical reasoning.  Theoretical reasoning is aimed at figuring out how the world is, so to speak.  
The Socrates syllogism above is an instance of theoretical reasoning, because it is about the way 
humans are.  It is based on a fact about humans, we might say.  Practical reasoning, on the other 
hand, is based on what ought or should be done.  The “ought” here refers not only to moral or 
ethical reasoning, but anything we’re trying to decide on doing.  “I ought to watch that next 
episode of _______,” I might think to myself, “because I enjoyed the last episode a lot.”  That 
sort of deciding and reasoning is also practical.  As for theoretical reasoning, Aristotle thought 
practical reasoning worked by means of syllogisms.  Here is one of his examples: 
 
Premise 1, “Major Premise”: Adultery is to be avoided. 
Premise 2, “Minor Premise”: This act (I’m considering) would be an act of adultery. 
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought to avoid this. (In other words, “I ought not to do this,” or “I 
should not do this,” or doing this would be wrong). 
 
The first premise, “Adultery is to be avoided” states a general ethical or moral principle, that is, 
some broad statement or generalization indicating that certain types of actions ought or ought not 
to be done.  The same point can be stated in different ways: “Adultery ought not be done,” “One 
should not commit adultery,” or “Adultery is wrong.”  These are all different ways of indicating 
that a certain kind of action is okay or not okay to do, permissible or impermissible, justifiable or 
unjustifiable, or something similar.  
 
The second premise, “This act would be adultery” states a more specific or particular detail that 
makes the general principle relevant to the present circumstances.  It links the first premise to the 
issue the deliberating agent is trying to figure out in the moment.   
 
Taken together, these two premises imply a specific conclusion about what should or should not 
be done.   
 
I find that as a teaching tool, it is useful for students to construct Aristotelian syllogisms.  One 
way it is useful is that stating the general principle justifications rely on helps clarify issues.  
Often in life, we might have a vague sense that it would be wrong or okay to do a certain thing, 
but without further reflection, we might have difficulty explaining why.  Stating these principles 
directly often helps us get clear on whether an action is or is not wrong. Another way 
Aristotelian syllogisms can be helpful is that often when two people disagree about the rightness 
or wrongness of some action, articulating relevant syllogisms can help zero in on what, exactly, 
they are disagreeing about.  For example, using Aristotle’s syllogism about adultery above, we 
can see that some people might disagree with the first (major) premise.  Or, perhaps more likely, 
two people might be disagreeing about whether a certain action would count as adultery.  (After 
all, the boundaries of what constitutes adultery or not are not entirely obvious – there are 
disputable borderline cases.) 
 
Here’s a couple other examples.   
 
It is wrong to deliberately escape a legally imposed punishment if one has implicitly agreed to 
obey the city’s laws.  (One of the principles relevant to Socrates’ reasoning in the Crito.) 
By breaking out of jail and fleeing his death sentence, Socrates would be violating a legally 
imposed punishment. 
Therefore, Socrates would be wrong to break out of jail.    
 
One should not worry about things that are out of one’s control.  (One of the most fundamental 
ideas in Stoicism.) 
One’s physical appearance is out of one’s control 
Therefore, one should not worry about one’s own physical appearance. 
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Background: Aristotelian Ethical Syllogisms 
 
The great moral philosopher Aristotle (384 – 322 B.C.E.), a student of Plato and philosophical 
descendent of Socrates, thought that moral reasoning and in fact all practical reasoning uses 
simple argument forms called “syllogisms.”  Here is one of Aristotle’s examples: 
 
Premise 1: Adultery is to be avoided. 
Premise 2: This act (the act I’m thinking about doing) would be an act of adultery. 
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought not do this. 
 
The first premise, “Adultery is to be avoided” states a general ethical principle or proposition. It 
makes a claim about what ought to be done, morally speaking. We could state the same idea in 
different ways, e.g. “Adultery is wrong,” or “One ought not to commit adultery.”  Moral 
principles tell us what we ought to do and ought not to do, or what it would be right to do or 
wrong to do, rather than describing some fact about the world.  (Most people, I think, would 
agree with Aristotle as regards his claim about the wrongness of adultery.) 
 
 The second premise, “This act would be adultery” states a more specific or particular detail that 
makes the general principle relevant to the present circumstances.  It asserts that a particular act 
is an instance of the type of behavior mentioned in the first premise.   
 
Lastly, the “therefore” claim (the “conclusion”) puts the first two premises together and draws 
the logical conclusion from their combination.  Thus, Aristotelian syllogisms, like all syllogisms, 
involve two premises followed by a conclusion.  If the syllogism captures good reasoning, the 
conclusion “follows logically” or is “implied” or “entailed” by the two premises take together.  
 
The Case: Anti-Social Security 
 
Hypothetically, would it be unethical to place a security firm’s lawn signs around my front yard 
even though I have not installed its security system?  These fake “caveats” would discourage 
intruders, and the security firm would get free advertising for its product.  So who’s hurt?  
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by James Morgan, New Brunswick, 
NJ) 
 
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA: 
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 40. 
 
Assignment: 
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify using the company’s yard sign 
without installing the security system.  (The conclusion will be something like “I may use this 
firm’s yard sign in my front yard.”) 
 
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong to use the company’s 
yard sign without installing the security system.  (The conclusion will be something like “I may 
not use this firm’s yard sign in my front yard.”) 
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Many psychological findings show the importance of what is called “framing.” Briefly, the 
framing effect refers to the way our impressions, views, and opinions are often shaped not just be 
the relevant facts, but the way the facts are presented or “framed.”  Often, the framing involves 
placing the facts in a kind of story or explanation: a broader narrative context or theory about 
things, people and events.   
 
Examples: 
In one study, 93% of PhD students registered early for classes when a penalty free for late 
registration was emphasized, whereas only 67% did so when prices were described as a discount 
for early registration.1 In another study, people were found more likely to choose meat presented 
as “75% lean” than meat presented as “25% fat”.2 
   
Framing is obviously of important in many ethical contexts.  A non-hypothetical and tragic 
example of the framing effect concerns the deaths that occurred in Mississippi’s prisons late 
December.  In the Clarion Ledger, former governor Phil Bryant is quoted attributing the prison 
problems to gang activity: "Phil Bryant, Mississippi’s outgoing governor, on Monday blamed 
gangs operating inside the prison system, saying prisons are difficult to manage “under the best 
of circumstances.”3 Bryant spoke specifically about the infamous Mississippi State Penitentiary 
at Parchman, and it is no doubt true that gang activity was an important factor in the inmates’ 
deaths.  However, Bryant’s framing of the issue overlooks the fact that in 2014, Bryant and state 
legislators slashed funding for the prisons and diverted much of the funding to tax cuts for 
wealthy Mississippians. 
 






1 Gächter, S. et al. (2009). “Are experimental economists prone to framing effects? A natural field experiment”. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70(3): 443-46. 
2 Revlin, R. (2012). “Chapter 11: Solving Problems,” in Cognition: Theory and Practice. New York, Worth 
Publishers. 
3 Amy J. and Pettur, E. W. (2020). “Foretold ‘uprising’ hits cash-starved Mississippi prisons,” Associated Press, Jan. 
7. 
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I am an African American male looking for Web programming work.  When I used my 
ethnically identifying first name on my resume, I got few calls for job interviews.  Now I use my 
middle name instead, and I’ve been getting more interviews.  My resume is accurate about my 
education and experience. Is it wrong to change my first name to conceal my ethnicity? 
 
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by Malik Raymond, Brooklyn, NY) 
 
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA: 
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 162. 
 
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that it would be wrong for this 
applicant to change his first name to conceal his identity, and another that concludes that the 
name change would be permissible. 
 
There is strong empirical evidence showing that discrimination against people with “ethnic-
sounding” names occurs and does so in a variety of contexts.  Job applications are one context: a 
well-known field experiment conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research found 
that, “Job applicants with white names needed to send about 10 resumes to get one callback; 
those with African-American names needed to send around 15 resumes to get one callback.” 
(See Bertrand and Mullainathan, “Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” 2003, available at 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.).   Other studies of job applications have found even larger 
disparities.  A different, more recent, study found discrimination on the basis of names in the 
selection of interns.  “A résumé audit study with more than 11,500 applications reveals that 
employers are… less likely to respond to applicants with black-sounding names and when the 
applicant is more distant from the firm.” (See Jaeger, Nunley, Seals and Wilbrandt, “The 
Demand for  Interns,” 2020, available at 
http://www.djaeger.org/research/wp/DFI_NBER_WP.pdf). Another study showed differential 
success in obtain federal research grant funds on the basis of the ethnicity of the applicant’s 
name.  (See Ginther, Schaffer, Schnell, Masimore, Liu, Haak, and Kington, “Race, Ethnicity, and 
NIH Awards”, 2011, Science 333: pp. 1015-1019.). Such discrimination also occurs in rental 
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While in general, lying is wrong, most people recognize that under certain conditions – perhaps 
only fairly rare circumstances - lying is the right thing to do.  Standard examples of justified lies 
are cases in which a lie is necessary to save someone’s life.  Imagine one is living in Nazi 
Germany, and the Germans are  going door-to-door rounding up Jews to ship off to concentration 
camps where they will likely be killed.  Suppose a homeowner is hiding Jews in a secret attic 
upstairs.  If the Nazis come knocking and ask if there are Jews inside, isn’t lying to them the 
right thing to do?  (Lying might of course put the homeowner at some risk, but that’s a different 
issue.)  
 
People have a tendency to rationalize lying when it is done for less noble reasons, of course.  But 
how about other kinds of lies intended for the benefit of others?   Are these all permissible?  
Consider the following case, drawn from a well-known article by philosopher Tom Hill. 
 
The Case: The Benevolent Lie 
 
A  college professor had a student he was tutoring.  The student began showing signs of severe 
and suicidal depression.  The student was later found dead, but the circumstances were 
ambiguous, and the death could be seen as either suicide or an accident.  The professor helped to 
gather up the boy’s belongings to return to his mother, and no suicide note was found.  But the 
mother, a devout Roman Catholic, was deeply worried about her son’s soul, and she asked the 
professor point blank whether he had any reason to suspect suicide.  The professor, an atheist, 
wanted to comfort her and so, by a quite deliberate lie, he assured her that as far as he knew, the 
boy had been in good spirits.  Was the lie justified? 
 
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (1984) “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies.” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 18, 




State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify the professor’s lie to the mother.  (The 
conclusion will be something like “This lie was the right thing to do.”) 
 
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that the professor’s lie was wrong. (The 
conclusion will be something like “This lie was the wrong thing to do.”) 
 
 
PHI 171 - Ethics Cases 5 – You Decide - The Housing Allowance1 
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Wilson Mutambara, a native of Rambia, gets hired by NewCom after earning a Master’s of 
Business Administration in the U. S. NewCom transfers Mutambara to his home city, the capital 
of Rambia, to work in a newly opened office. Much of the housing in the capital is of poor 
quality and unsafe, so NewCom gives its Rambian employees up to $2,000 housing allowance so 
they can live in safe parts of town and in a style appropriate to the company’s image. In order to 
claim the housing allowance, NewCom’s employees must turn in receipts, and every month 
Mutambara submits an itemized statement for $2,000 from his landlord. However, NewCom 
discovers that Wilson is actually living with relatives; the receipts are fraudulent. 
When his deceit is discovered, Mutambara defends himself by arguing, “Every other 
NewCom employee in Rambia receives $2,000 a month. If I live economically, why should I be 
penalized? I should receive the same as everyone else.” When his supervisor points out that the 
allowance is also to uphold the company’s image and that Wilson’s housing is “unseemly,” 
Mutambara protests that “I’m not just a NewCom employee; I’m also a Rambian… it’s insulting 
to be told that the area I grew up in is ‘unseemly’ or inappropriate for a company employee” (p. 
568). He is using the housing allowance to help pay school fees for eight nieces and nephews. 
 
Assignment: 
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify Mutambara’s deceitful claiming of the 
housing allowance.  (The conclusion will be something like “It is ethically permissible for 
Mutambara to turn in the fraudulent receipts.”) 
 
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong for Mutambara to turn in 





1 Shaw, W., and Barry, V. (2010). Moral issues in business. 11th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 568-569. 
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Tik Tok is a video-sharing app used by hundreds of millions of users around the world.  The 
product is owned by ByteDance, a company headquartered in Beijing, China. According to 
recent reporting by The Intercept, based on some internal company documents obtained from the 
company, Tik Tok’s corporate moderators were to told suppress posts by users who were “too 
ugly, poor, or disabled for the platform.”  In addition, moderators were instructed to censor 
several kinds of political speech, including posts that hurt “national [Chinese] honor” or that 
criticized “state organs such as the police.”  Users posting illicit political posts were also banned 
from the platform.   
 
Unacceptable political materials included livestreamed military movements, videos that 
“defamed civil servants,” and other content deemed threatening to “national security.”  Videos 
showing poverty conditions, slums, beer bellies and other images of overweight people were 
suppressed, as were pictures of people with crooked smiles, unattractive faces, and more serious 
deformities.  One document told moderators to check for “disreputable decorations,” cracked 
walls, and peeling paint in users’ homes and to narrow the audiences of such users.  The 
company set up sophisticated computer algorithms to scan for offending videos.    
 
A different company document describes how various physical, bodily and environmental 
characteristics deemed “too unattractive” were scanned to prevent the offending videos from the 
special “For You” section of the app, where select Tik Tok videos were funneled to a vast 
audience.  The list of unattractive features includes “ugly facial looks,” “dwarfism,” “too many 
wrinkles” and various other “low quality traits.”  The stated rationale for such manipulation was 
that undesirable users could “decrease the short-term new user retention rate,” and thus limit the 
product’s popularity.  The company also padded users’ feeds with content from “shadow 
accounts” operated by company employees posing as regular users, and it held regular coaching 
sessions with key “influencers” advising them how to insure their posts stayed clear of the 
company’s automated filters.  The company also downloaded popular Instagram posts and 
reshared them on Tik Tok to maintain a steady supply of appealing content. 
 
While a corporate spokesman interviewed by The Intercept claimed that the policy of 
suppressing videos featuring unattractive, disabled, or poor users was no longer in effect, sources 
indicate it was in effect until at least late 2019.    
 
On the face of it, the ethics of such screening practices are somewhat complicated.  While 
screening out posts of unattractive and poor people offends most peoples’ sense of justice and 
fairness, and the company actively hides its use of such tactics from users, one can also argue 
that social networking companies have a right to promote their own products in various ways, as 
companies have traditionally done through various forms of advertising and media.  What makes 
social networking companies distinctive, however, is the extent to which the value of their 
products depends on active participation and contributions from users.     
 
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that Tik Tok’s screening of the 
unattractive is wrong, and another showing that it is ethically permissible.   
 
(1Derived from S. Biddle, P. V. Ribeiro, and T. Dias, “Invisible Censorship,” The Intercept 
(March 15), accessed at https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-users-
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Our master’s degree program in public policy requires students to devise solutions to a real-life 
policy problem – this year, the crisis in military recruitment and retention.  The best paper will 
be forwarded to the Department of Defense.  We students oppose the war in Iraq and the 
military’s rejection of gay recruits, and see each as a cause of the recruitment problem.  Is it 
ethical to require us to participate in an exercise aimed at assisting an institution whose policies 
we morally oppose? 
 
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by H. V. Singleton and A. Kasdan, 
Cambridge, MA) 
 
Derived from Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, 
CA: Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 152. 
 
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that the students’ participation in 
the exercise can be required, and another that concludes it would be wrong to require the 
students’ participation.   
 
 
PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 8 – You Decide – Whistleblowing 
 
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele 
 
            
 
Socrates’ main argument against escaping from jail and avoiding his impending execution is 
based on what we might call his “Principle of Obedience”.  As he phrases it in the Apology: “For	
wherever	a	man's	place	is,	whether	the	place	which	he	has	chosen	or	that	in	which	he	has	
been	placed	by	a	commander,	there	he	ought	to	remain	in	the	hour	of	danger;	he	should	not	
think	of	death	or	of	anything	but	of	disgrace.” In other words, one’s duty is to obey, come 
what may. A similar idea comes up in the Crito, of course, where the basic argument is that 
Socrates must not try to escape and disobey his death sentence imposed by Athens, since “he 
agreed to be governed by [his fellow citizens] in word and in deed.” (52d). Again, his obligation 
is to obey the laws he agreed to obey. 
 
Does that mean Socrates would always disapprove of whistleblowers? 
 
“Whistleblowing” refers to the act of disobeying laws, employment policies, or agreements by 
releasing non-public information for the sake of the public good.  Unlike ordinary journalists or 
reporters, whistleblowers are not simply giving people new information about what is going on.  
Rather, by their releasing of non-public documents, plans, or other details, whistleblowers are 
acting in a seemingly disloyal way. They are violating the directives of a superior, or 
commander, or in some cases, violating the law.  Whistleblowing differs from other kinds of 
protect or civil disobedience in that it involves a disclosure of non-public information.  Rosa 
Parks’ sitting on the bus in Montgomery was a violation of a Montgomery city ordinance, but it 
did not involve disclosure of non-public information or documents.  
 
Daniel Ellsberg is arguably the best-known American whistleblower of the last century.  After 
earlier in his career serving as military analyst, Ellsberg came across a top-secret Pentagon Study 
while working for the RAND Corporation, a giant U. S. Defense Department contractor.  The 
study detailed how Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon, and other high-ranking officials had 
systematically lied to the American public about the Vietnam War.  It showed that while the war 
was going on in the 1960s and 1970s, top officials recognized that the war was unwinnable.  Yet 
rather than stop the war, again and again they tried to reassure the public of eventual victory and 
ramped up U.S. troop involvement and resource commitment.  The result was the needless loss 
of thousands of American lives, vast amounts of money, and untold Vietnamese casualties.  
 
   Image 2: "Daniel Ellsberg" by ALA - The American Library Association is 
licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0  
 
In 1971, while the war was still going on, Ellsberg shared what came to be known as the 
“Pentagon Papers” with The New York Times.  The paper published a first installment before 
further publication was halted for several days by means of a court order obtained by the Nixon 
administration.  Ellsberg then leaked the documents to The Washington Post, and soon 
afterwards the Supreme Court decreed that the documents could be freely published.  (The Post’s 
important role in the affair is the subject of a recent movie, The Post, starring Tom Hanks and 
Meryl Streep.) 
 
Days later, Ellsberg publicly revealed that he was the source of the documents.  In defending his 
decision, Ellsberg said: 
 
“I felt that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I could no longer cooperate in 
concealing this information from the American public.  I did this clearly at my own jeopardy and 
I am prepared to answer to all the consequences of this decision.”1 
 
The Pentagon Papers played a crucial role in turning public opinion against the war.  Ellsberg 
has continued an active public life, often voicing support for other political causes and other 
whistleblowers.  Those Ellsberg has supported include Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks, 
which revealed American War crimes in Iraq, Private Chelsea Manning, who provided Assange 
with classified video of U.S. helicopter gunships killing Iraqi civilians, and Edward Snowden, 




Is there any way to reconcile Socrates’ principle of obedience with instances of justified 
whistleblowing? Does Socrates say or do anything that might imply justified whistleblowing?  




1 "The Pentagon Papers". 1971 Year in Review. UPI. 1971. Accessed January 23, 2020. See also Ellsberg’s 
extensive commentary in the 1974 documentary, Hearts and Minds, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0DTs6edZjs, especially from 1:17:00 on. Accessed January 23, 2020. 
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When I asked to be excused from jury duty, the judge berated me for leaving my civic duty to the 
“poor.”  I did not oppose her diatribe, but I make good money and feel it’s more efficient for 
society if I work, pay taxes, support charities, and leave jury duty others.  Isn’t this like leaving 
other essential functions – trash pickup, policing, dentistry – to others?  Alternatively, couldn’t I 
defer service to a less onerous period, like retirement?   
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by “name withheld,” San 
Francisco, CA.) 
 
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA: 
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 76-77. 
 
Assignment: 
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify The Reluctant Juror’s preference to be 
excused from jury duty because of his or her contributions to the tax base and charities, deferring 
jury service until retirement.  (The conclusion will be something like “It is ethically permissible 
for people who contribute to society in other ways to try to be excused from jury duty.”) 
 
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong for the Reluctant Juror to 
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What is commonly called the “death penalty” or “capital punishment” is the practice of 
government-authorized executions (putting people to death) as punishment for crimes.  In the 
majority of countries around the world, the death penalty is illegal or is used only rarely.  In 
every country in the European Union and in England it is outlawed.  However, the death penalty 
is practiced regularly in four of the most populated countries in the world, namely, China, India, 
Indonesia and the United States.   
 
In the United States, capital punishment is legal in the majority of states (31), including 
Mississippi and other southern states, although it is illegal in 19 states and the District of 
Columbia.  Since 1976, U.S. federal and state governments have executed over 1,400 people.  In 
a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision, in a case titled “Furman v. Georgia,” the Court ruled that 
the death penalty violated the legal prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” found in the 
8th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and was therefore illegal.  The Court’s basis for this 
decision was evidence that the death penalty had been used in “arbitrary” and discriminatory” 
ways.  However, in 1976 The Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty could be used so long 
as safeguards were put in place to prevent its arbitrary application.  In the U.S., the death penalty 
is an option only for “crimes against the state” such as treason or espionage and for “aggravated 
murder,” that is, murder which is made worse by some additional factor.   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there are large sex and racial differences in who gets executed in the 
United States.  Since its re-institution in 1976, only about 1 percent of people executed have been 
women.  While African Americans constitute about 12% of the U. S. population, over 34 percent 
of those executed since 1976 have been black.  Statistics also show that African Americans 
convicted of killing a white person are much more likely to be executed than whites convicted of 
killing African Americans.   
 
In a Pew Research Poll conducted in 2018, 54% of Americans said they are in favor of the death 
penalty for people found guilty of murder, while 39% said they were opposed.  The same poll 
showed that while the majority of whites favor the death penalty (59%), it is supported only by 
36% of blacks and 47% of Hispanics.1  Men also tend to be more approving of capital 
punishment than women.   
 
Ethical Justification – Pro and Con 
 
 
1 From Masci, David. “5 Facts About the Death Penalty,” 2018, accessed at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/08/02/5-facts-about-the-death-penalty/.  Last accessed 02/05/2020. 
 
Because capital punishment necessarily involves something that is in and of itself is very bad – 
intentional killing of another human being – its ethical justification is not obvious.  Philosophers 
customarily distinguish between two kinds of arguments used to justify the death penalty.  One 
of these arguments is based on consequentialism, the view that actions are ethically justified 
when their overall effects on everyone are best.  Consequentialist support for the death penalty is 
often expressed using the term “deterrence.”  Even though the death penalty is clearly very 
harmful to the person being executed, many people think these bad effects are morally 
outweighed by the benefits to society that result.  One benefit is so-called “special deterrence”: 
the death penalty prevents the executed person from committing any more crimes.  The death 
penalty is also often thought to provide “general deterrence”: it discourages others in society 
from committing similar crimes.  The consequentialist case for deterrence is therefore that the 
good that comes from these two kinds of deterrence more than balance out the harms the death 
penalty causes.   
 
A very different kind of argument for the death penalty is often expressed with the biblical 
injunction of “an eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20, Deuteronomy 19:21), or in 
Latin, the lex talionis.  The basic idea here is that justice requires that murderers receive the fate 
they have inflicted on others: death.  In other words, the death penalty the best way of giving 
killers what they deserve.   
 
People who oppose the death penalty are often referred to as “abolitionists.”  Abolitionists tend 
to disagree with both of the pro-death penalty arguments given above and also add additional 
arguments against the practice.  According to abolitionists, the main difficulty with 
consequentialist deterrence-based arguments is that they have the facts wrong.  There is no good 
empirical evidence that the death penalty deters criminals, despite countless studies by social 
scientists trying to establish the link.  For example, murder rates are often unchanged before and 
after states start using the death penalty.2  Neither do studies show that people have less 
inclination to do terrible things when threatened with execution rather than mere life 
imprisonment.  Most criminals either do not think they will be caught or they do not think about 
what will happen if they are. 
 
Abolitionists typically respond to the “eye for an eye” point by simply denying that murderers 
deserve to die for their crimes.  There are various ways of making this point.  Some simply 
counter with the maxim that “two wrongs don’t make a right.”  If murder is bad and wrong, how 
does killing the killer makes things then all right again?  Also, for a wide range of crimes, we 
make no attempt to punish according to an “eye for eye.”  We do not punish rape by raping 
rapists, we do not punish robbery by robbing from the robbers, etc., etc.  For that matter, few 
people have objections in principle to allowing plea bargains, pardons, reduced sentences for 
good behavior, and other ways of departing from strict demands of lex talionis.  So what makes 
killing murderers such a demand of justice?   
 
 
2 See, for example, Lamperti, John. “Does Capital Punishment Deter Murder?” 2010, accessed at 




Two other important abolitionist arguments are worth mentioning briefly.  One is sometimes 
called the “inconsistency” argument: this is the idea that it is inconsistent and thus wrong for 
governments to insist both that killing human beings is wrong and that punishing by killing is 
morally justified.  “Wrong is wrong,” an abolitionist might say.  A defender of capital 
punishment might respond to this by pointing out that actually very few people believe that 
killing is wrong under all circumstances.  Standard examples of justified killings include self-
defense and justified war (which is itself a kind of self-defense).  To this point, an abolitionist 
might counter that the issue of self-defense is irrelevant.  The death penalty is not needed for 
self-defense, since life imprisonment works just as well.   
 
A different abolitionist tactic is to appeal to the fact that capital punishment is likely to put 
innocent people to death, and in all likelihood, it has already done so, perhaps many, many times.  
Given the fact that many people have been shown to be innocent and wrongfully convicted after 
years or decades spent in jail, it is difficult to believe the list of the wrongfully convicted persons 
does not include at least a few people who were executed.  Death penalty advocates sometimes 
respond to this by pointing out that sometimes evidence of guilt is overwhelming.  Sometimes 
this is true, of course, but often people are convicted of murder on rather flimsy and 
circumstantial evidence.  The fact that sometimes the evidence is irrefutable does not mean that it 
always is. 
 
In this connection, think about the recent tragic saga of Curtis Flowers.  Mr. Flowers is an 
African American man from Mississippi who has been tried six times for the heinous killing of 
four people at a furniture store in Winona.  Four of these trials ended in convictions, but these 
four convictions were overturned on appeal.  The first two were overturned by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court due to the prosecutor’s misconduct.  (The Prosecutor for five of the six trials is a 
white man, Doug Evans, who has consistently sought the death penalty for Flowers.).  Two other 
trials ended in mistrials.  In June 2010, a majority white jury convicted Flowers and sentenced 
him to death in his sixth trial.  This verdict was eventually overturned by the U. S. Supreme 
Court in June 2019 due to racial bias in jury selection.  In December 2019, Flowers was released 
for the first time since his original arrest on $250,000 bond.  All and all, he has served over 20 
years on death row at Parchman prison and despite his past failures, it is possible that Prosecutor 
Evans will try Flowers a seventh time.   
 
Throughout, the evidence against Flowers has been shaky.  While the bullets used in the killing 
were of the same caliber as a gun stolen from a car near the crime, no direct evidence has ever 
connected Flowers to the gun or the gun to the crime.  While witnesses claim to have seen 
Flowers near the store before the killing, there are also reasons to doubt the veracity of the 
witnesses.  Other witnesses who later claimed Flowers confessed to the murders in jail turned out 
to be lying.  The only other reasons for suspecting Flowers in the first place were that he had 
been fired from the store 13 days prior to the murders, supposedly he owed one of the owners 
$30 for a cash advance on his paycheck, and there were a couple other bits of inconsequential 
circumstantial evidence.  The whole affair was covered extensively in an award-winning podcast 
series, In the Dark, Season 2, by American Public Media.3 
 
3 See also “Curtis Flowers,” 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_Flowers, and Gilbert, C., Mann, D., 
Tungekar, R., and Yesko, P. “The Supreme Court has Reversed Curtis Flowers’ 2010 Conviction…” 2019, 
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When I hire local teenagers to do odd jobs – weeding, hauling boxes – I pay about what they’d 
earn at a fast-food restaurant.  I pay adults doing similar work at least twice as much and add a 
hefty tip, since they have families and basic living expenses.  It’s not the money but the message; 
I don’t want the teens to think this sort of labor might provide a lucrative career. Is this pay 
inequality ethical?   
 
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by Joan Hess, Fayetteville, AK) 
 
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA: 
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 166. 
 
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that it would be wrong to pay 
teenagers and adults differently for what is essentially the same work, and another showing that 
such pay inequality is morally permissible.    Critically comment: which of the arguments is 
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What are commonly called “genetic modifications” are deliberate changes to the genetic material 
(DNA) of organisms to somehow change or improve their functioning.  In some of its forms, 
genetic modification has been occurring for thousands of years and is ethically uncontroversial.  
Consider, for example, agricultural cross-fertilization and breeding practices aimed at increasing 
crop yields and improving plant resistance to disease.  However, recent scientific developments 
have brought on the very real possibility of much more sudden and controversial ways of 
changing the genetics of plants and animals alike.  
 
To a certain extent, scientists have been directly manipulating the genetic material of select 
plants and animals already over the past couple of decades.  So-called “GMO” (genetically 
modified organism) crops now include tomatoes that are more resistant to freezing temperatures, 
which was accomplished by insertion of genetic material from a fish (a winter flounder).  
Scientists have also created potatoes that do not bruise and apples that do not brown.  Thousands 
of acres of Mississippi cropland features GMO corn engineered to be resistant to “Roundup” 
pesticide, so farmers can douse their fields with Roundup and the corn will survive, and most soy 
grown in the U.S. is now GMO as well.  Scientists have engineered a goat that produces silk in 
its milk and sheep whose milk can be used to treat cystic fibrosis.  Yeast and bacteria have been 
modified to help make insulin which is then used to treat people with Type 1 diabetes.   
 
So-called “genetic enhancement” offers the promise of more radical changes still.  While it is 
difficult to draw a sharp conceptual distinction between “modification,” and “enhancement,” the 
intuitive idea is whereas modifications involve repairing defects and removing vulnerabilities, 
enhancements are ways of making organisms function even better-than-normal.  Genetically 
enhanced humans, for example, could potentially be smarter, more attractive, or longer living.  
Or perhaps it will be possible to change people such that they are more gifted artistically, or 
better at math, or have better memories.  The possibilities seem endless, especially given new 
“CRISPR-cas9” technology.  CRISPR was developed using the ability of some bacteria to keep 
parts of the DNA from viruses that infect them.  (CRISPR, last accessed 2/10/20). 
 
But what about the ethics of genetic enhancement?  To some extent, the ethics of possible 
practices like this are difficult to assess confidently, since many important as-of-yet-unknown 
details will greatly shape future ethical debates.  For example, it matters a great deal whether the 
genetic enhancements being considered are done to children, who are too young to legally give 
informed consent, or to adults who are better equipped to understand potential risks and benefits.  
It also matters a lot whether the enhancements affect only individuals given the genetic 
treatments directly or whether, through changes made to the human germline, the children of 
those who have been genetically enhanced would also have the enhancements. 
 
Even given such uncertainties, however, it is worth sketching some important arguments that 
have been made on both sides of this ethical debate.  In terms of the arguments for enhancement, 
the main point that is made is that if indeed it is possible to make humans better, particularly if 
this can be accomplished in ways that make human life better for us all, then it seems worth 
doing, subject to appropriate precautions and safeguards.  One might also add that given the 
almost-certain availability of the technology, it seems unlikely that humans can somehow 
collectively prevent it from being used, at least on small scales.  Genetic enhancement is bound 
to start happening whether we want it or not, so the best we can hope for is to put systems in 
place to shape its use for good rather than ill.  Sticking our heads in the sand and merely hoping 
we do not have to confront these issues is unrealistic.   
 
Two of the most common arguments against genetic enhancement are what we might call the 
“naturalness” argument and the “playing God” argument.   The naturalness argument can be 
rendered like this: 
 
Premise: It is wrong for humans to deliberately change what is biologically “natural” to them.    
Premise: Genetic enhancement deliberately changes what is biologically natural.   
Therefore, genetic enhancement is wrong.   
 
The “playing God” argument is very similar, in fact, pretty much just a more theological version 
of the same thought: 
 
Premise: It is wrong for humans to deliberately “Play God.” (Only God can legitimately “play 
God.”) 
Premise: Genetic enhancement involves “playing God.” 
Therefore, genetic enhancement is wrong.   
 
There are two main problems with both arguments, and in both cases, the problems involve the 
first premises.  The first problem is that the divide between what is natural and unnatural, or 
playing God vs. not playing God, is far from clear.  So much of the way we live now has been 
shaped by technological advances, cultural changes, changes in the food supply, lifestyle and so 
forth, exactly what is “natural” any more and what is not?  What counts as “Playing God” and 
what does not?  But perhaps the bigger problem is that much that seems in one sense “unnatural” 
or “playing God” seems not wrong at all.  When surgeons perform emergency surgeries to save 
the lives of people with ruptured appendices, this is not something our ancestors five thousand 
years ago did.  Does that mean such life-saving surgeries are wrong?  Surely not.  When 
battlefield doctors decide which soldiers to treat and which to allow to die because the odds of 
saving their lives are so slim, the doctors are in a sense “playing God” in helping determine 
which soldiers live and which die.  But that is exactly what is needed to save the most lives, 
which is obviously a good thing, is it not?   
 
Recently, Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel has offered subtle and thoughtful ethical 
arguments against genetic enhancement.  It is difficult to summarize Sandel’s arguments 
concisely, but the main thought turns on the idea that viewing life as a gift is a very important 
moral attitude.  The desire to genetically enhance ourselves and our children stems from our 
problematic desire to control and dominate everything.  These desires are a product of some of 
the worst aspects of American culture: our hyper-competitiveness, our need for mastery, and the 
moral narrowness of thinking we are actually making people more valuable by making them 
smarter, taller, prettier, or what have you.  Parents, for example, should view their children as 
gifts and blessings, not as sets of abilities to be maximized for useful purposes.  Quoting Sandel 
directly:   
 
The bigger stakes are of two kinds. One involves the fate of human goods embodied in important 
social practice–norms of unconditional love and an openness to the unbidden, in the case of 
parenting; the celebration of natural talents and gifts in athletic and artistic endeavors; humility 
in the face of privilege, and a willingness to share the fruits of good fortune through institutions 
of social solidarity. The other involves our orientation to the world that we inhabit, and the kind 
of freedom to which we aspire. ..But changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other 
way around, is actually the deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting 
critically on the world, and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement. Rather than 
employ our new genetic powers to straighten ‘the crooked timber of humanity,’ we should do 
what we can to create social and political arrangements more hospitable to the gifts and 




1 Michael Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection,” The Atlantic , 2004.  Accessed at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/04/the-case-against-perfection/302927/.  Last accessed 
2/12/2020. 
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As a result of the terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001, the US 
military ramped up development of a lethal force of aerial drones.  Fleets of American unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) stationed around the globe have become the weapons-of-choice against 
known and suspected terrorists in a number of countries. The program to hunt down and take out 
terrorists was first revealed to the American public in 2013.  It was made public by a government 
whistleblower, as reported in the book, The Assassination Complex, by Jeremy Scahill along 
with reporters for the intercept.com website. 
 
The book and subsequent coverage by the news media generated concern about the way the US 
government was deciding which of the reported 460,000 people, suspected as terrorists by the 
CIA and the military, were being added to the list of potential drone targets.  A panel of national 
advisors is responsible for selecting those to be added to the kill list, sometimes reportedly listing 
individuals who had merely drawn the attention of authorities by their posts on social media.  
The President is ultimately responsible for signing off on their fate as clear and imminent threats 
to American lives.   
 
At the time, one of those names belonged to an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki.  Legal 
experts noted that he was not being accorded due legal process, including the right to stand trial 
for his alleged activities.  In October of 2011, he was killed by a drone strike in Yemen.  Two 
weeks later, his son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was also a US citizen but not on a kill list, 
also died in a US drone strike against someone else, thus becoming collateral damage in the war 
on terrorism.   
 
While scores of intended targets have been killed, so have hundreds of innocent victims, 
according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.  
 
Aside from Constitutional and moral questions raised by the drone program, a Defense 
Department task force has concluded that, rather than killing terrorists, it would be preferable to 
capture them along with any matériel.  Furthermore, many US commanders have been quoted as 
saying drone attacks have led to increasingly radicalized terrorists and the recruitment of new 
members to their ranks.      
(*case description adapted from “Cases for the Twenty-First Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl 
National Championship,” available at 
https://usuphilosophy.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/2017_cases_for_nationals.pdf, prepared by 
Robert Boyd Skipper (Committee Chair), Peggy Connolly, RuthAnn Althaus, Robert A. Currie, 
and Heidi Malm, Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. © 2016 Robert Skipper, Peggy Connolly, RuthAnn 
Althaus, Robert Currie, and Heidi Malm.)  
  Let us suppose the President acts based on information provided through the CIA via a 
particular informant in the middle East indicating that a certain US citizen, living in Afghanistan, 
is associated with a known terrorist group. The suspected terrorist is not given a criminal trial, 
nor is there evidence that as of yet, this person has violated any U.S. laws.  Is the President 
justified in ordering a drone bombing attack on a house in which this target is reported to be 
staying?  Bear in mind that others, who may or may not be associated with the suspected terrorist 
(such as children or spouses), are quite likely to be in the house as well. 
 
Construct two Aristotelian syllogisms, one showing that the President would be justified in 
ordering a drone attack on this house, and another showing that the President would not be 
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This case –at least the specific version of it discussed below – is from a famous philosophical 
paper published in 1972: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 229-243. 
 
Singer’s article was inspired by a crisis in Bengal (near India).  Millions of people were dying 
due to a famine produced by a drought. The thrust of Singer’s argument is that those of us 
capable of doing something to relieve this suffering, at least to some degree or other, have an 
obligation to do so.  The basic reasoning can be nicely captured in an Aristotelian syllogism: 
1) People (morally) ought to reduce others’ suffering so far as they can, provided they do not 
sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.)  
2) Most individuals in the west (e.g. United States) can do things (e.g., make significant financial 
contributions) that would relieve the suffering of famine victims in Bengal without sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance. 
3) Thus, most individuals in the west morally ought to (are morally obligated to) make such 
contributions.   
 
The above reasoning is simple and elegant.  
 
One might make various objections to it, however.  One might, for example, argue that although 
it would be quite nice of someone to donate to relieve Bengali suffering, Americans and other 
westerners have no moral obligation to do so.  Singer’s response is simply to deny that this is 
merely a matter of niceness, as opposed to an issue of genuine obligation.  He argues that the fact 
that these people are in Bengal (far away) rather than nearby, makes no moral difference.  (He 
admits that the case may feel differently psychologically, but this makes no moral difference.  
It’s easier to forget about those who are far away, but this makes no difference as to whether or 
not it is okay to do so.)  Consider, by analogy, someone who walks by a shallow neighborhood 
pond and notices a small child drowning in the pond.  Surely, he argues, everyone will admit that 
to ignore the child’s plight, to walk on by and do nothing, would be shameful wrongdoing. 
(Imagine one only has to wade into the water up to the knees.) So what’s the moral difference 
with Bengal?  In both cases, helping out costs us relatively little, and yet could make a huge 
difference to the well-being of those we help.  (We could save someone’s life for the price of a 
few cups of Starbucks coffee!)  Surely there’s an obligation to do something if we can.  
 
A different objection imagines that while there is an obligation to do something, it is not my 
obligation.  Rather, it’s the obligation of our government, or rich Americans, or Bengali 
immigrants to the United States.  However, Singer argues that the fact that others may also have 
obligations to help does not get me off the moral hook.  Unless others are relieving the suffering 
entirely – and they’re not, far from it! – it is still an obligation of mine to do what I can.  (By 
analogy, the fact that other bystanders who see the child drowning in the pond are not doing 
anything does not lessen my obligation to do what I can.)  And most of us (college professors, 
for example) could give a lot: hundreds or thousands of dollars’ worth, and the sacrifice to 
ourselves would be a few less Starbucks coffees, or something on the same moral level.   
 
Thus, Singer argues, most of us not only have such obligations in response to the suffering of 
others, at home and abroad, but that also, most of us fail to fulfill these obligations regularly and 
in rather dramatic ways. 
 
It seems clear that if Singer is right about the obligations, then most of us fall short.  But is there 
such an obligation?  Make a direct argument against Singers’ conclusion, e.g., by challenging 
one or more of the premises in his argument.  Then respond to your own objection, and explain 
whether or not your first point is a serious objection to Singer. (Compelling?  Reasonable?) 
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There’s obviously big money at stake in elite college sports, especially Men’s Division 1 football 
and basketball.  CBS/Turner pays the NCAA over a billion dollars a year to broadcast “March 
Madness,” the annual men’s basketball tournament.1  In 2019, college football’s top 25 most 
valuable programs are estimated to have generated a whopping $2.7 billion in total revenue for a 
profit of $1.5 billion. After winning the national championship in 2018, Clemson took in a 
school-record $40 million in athletic contributions alone, aside from gate receipts, broadcasting 
rights fees, and merchandise sales. And it is lucrative to be a coach of such programs, especially 
a head coach.  A New York Times article from September 14, 2016 reported that in forty states, 
the highest paid public employee is a college coach.  In 2019, the highest paid state employee in 
Mississippi was ex-Ole Miss football coach Matt Luke.  He earned a salary of $3.1 million, 
dwarfing the $122 thousand dollar salary of governor Phil Bryant.2  And salary alone is only a 
share of a glamorous head coach’s annual earnings, since it excludes additional compensation 
from endorsement deals, shoe contracts, speaker’s fees, and so forth.   
  
Players – those competing on the field and on the court, the people who the fans pay to see – are 
excluded from the direct financial compensation, as is required by their NCAA status as 
“students athletes.” To be sure, most players earn athletic scholarships that pay for their tuition, 
room and board, and the costs associated with their athletic compensation.  Additionally, many 
dream of careers in professional sports, and participation in college sports often gives them the 
training and exposure needed to make those dreams a reality.  But the number of college players 
who end up with pro careers is very small – somewhere around 1% - and even many who make it 
to the “next level” don’t hang around there long.  For every Tom Brady or Steph Curry with a 
long, lucrative tenure in the pros, there are many whose pro careers last little longer than the 
proverbial “cup of coffee” in the big leagues.   
 
Given the relatively small direct rewards college sports provides to its players, and the outsize 
benefits it provides to schools, coaches, athletic administrators, television and radio networks, 
etc., many argue that the situation has become unfairly exploitative of athletes.  After all, high 
 
1 R. Sherman, 2016. “The NCAA's new March Madness TV deal will make them a billion 
dollars a year.” SBNation, (April 12). Accessed at https://www.sbnation.com/college-
basketball/2016/4/12/11415764/ncaa-tournament-tv-broadcast-rights-money-payout-cbs-turner.   
(Last accessed April 17, 2020).   
 
2 C. Gibson, 2019. “Who’s highest paid in your state? ESPN.com, (n.d.). Accessed at:  
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/28261213/dabo-swinney-ed-orgeron-highest-paid-
state-employees (Last accessed April 17, 2020). 
school prospects looking towards possible pro careers have little choice but to play college ball: 
the NFL refuses to draft or try out high school players looking to bypass college.  For the NFL, 
college sports is effectively a free minor league system, where the most promising prospects can 
hone their skills until they are intellectually and physically mature enough for the pros.  
Basketball is similar, except that the NBA will now draft players as early as early as a year after 
entering college. Meanwhile, colleges get to retain the bulk of the revenue the best of them 
generate while there.      
 
Make Aristotelian syllogistic arguments on both sides of the equation: an argument showing that 
the current system is unfair to elite college athletes, and an argument defending the current non-
payment of college athletes as fair and permissible.   
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 In the late 1940s, after Allied Forces defeated Nazi Germany and world saw for itself the 
colossal horror of the death camps, attention focused on some of the research the Nazis had been 
conducting on Jews and other “undesirables” (Romani, Sinti and ethnic Poles, as well as Soviet 
Prisoners of War) kept in the camps.  A certain number of prisoners – rather than being killed 
directly – had been forced to serve involuntarily in experiments conducted by the Nazis.  For 
example, study subjects were placed naked in subfreezing temperatures outdoors to study the 
effects of cold exposure.  Some prisoners at Dachau camp were forced to sit in tanks of freezing 
water to up to three hours to study the effectiveness of various reheating techniques.  Others had 
bones removed without anesthesia to try bone transplantation techniques.  Some prisoners were 
deliberately injected with jaundice or given severe chemical burns from exposure to mustard gas 
to investigate the efficacy of treatment methods.  Children were intentionally infected with 
tuberculosis and later murdered.1 The cruelty and suffering caused by these and other shockingly 
inhumane tests can scarcely be overstated. 
(https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nazi-medical-experiments) 
 After the war, some of the Nazi doctors were tried for their crimes against humanity at 
the “Doctor’s Trial.”  Worldwide revulsion led to the formulation of the Nuremberg Code of 
medical ethics, perhaps the first attempt to articulate systematically ethical principles for human 
subjects research.  The Nuremburg Code was influential in the development of later sets  of 
principles, including the Helsinki Code, first drafted in the 1950s, and the 1978 Belmont Report2 
in the United States.  The Belmont Report formed the ethical basis of U. S. federal regulations on 
human subjects research first implemented in the 1980s.  Federal action was spurred by public 
disclosure of the Tuskegee Syphilis study.  This notorious decades-long experiment on black 
men in Alabama had come to light only in the early 1970s.     
 One of the controversies that emerged after the war is whether or not it is ethical to use 
the results from the Nazi experiments.  Some people object on ethical grounds alone, arguing 
that it would be unethical to use results from experiments that had been conducted unethically.  
(Everyone acknowledges that the research had been performed in the most grossly unethical 
ways possible.)  Others refused to use the results based solely on scientific grounds, citing 
inconsistencies of methodological and experimental methods that limited the scientific 
usefulness of the findings.  However, most scientists admitted that the data were of some 
experimental value, particularly since many of the experiments could not be replicated in more 
humane ways.  Many scientists and ethicists have argued that it would be unethical not to use the 
Nazi research, given that it has the potential to save lives.  For example, Dr. John Wayward from 
 
1 Accessed at: http://www.auschwitz.dk/Bullenhuser.htm (Last Accessed, April 24, 2020). 
 
2 Accessed at: https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html (Last Accessed, April 
24, 2020). 
 
the University of Victoria and University of Minnesota researcher Dr. Robert Pozos have argued 
in favor of using the work.  By contrast, Arnold S. Relman, editor of the prestigious The New 
England Journal of Medicine from 1977 to 1991, refused to publish any study that cited the Nazi 
experiments.  Some of the same ethical concerns surround the use of Japanese wartime 
experiments conducted to explore the effects of weapons of biological warfare.   
 A new version of this problem has arisen relating to recent research conducted in China.  
Some leading scientific journals have begun retracting papers that use data from experiments 
performed using the organs of prisoners executed in China.  China alone tops the United States 
in the number of executions it performs, and in contrast to the United States, many of the 
executions are performed on prisoners guilty of “political” crimes of various sorts.  Many 
observers, particularly in the west, have objected that many of those executed are killed in 
violation of their human rights.  Thus, the argument in favor of retracting articles that report data 
obtained by experimenting on the organs of executed Chinese prisoners is that as in the Nazi 
case, it is unethical to use data that has been unethically obtained.  A typical journal notice, in 
this case, an “expression of concern” by the editors of Biomarkers, reads as follows: 
 
“The Editors and Publisher of Biomarkers wish to issue an Expression of Concern for the published 
article. 
 
Yi Li, Mingli Zhu, Qiang Xia, Siyue Wang, Jiaqi Qian, Renhua Lu, Miaolin Che, Huili Dai, 
Qingwei Wu, Zhaohui Ni, Bengt Lindholm, Jonas Axelsson & Yucheng Yan, Urinary neutrophil 
gelatinase-associated lipocalin and L-type fatty acid binding protein as diagnostic markers of early 
acute kidney injury after liver transplantation, Biomarkers, 17:4, 336-342, 
https://doi.org/10.3109/1354750X.2012.672458 
 
Concerns have been raised that the study described in the article did not adhere to ethical guidelines 
as outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki and the Declaration of Istanbul and guidance from the 
World Health Organization and the World Medical Association regarding the source of transplanted 
human organs. Specifically, the British Medical Journal Open (BMJ Open) published an article 
highlighting many papers in which there is concern that transplanted organs were harvested from 
executed prisoners in China. 
 
In response to these concerns we contacted the authors to clarify the source of the transplanted 
organs received by the patients described in their study. However, despite multiple attempts to 
contact the authors and their institutions, no response was received. The Editors of Biomarkers 
would like to alert readers of this. We will provide an update if we receive any further information.3 
 
Make an argument of your own either defending or disagreeing with the principle:  
 
“it is unethical to use the results of experiments that were performed unethically.”   
 
Your answer should be at least a solid paragraph in length.  Compare with analogous 
circumstances in non-scientific contexts, if you can think of any.   
 
 
3 Accessed at: https://retractionwatch.com/2020/04/15/journals-have-retracted-or-flagged-more-than-40-papers-
from-china-that-appear-to-have-used-organ-transplants-from-executed-prisoners/ 
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Philosophers before the 20th Century were not much concerned with animal rights or animal 
suffering.  Schopenhauer is an interesting exception – as can be seen in the short piece of his we 
read and elsewhere in his writings, he’s very sensitive to the issue of animal suffering.  In Anglo-
American philosophy, Peter Singer (discussed previously as the author of “Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality”) is as responsible as any one for putting the issue of animal suffering on 
philosopher’s agenda.  His book Animal Rights spurred a lot of interest and work in this field.  
Since it was published in the 1970s, the issue of animal rights has remained a staple topic for 
many collegiate “applied ethics” classes. 
 
   Image 2: “Peter Singer” by Mal Vickers is licensed by CC0 1.0 Public Domain 
Dedication 
 
Singer’s basic argument on behalf of animal rights is a straightforward and generalized version 
of the principle we saw in Case 14: 
 
People (morally) ought to reduce others’ suffering so far as they can, provided they do not 
sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.  
 
Generalizing the principle slightly, we get this: 
 
1. People (morally) ought to suffering reduce suffering in the world so far as they can, provided 
that in so doing they do not produce an equal or greater amount of suffering elsewhere.   
 
So think about the trade-offs most of us are making when we have a nice piece of meat for 
dinner.  (Americans tend to eat more animals per person and feature meat more regularly at their 
meals than citizens of virtually any other country in the world.)  We like the taste of meat, and 
were we to substitute, say, some beans or bread or something for the meat, the meal would not be 
as pleasurable.  So morally speaking, what speaks in favor of eating the meat is the boost in 
pleasure most of us get from meat vs. the alternative.  However, meat consumption comes at a 
huge cost, namely, the life of the animal we’re eating.  Of course one cow or pig can be used for 
many meals.  But Singer’s argument is that when you add up all the pleasures we get from eating 
that cow or pig compared to the pain and loss of its continued life, the moral “calculus” is that 
much less suffering would occur in the world if we ate fewer animals and more beans (or wheat, 
or whatever is being substituted for the meat.)  
 
The basic argument in Singer is independent of special contexts you might think of.  In these 
debates, people tend to start thinking of dramatic scenarios in which they’re alone on a small 
island with no other source of food (no beans, no pineapple!), and all that’s available to eat is an 
animal. Then, isn’t it okay to eat the animal?  Sure, says Singer, because other things being 
equal, pains and pleasures of humans are in some measure more important – morally weightier – 
than the pains of animals.  (This is even more true if we’re talking about eating fish or shrimp 
rather than cows or pigs. Chickens, perhaps, are somewhere in between.  And it would be 
cheating to think vegetarians don’t enjoy their meals at all – they do! – often more than 
carnivores.)  But Singer’s response is that the island scenario is clearly not the kind of situation 
most of us are in, and so it is irrelevant.  Most of us eat meat simply because we find it slightly 
more pleasurable than the alternative of eating meatless.  Nutritionally, vegetarianism is a 
perfectly viable way to sustain oneself, particularly if one supplements plant sources of food with 
Vitamin B12 and one is willing to mix in the occasional egg or slice of cheese.  Protein is easy 
enough to get from beans and other plant sources if one is smart about it.  (On the other hand, my 
niece’s “vegetarian” diet of pasta with butter and potato chips is definitely not nutritionally 
sound.)  And Singer need not insist that total vegetarianism is the only way we can fulfill our 
moral obligations.  His reasoning is gradualist, meaning that the world is better off whenever we 
skip the meat and eat plants instead, even if we are not willing to live meatlessly entirely.  
(Michael Pollan, author of the bestselling Omnivore’s Dilemma and other great books on food, 
argues that most people can do very well nutritionally with approximately one 4 oz. serving of 
meat per week.  Think how many fewer animals we’d be slaughtering daily were we to live like 
this!) 
 
And there’s no doubt that humans impose tremendous suffering on animals.  Industrialized 
agriculture has deliberately done a good job of shielding most of us from the horrors of mass 
feedlots, not to mention the incredible waste and resource use brought on by industrialized meat 
production.  But the suffering is there, nonetheless.  Consider the following from Dominion, 
Matthew Scully’s moving account of the tragedy of death in a feedlot:   
 
Squealing hogs funnel into an area where they are electrocuted, stabbed in the jugular, then tied, 
lifted, and carried on a winding journey through the plant.  They are dunked in scalding water, 
their hair is removed, they are run through a fiery furnace (to burn off residual hair), then 
disemboweled and sliced by an army of young, usually immigrant workers…. The 
electrocutors, stabbers, and carvers who work on the floor wear earplugs to muffle the 
screaming.1 
 
As Scully emphasizes, the moral cost of this mass death is not borne by the animals alone; it is 
also tragic for the humans involved.  He quotes a New York Times writer Charles LeDuff who 
worked undercover at the meat plant for a summer.  LeDuff writes, “Slaughtering swine is 
repetitive, brutish work… Five thousand quit and five thousand are hired every year.  You hear 
 
1 Scully, M (2003). Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (St. Martin’s), p. 
282. 
people say, ‘They don’t kill pigs in the plan, they kill people.’” He reports that the plant “reeks 
of sweat and scared animal, steam and blood,” and continues: 
 
Kill-flor work is hot, quick and bloody.  The hog is herded in from the stockyard, then stunned 
with an electric gun.  It is lifted into a conveyor belt, dazed but not dead, and passed to a 
waiting group of men wearing bloodstained smocks and blank faces.  They slit the neck, shackle 
the hind legs and watch the machine lift the carcass into the air, letting its life flow out in a 
purple gush, into a collection trough.2   
  
As of almost two decades ago, when Scully’s book was written, some 38 million cows and 
calves were slaughtered annually in the U.S., not to mention the pigs and over 8 billion chickens.  
That’s a lot of death.   
 
Formulate an Aristotelian syllogism both for and against the consumption of meat for pleasure.  
(Assume what’s at issue is not complete meat abstinence, but Americans’ tendency to include 




2 Scully (2003), p. 283. 
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In the 2016 Presidential election, only 55.7% of Americans eighteen years or older exercised 
their right to vote.  That level of participation puts the US in the bottom third of the developed 
countries worldwide.  In non-Presidential elections, participation is lower still, dropping into the 
single digits for primary races. The problem of participation is particularly evident in younger 
adults.  Surely, a big reason for the fact that many of our social welfare programs (social 
security, Medicare) skew in favor of older Americans is that older folks are much more likely to 
vote.  Politicians reward those who put them in office. 
 
Commentators frequently lament this lack of voter participation, and quite clearly, electoral 
results would be more representative of US citizens’ views as a whole if electoral turnout was 
greater.  But what can be done?  Eight states have automatic voter registration on individuals’ 
18th birthdays unless they opt out. Other states are considering options to make voting and voter 
registration easier, although the tendency in states leaning politically right has been to make 
voting harder, not easier.  States are experimenting with online voting and more voting by mail.  
No state has of yet made voting mandatory, however.  Australia and Belgium require citizens to 
vote, and Australia even imposes a $20 fine on those who fail to discharge this civic duty.   
 
Yale Law professor Stephen L. Carter has recently proposed paying citizens to vote.1  He reasons 
that perhaps this would help encourage more young people, minorities, and lower income voters 
to show up at the polls. This proposal, as compared to the option of requiring voting, could be 
argued to better respect citizens’ right to choose.  On this other hand, it would increase the costs 
of holding elections considerably, and there’s of course no guarantee that someone who is paid to 
vote will vote responsibly.  (Of course, there’s also no way at present of insuring that people vote 
responsibly.) 
 
Set aside the likelihood that a law paying people to vote would actually get passed.  (Seem quite 
unlikely, on the face of it.)  Make an Aristotelian argument in favor of paying people to vote, and 
an argument against it.   
 
 
1 Carter, S.L (2015) “Want More Voters?  Pay Them.” Bloomberg (April 2). Accessed at: 











The assignment is to watch one of the movies on the list below and take a brief quiz based on 
what you’ve seen.  A longer, reflective essay about the movie will appear on the final exam, so 
you should take good notes about the ethical message of the film, so that in preparation for the 
final exam, you can review your thoughts.   
 
1) The movie you choose to watch must be drawn from the list below.  I welcome your 
suggestions as to possible movies to add to the list for future sessions of the class, but for this 
semester you are restricted to one of the movies from the following list.   
 
2) The quiz is up and available on Canvas for you to take at any time.  When you go to take the 
movie quiz on Canvas, you will first select the movie to be quizzed on, and that selection will 
populate the quiz with questions appropriate to that movie choice. 
 
3) The quizzes are brief and time-constrained, designed not to allow you time to look up answers 
on Google or something of the kind.  I recommend taking the quiz within a day or so of watching 
the movie, so the movie is still fresh in your mind.   
 
4) I’ve tried to indicate the parental guidance ratings for the movie below. Please pay attention to 
these.  Some of the movies have extremely vulgar language that may be offensive to some.  
None of the movies are exactly pornographic, but some have mild sex scenes and nudity.  Some 
are quite violent.  However, some of the selections are more suitable for general audiences.  
Please choose a movie appropriate to your comfort level. 
 
Do the Right Thing (1989, Spike Lee) 
Do the Right Thing put Spike Lee on the map as filmmaker – he produced, wrote, directed, and 
stars in the film  It is a comedy-drama that ends in tragedy.  In sweltering summer heat on a 
block in Brooklyn, NY, racial tensions rise, culminating in violence and death.   
Rating: R (extremely harsh and offensive language, brief nudity, a mild sex scene, some 
violence). 
 
Blood Diamond (2006) 
Blood Diamond tells part of the story of Sierra Leone’s tragic civil war and its “wealth curse,” 
i.e., the coveted diamonds that people fought for, died for, and that exacerbated the country’s 
political problems.  It is a powerful movie, but the story it tells is a familiarly grim tale of 
African exploitation at the hands of European and American whites.  Leonardo DiCaprio stars as 
a South African mercenary who undergoes a radical change of heart.  Rating: R (strong violence 
and language. 
 
Harold and Maude (1971) 
Harold and Maude is a “small,” quirky movie about a teenager obsessed with gaining his 
mother’s attention and his rescue by a much-older woman.  Funny, for those (such as myself) 
who like slightly odd movies. Rating: G. 
 
Hotel Rwanda (2004) 
Hotel Rwanda tells the tragically true story of Paul Rusesabagina, a hotel manager who 
courageously and generously put himself and his family in grave danger to help save the lives of 
over a thousand innocents.  Among the ravages of a brutal and hysterical genocide, there are 
some who can be compassionate, even when failed on all sides by the United Nations and others 
who could have done much more.  The Rwandan genocide, while little thought about by most 
Americans, brought out human cruelty and mass slaughter not seen since World War II.  




Just Mercy (2019) 
Just Mercy tells the true and very moving story of Bryan Stevenson and of his first cases in 
which he tried to free wrongly convicted death row inmates from execution.  The centerpiece 
case is that of Walter McMillan, sentenced to death on the flimsiest evidence for killing a young 
white woman.  Stevenson’s ultimate success catapulted him to later work with the Equal Justice 
Initiative in Montgomery, AL, which recently opened the national anti-lynching museum and 
monument.  Stevenson is wonderfully played in the movie by Michael B. Jordan.  Rating: PG 
(mild language, minimal on-screen violence).  
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“Blood Diamond” (2006) Study Questions: 
 
For over a decade beginning in the 1990s, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fought an 
insurgent rebel campaign against government forces of Sierra Leone, a small country in west 
Africa.  The conflict caused over 2 million people to become refugees and killed untold 
thousands of innocents and combatants.  Many who were captured were mutilated by having 
limbs severed by machetes, and others were enslaved and forced to work in the diamond mines.  
Diamonds were the chief source of financial support for the RUF, who ultimately traded them for 
weapons.  RUF diamonds were smuggled out of the country through Liberia and strongman 
Charles Taylor, who later became a notoriously corrupt president of Liberia. These diamonds – 
“Conflict Diamonds” or “Blood Diamonds” – eventually ended up in world diamond markets 
where there were often bought and sold by prosperous Europeans and Americans.  
 
This movie tells the story of a white, Rhodesian diamond smuggler named Archer, who becomes 
caught up in this struggle, through a link to one of the unfortunate victims of the war, a man 
named Solomon.  Much of the movie focuses on how Archer and an American journalist try to 
help Solomon find his kidnapped son.  While Solomon ultimately succeeds, Archer’s does not 
fare so well.   
 
Rated R for violence, graphic scenes of murdered corpses and mutilations, and occasional foul 
language.   
 
Retool following paragraph: 
Apparently, in October 2006, the Diamond Council tried to persuade Blood Diamond's director, 
Edward Zwick, to add a disclaimer to the film citing the “Kimberley process” and noting that 
Sierra Leone's civil war was long over. Zwick refused, explaining: "What I wanted to create in 
their [movie-goers'] minds is consciousness," said Zwick. "A purchase of a diamond just has to 
be an informed purchase. I think after seeing this movie, people will feel it incumbent upon 
themselves to ask for a warranty, so as to guarantee the diamond they’re buying is not from a 
conflict zone." 
Questions: 
Which affluent country is responsible for the diamond purchases?  
When he’s caught trying to smuggle diamonds into Liberia, Archer is trying to smuggle them in 
what?  
The point of the RUF making blindfolded young kidnapped recruits kill someone standing at the 
wall is what, would you say?   
The journalist’s name is?  
Solomon’s last name is ?  
Where does Solomon reconnect with Jesse?  
The name of the European diamond company mentioned in the film is Van de ____________? 
(Kaap) 
Is this company profiting from the war? If so, how?  
Earlier in his life, Danny was a mercenary, meaning what, exactly? 
What happened to Danny’s parents? 




In ethical quagmires like the one depicted here, it can be difficult and controversial to say who is 
responsible for the problem, and to what degree.  Do western diamond companies who buy and 
sell blood diamonds have an obligation to refrain from this practice, especially when they are 
aware of the possibility certain diamond are blood diamonds sold by the RUF or a similar group?  
Is it wrong for individual smugglers like Archer to attempt to profit from the conflict in the way 
he was trying to, earlier on in the film? 
Quoted from Langfitt, F. (2006) “Industry Braces for Blowback from ‘Blood Diamond,”  (Oct. 
20), Available at: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6353402 (last 
accessessed May 6, 2020). 
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“Do the Right Thing” (1989) Study Questions: 
 
Which character first says: “Do the Right Thing”? 
 
What is the name of the owner of the pizza shop? 
 
The stutterer’s name is? 
 
The character who saves the child’s life by pushing him out of the path of the oncoming car. 
 
The fledgling boycott against the pizza shop is directed at what? 
 
Radio Rahim’s boombox is smashed up by who or what? 
 
The trash can through the window was thrown by whom? 
 
The message in the end, or at least the view of MLK, is what? 
 
Who kills whom? 
 
Essay question: In the end, there is a memorable post-riot conversation between Sal and Mookie.  
While they have and show signs of some lingering hostility towards each other, there are also 
hints of mutual understanding and respect.  Interpret the meaning of this scene as you see it and 
tie it to the larger message the film tries to convey.    
 
Recent (April 2020) article on “Do the Right Thing” from the New York Times: Viewing Party -- 
Do the Right Thing. 
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“Harold and Maude” (1971) Study Questions: 
 
Harold and Maude is a quirky, funny story about what happens when a rich, death-obsessed 
young man has his life turned upside-down after meeting a lively septuagenarian named Maude 
at a funeral.  Stars Ruth Gordon, Bud Cort, and Vivian Pickles, directed by Hal Ashby.     
 
(Available as of 4/2020 for free on Amazon Prime.  No issues with dirty language, violence, 




At one point in the movie, Harold estimates the number of feigned (pretended) suicides he’s 
staged.  How many?   
 
Why do you think he does them (the feigned suicides)?   
 
What ruins his Mom’s first attempt to set Harold up with a blind date she’s lined up? 
 
At one point, Harold says he wants to be a daisy, because they are all the same.  Maude’s 
response is that “much of the world’s sorrow comes from people who are this (pointing at one 
daisy in particular), yet allow themselves to be treated as a that (gesturing at the field broadly).”  
What does she mean?   
 
What happens to the highway motorcycle cop who tries to write Maude up for her bad driving?   
 
Describe the first time Harold’s Mom thought he was dead.  How does this incident help make 
sense of his later feigned suicides? 
 
What becomes of uncle Viktor’s attempts to turn Harold around?  
 
What happens to Harold’s “last” blind date?  
 
Essay: What perspective about life does Harold ultimately get from Maude?  How did she 
convey this perspective in her actions?  In what ways does his “new, post-Maude perspective” – 
what little we see of it – reflect Maude’s approach to life?        
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“Hotel Rwanda” (2004) Study Questions: 
 
Rwanda, and African country colonized by Belgium, gained its independence in 1962, following 
which the country became mired in tensions and violence between the country’s Hutu majority 
tribe and its Tutsi minority.  Thousands of Tutsis fled into neighboring countries, and an 
attempted invasion by a Tutsi rebel group out of exile resulted in civil that ended in 1993.   
 
In 1994, the Hutu president of Rwanda was killed when his plane was shot down. Hutu 
politicians blamed Tutsis for the attack.  Within hours of the president’s death, loosely organized 
Hutu militia groups mobilized and killed approximately 800.000 Tutsis over a span of just 100 
days.  Despite full awareness of what was going on, the international community, including the 
United Nations (UN), did virtually nothing to stop or even slow the slaughter.   
 
Hotel Rwanda tells the true story of one man’s courage.  Paul Rusesabagina is the manager of a 
Belgium-owned luxury hotel in Rwanda’s capital city of Kigali.   He is good at pleasing the 
hotel’s mostly white patrons and skillful at staying in the good graces of Rwandan army officers 
and local businessman.  Though himself a Hutu, Paul’s wife is Tutsi, making their children 
mixed.  
 
Paul’s Tutsi neighbors seek refuge in his house once the killing starts.  Eventually, he bribes a 
Rwanda army officer to allow him put them up at his hotel.  Soon enough, over a 1,000 Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus were being sheltered in the Hotel Rwanda. The UN withdrew most of its 
peacekeeping force, and troops sent by foreign governments arrive only evacuate citizens from 
their home countries.  Through shrewd determination and courage. Paul is ultimately able to save 
both his family and over 1,200 others.   
 
For more on the genocide: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486 
 
An interview with the real Paul Rusesabagina can be heard here: 
https://www.npr.org/2006/04/06/5324187/paul-rusesabagina-no-ordinary-man.  He also wrote a 
book describing his life and his experiences during the genocide, An Ordinary Man: An 
Autobiography (2006). A book written by the UN Commander (Romeo Dallaire) portrayed in the 
movie, co–written with Samantha Power, is Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of 
Humanity in Rwanda (2004).  
 





Right at the outset, the basis of Hutu resentment towards Tutsis is explained briefly.  What 
explanation of the resentment is given? 
 
Who created the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis?   
 
What’s the significance and meaning of the phrase: “cut the tall trees”?   
 
What color hats and vests do the UN peacekeepers wear?  
 
When the UN commander (Dallaire) tells Paul: “we think you’re dirt,” what is his point?  Is that 
Dallaire’s own view, do you think? 
 
Paul saw something so revolting he made his driver promise not to tell anyone he’d seen.  What 
was it?   
  
Where do Paul and Tatiana live now?   
 
While at the beginning of the film, Paul’s allegiance lies primarily to his family.  As the story 
goes on, his sense of obligation to the innocents being sheltered at his Hotel seems to grow, to 
the point of leaving his family to stay to help those in the Hotel.  In leaving his family in this 
way, did Paul do the right thing, or should his primary allegiance have remained with his family?  
 
In 2005, largely in reaction to the Rwanda disaster, world leaders adopted a resolution called 
“Responsibility to Protect” )(R2P). This resolution obligates nations to come to the assistance of 
innocents in civil conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide.  In 2006, the UN Security Council 
passed a similar measure, Resolution 1674.  What is your view on this?  Do countries with the 
capacity to help have an obligation to intercede in such conflicts to protect innocents?  Or is this 
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“Just Mercy” (2019) Study Questions: 
 
Just Mercy tells the true story of Bryan Stevenson, an African American lawyer who’d recently 
graduated from Harvard Law School, and his heroic and ultimately successful struggle to free 
unjustly convicted death row prisoners in Alabama.  The narrative focuses on the plight of 
Walter McMillan, who was sentenced to death for the killing of a young, pretty white woman.  
The main evidence against McMillan at trial was the bogus testimony of a criminal with a strong 
incentive to lie.  The film exposes the almost unbelievable racism and indifference to justice by 
prominent whites, such as the local sheriff and D.A.  Through guile and perseverance Stevenson 
prevails in the end.  The end of the film shows Stevenson and McMillan testifying at a U.S. 
Senate hearing on the death penalty and injustices that are so often related it in our criminal 
justice system.   
 
Bryan Stevenson founded and runs the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, AL.  
https://eji.org/about/.   One of the signature accomplishments of EJI is a national lynching 
monument and nearby museum.  The monument honors over 4,000 documented victims of 
lynching by whites in the US.  The Washington Post, NYTimes, and other prominent media 
outlets have praised it for its emotional power and the elegant grace and dignity with which it 









What was the name of Walter McMillan’s alleged victim?  
 
Who was strip searched and why?   
 
When Stevenson goes to visit McMillan’s wife, who else comes out to meet him?   
 
Why were the whites out to get McMillan?   
 
When visiting him in prison, what does Stevenson bring McMillan from his wife? 
 
What was Herb convicted of doing?   
 
What caused Herb’s mental problems?   
 
What did Darnell get arrested for?   
 
What does Ralph Myers say about his knowledge of the killing of McMillan’s alleged victim 
when he is interviewed a first time, as Stevenson discovers on tape?   
 
What did Herb request as his last song?   
 
How did Ralph Myers become so afraid of fire?   
 
After Ralph Myers recounts his testimony on the witness stand, how does the judge then rule?   
 
What show did Stevenson appear on that led to McMillan’s conviction being overturned?  
 
One of the last lines of the movie is “we all need some measure of unmerited ________”. 
 
What happened to Ray Hinton, McMillan’s cell mate friend?  (Stevenson got him exonerated in 
2015). 
 
 
